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ABSTRACT
Two of the important issues concerning the general well-beings of the working
population– wage inequality and wage health insurance– are studied. This
thesis consists three chapters. In the first chapter, we (co-authored) examine
the effects of corporate restructuring on wage patterns and inequality in a
Fortune 500 firm. We show that the restructuring, including reductions in
force and transformation in compensation systems, shifts the firm’s employ-
ment system away from the traditional internal labor market model; hence
the wage structure is penetrated by external market forces, leading to lower
starting salaries for new hires, lower returns to seniority, and a more polarized
wage distribution within the firm. The second chapter addresses the causal
relationship between dynamics of health insurance coverage and employment.
I find that at most 60% of the male non-elderly population is consistently
insured during a 12-year span while only 2% consistently uninsured. Estimat-
ing the causal relationship between coverage and employment is challenging
because of their correlation and state dependence. A model without con-
trolling for the correlation between coverage and employment suggests that
unemployment has a negative impact on the likelihood of being insured that
lasts for three years. However, after controlling the correlation between cov-
erage and employment, the effect becomes much smaller. In the final chapter
I examine the racial gap in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage as
well as how the recent hike in insurance premium affects employer offering as
well as employee enrollment in the health insurance plan. The black-white
insurance coverage gap is trivial after controlling for individual and job char-
acteristics, but the Hispanic-white gap remains significant. Around one-third
of the racial gap can be explained by the racial discrepancy in education and
another one-third by the discrepancy in job characteristics. The minorities,
nevertheless, are especially vulnerable to the loss of employer offering and
hence health insurance coverage when the insurance premium cost increases.
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The increase of wage inequality in U.S. labor market since the 1980s is well
documented in the social science literature. The literature shows that the
wage structure has polarized (Morris, Bernhardt and Handcock 1994), as the
upper-tail (the difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles) inequality
increased steadily and the lower tail (the difference between the 50th and 10th
percentiles) inequality rose sharply in the early 1980s but stopped increas-
ing and even retracted thereafter (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008, Lemieux
2008). Also, the within-group dimension of inequality has increased signifi-
cantly since the late 1970s (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993), and occupation
is playing increasingly important roles in wage determination and inequality
(Kim and Sakamoto 2008, Mouw and Kalleberg 2010).
Research on the increase in wage inequality has generated a wealth of in-
formation about this phenomenon, yet it has also raised important questions
regarding the ultimate determinants of this increase. Scholars in different
disciplines have sought to answer these questions by examining changes in
demand for certain types of skills, as well as changes in the occupational
structure. While the increase of wage inequality in the 1980s is studied
0This chapter is co-authored with Professor John Dencker in School of Labor and
Employment Relations at the University of Illinois.
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early and a lot in labor economics (Autor et al. 2008, Autor, Katz and
Krueger 1998, Borjas and Ramey 1995, Card and DiNardo 2002, Chay and
Lee 2000, DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996, Katz and Autor 1999, Katz
and Murphy 1992, Lemieux 2006, Lemieux 2008, Murphy and Welch 1992),
the roles of the firm and its human resource policies in contributing to such
increase is surprisingly not widely studied. A growing number of schol-
ars maintain that answers to these questions can be obtained by assess-
ing how corporate restructuring– a widespread and ongoing process that
substantially transformed the way firms reward employees (Cappelli, Bassi,
Katz, Knoke, Osterman and Useem 1997)– affected wage dynamics (Kim
and Sakamoto 2008, Morris and Western 1999). However, aside from impor-
tant insights on how organizational practices modify effects of restructuring
on wages (Fernandez 2001) and on the nature of work in restructured firms
(Cornfield, Campbell and McCammon 2001), it is not only unclear whether
and how restructuring influenced wage inequality, but also why– given that
multiple forms of restructuring influenced employee groups in similar ways
(Baumol, Blinder and Wolff 2003)– the rate of growth in inequality var-
ied within and across these groups (Kim and Sakamoto 2008, Mouw and
Kalleberg 2010).
Extant research provides some important insights into whether and how
restructuring influenced inequality, suggesting that there are two main ways
in which it did so: through corporate reductions in force (RIF) and through
substantial transformations in compensation systems within firms (Cappelli
et al. 1997). RIF– a large scale separation process affecting most if not all em-
ployee groups– transformed employment relationships from closed systems,
wherein employees held long term employment contracts with firms, to open
systems, wherein firms could terminate employees at will (Sørensen 2000).
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RIF thus reflected a shift in power from employees to firms’ owners, allowing
firms to rely more extensively on external market forces to govern the alloca-
tion of rewards (Cappelli 1992, Sørensen 2000). For example, through RIF,
firms could arguably replace employees with equally productive but lower-
paid individuals from the external labor market, thereby generating strong
downward pressures on starting salaries for these vulnerable employees.
By ending guarantees of life-time employment, RIF also made past im-
plicit employment contracts– in which pay was a strong function of con-
tinued employment with a firm– much less feasible. Nevertheless, because
the employment relationship was not fully open– in that it did not resemble
a spot market contract (Goldthorpe 2000)– firms had to find new ways of
motivating and rewarding employees. They typically did so by relying on
variable pay systems that reduced the degree to which wages were depen-
dent on seniority, and increased the degree to which they were dependent on
performance (Cappelli et al. 1997, Dencker 2009). The shift to variable-pay
systems has had an influence on wage inequality as, for instance, the number
of jobs wherein rewards depend solely on employee performance increased
considerably (Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent 2009). Yet, such types of re-
structuring likely affected wage inequality in other ways as it also increased
the degree to which all types of jobs were less dependent on seniority (and
more dependent on performance).
Although RIF and transformations in compensation systems have affected
employment relationships of most if not all employee groups in similar ways,
we argue that their effect on wage inequality will vary within and across em-
ployee groups due to variations in path dependencies in pay and employment
systems for each group. In particular, in order to understand the effect of the
two main restructuring forms on inequality, we maintain that it is important
3
to consider the nature of pre-restructuring job and wage structures for each
employee group– as well as variation in how and the extent to which these
group-specific structures were altered by the restructuring process.
Prior to the onset of restructuring, production workers derived their power
in the employment relationship through labor unions and collective bargain-
ing. Unions secured above market wages for these workers, and limited
within-group wage inequality through a reliance on simple job structures
and on seniority for allocating pay increases. As we will argue, restructuring
increased inequality for production workers not only due to a shift to a two-
tiered job structure (Cappelli and Sherer 1990)– wherein starting salaries of
incoming workers were lower than they were for previous cohorts– but also
to a decreased reliance on seniority (and increased reliance on performance)
to govern salaries.
By contrast, managers’ power in the pre-restructuring employment rela-
tionship was a function of their firm-specific human capital, which led to the
formation of closed (long-term) employment relationships (Sørensen 2000).
In such relationships, firms implemented incentive systems that resembled
deferred compensation contracts. In particular, managers received a start-
ing salary that was lower than they could receive in the external market,
with the implicit promise that their salaries would raise above the external
market later in their careers (Lazear 1979). As such, seniority played an
important role in salary increases, although performance was a key factor as
well. Because corporate restructuring limited firms’ ability to use implicitly
bonded contracts, they were unable to rely on seniority-based pay systems
to the extent they previously did. Instead, firms relied on market forces
to govern managerial pay– thus arguably leading to an increase in starting
salaries of managers, albeit with some limits imposed by the staying power of
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this group’s job and wage structures. Moreover, firms altered the way they
rewarded managers by increasing the link between pay and productivity.
However, since firms had previously relied in part on performance to adjust
salaries over time, the magnitude of the decrease in returns to seniority would
be lower for managers than for production workers.
Finally, the power of clerical workers in the employment relationship was
generally lower than that of managers and production workers, yet their
wages were in theory higher than what they could receive in the external
market due to efficiency wage and fairness considerations. For example, firms
paying above market wages to some employees would pay above market wages
to all employees. Yet, clerical workers generally were paid at a lower wage rate
than were production workers and managers. Thus, although restructuring
should lead to downward pressures on starting salaries of clerical workers,
their starting salaries should not fall as much as those of production workers.
Similarly, the magnitude of the decreased reliance on seniority to allocate
salary increases following restructuring should be lower for clerical workers
relative to production workers– as clerical workers’ rewards in the past were
in part a function of performance, not simply seniority (Spilerman 1986).
In short, the two forms of corporate restructuring– RIF and the trans-
formation in compensation systems– should not only increase the degree to
which firms relied on market forces to govern the allocation of rewards, but
also decrease the degree to which institutional features of internal labor mar-
kets (ILMs), such as seniority-based pay systems, affected pay adjustments.
Moreover, pre-restructuring variation across employee groups in the nature
of job and wage structures, and the institutional rules governing the alloca-
tion in rewards– combined with variation in stability of these factors over
time– should lead to post-restructuring differences in the rate of increase in
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wage inequality within and across these groups, even though the forms of
restructuring had similar effects on all groups.
In this article, we develop a framework to explain the effects of restruc-
turing on three wage patterns and outcomes: starting salaries; returns to
seniority; and wage inequality– for three key types of employees, namely
production workers, clerical workers, and managers. We analyze predictions
from our framework using data from personnel files of a Fortune 500 energy
sector firm for the period 1969 to 1993. Our study thus offers a unique in-
sight into the effects of restructuring on wage inequality. It spans a period of
stability and change and allows us to analyze at a more fine grained level the
proximate mechanisms influencing wage dynamics within and between work
groups.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We begin by dis-
cussing how the dependencies of a firm on different employee groups influ-
enced pre-restructuring wage and job structures. We then develop a frame-
work to explain how temporal variation in the inter-group stability of these
structures moderated or magnified the effect of restructuring on wage deter-
minants and outcomes. After providing information on our data and meth-
ods, we present and discuss our results.
1.2 Pre-Restructuring Wage Systems and Patterns
A key feature of the employment relationship prior to the onset of corporate
restructuring was the internal labor market (ILM)– a set of rules and pro-
cesses whereby employment and wage decisions were made within firms rather
than through a reliance on the external market (Doeringer and Piore 1971).
In ILMs, employees were buffered from market competition, with employ-
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ment separation decisions largely being the right of the employee rather than
a firm. Although ILMs were similar across employee types on several di-
mensions (e.g., entry into common portals, with promotions allocated to
internal workers), their determinants– and hence the bargaining power of
the employee– differed according to the group to which she belonged.
For production workers, unions were a critical source of bargaining power,
as they gave their members a voice in the actions of firms, and provided
protection against economic turbulence (Freeman and Medoff 1984). For
example, layoffs for production workers were largely temporary, with more
senior workers the last to be laid off, and the first to be recalled. Unions also
helped production workers secure wages that were higher than what they
would receive on the external market through collective bargaining (Kochan,
Katz and McKersie 1994), with spill-over effects increasing the welfare of
workers in non-union settings (Hirsch and Addison 1986) where firms pro-
vided high enough wages to deflect union organization drives (Kochan et
al. 1994).
In effect, unionism created a highly formalized contract wherein a partic-
ular wage rate was attached to a job, with unions controlling income over
a worker’s career by setting up seniority rules that allocated job vacancies
in a firm’s hierarchy for internal promotion (Kochan et al. 1994). These se-
niority based systems also played a key role in minimizing wage inequality
for similarly situated production workers because salary adjustments were
determined primarily by time spent in a firm and a job, with unions resisting
the use of performance-based pay.
Managerial ILMs, by contrast, arose largely from the joint investment be-
tween a firm and its managers in the managers’ human capital, resulting in a
specific asset unique to their relationship (Becker 1994). Given the long-term
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nature of these employment relationship– as both firms and managers wished
to remain attached– firms relied on incentive systems to motivate managers
(Sørensen 1994). These systems promised future rewards to ensure that man-
agers remained attached to a firm and that employees put forth the effort
sought by the firm. Thus, the employment relationship in an ILM resembled
a deferred compensation contract: a new manager accepted a below-market
wage when she joined a firm, with her wage growing at a faster rate over
time than productivity (Lazear 1979).
Managers also experienced greater within-group wage inequality than pro-
duction workers did due to the hierarchical job structures within which their
careers unfolded. In these structures, pay was generally attached to a job
level, with the wage increasing in increasing job level (Baker, Gibbs and
Holmstrom 1994). These salary grade level systems often spanned myriad
levels (Gerhart and Rynes 2003), thereby making wage inequality a struc-
tural feature of managerial ILMs. Thus, an employee’s wage was a function
of her ability to move up the organizational job ladder, and to earn salary
increases within a given job level. Promotions and pay adjustments were
dependent on both seniority (Medoff and Abraham 1980) and performance
(Rosenbaum 1979).
ILMs also provided employment protection to clerical workers. Although
these workers obtained a lower wage than other employees, reflective of their
relatively lower bargaining power– in theory, their wages were higher than
what they would receive in the external market due for instance to efficiency
wage rationales (i.e., above market wages motivated workers). In addition,
the fairness variant of efficiency wage theory predicts that a firm paying above
market wages to some of its workers would pay above market wages to all
of its workers, as scholars have uncovered in studies of inter-industry wage
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profiles (Krueger and Summers 1988).
Similar to managers, a key means of wage growth for clerical workers was
a promotion to a higher ranked job, as well as salary growth within a given
job level that was driven primarily by seniority. For example, promotion
competitions were less common for clerical workers than for managers, as
their upward moves were determined by seniority in a job, and some minimum
level of performance (Spilerman 1986). In addition, career ladders of clerical
workers were shorter than those of managers, leading to lower within-group
wage inequality.
In sum, prior to the onset of corporate restructuring, the different determi-
nants of ILMs and the job and wage structures within them lead to differences
in the extent of inequality within work groups, as well as differences across
these groups in the extent to which pay was determined by seniority. Within
group inequality was greatest among managers and clerical workers relative
to production workers. Average wages levels were highest for managers, and
lowest for clerical workers, with production workers’ average wages falling in
the middle of these two distributions. Finally, seniority was an important
determinant of salary increases for all employee groups, but it was more im-
portant for production workers relative to clerical workers, and for clerical
workers relative to managers.
1.3 Corporate Restructuring and Wages
Corporate restructuring refers to a process affecting workers at all orga-
nizational levels (Frenkel 2003). It involves the positive language of re-
ducing costs, increasing profits, improving product and service quality, in-
creasing share price, and responding quickly to opportunities (Hirsch and
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De Soucey 2006). Due to corporate restructuring, traditional career models
such as long-term employment and job security are less common (Cappelli
et al. 1997, Cornfield et al. 2001, Hallock 2009), as “new economy” em-
ployment models redefine career paths, risks, and networks (Hirsch and
De Soucey 2006).
Corporate restructuring began in the early 1980s, and was driven by a
number of factors (Baumol et al. 2003). For example, demand shifts stem-
ming from increased foreign competition pressured firms to make extensive
changes in the way they operated (Baumol et al. 2003). These pressures
were exacerbated in the early 1980s by corporate raiders who engaged in
hostile takeovers (Shleifer and Summers 1998). Although takeovers were re-
stricted by the late 1980s (Jensen 1993), the pace of restructuring increased
afterwards due to pressures from institutional investors (Useem 1996).
Corporate restructuring has been widespread, with most large firms re-
structuring multiple times (Cascio, Young and Morris 1997). The two most
common types of restructuring are corporate RIF and transformations in
compensation and performance management systems (Cappelli et al. 1997).
Firms engaging in RIF ended guarantees of protection against layoff, making
continued employment a function of market rather than non-market factor-
sas firms had greater flexibility in replacing an employee if they could find a
more productive one at a given wage rate (or a less expensive one with the
same level of productivity). Thus a firm would no longer promise long-term
employment and job security to its workers; instead, employment outcomes
varied dramatically by types of employees, amounts of human capital, and
employee bargaining power relative to the employer (Cappelli et al. 1997, Kim
and Sakamoto 2010).
In effect, RIF increased the degree to which market forces penetrated a
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firm, and decreased the degree to which a firm relied on internal arrange-
ments to link productivity and wages (Sørensen 1994). In addition, firms
that transformed their compensation and performance management systems
dramatically altered the way they linked wages and productivity by making
pay more variable (i.e., more dependent on performance and less dependent
on seniority) (Cappelli et al. 1997). As we show below, both forms of restruc-
turing have significant implications for key wage determinants and outcomes.
1.3.1 The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Starting
Salaries
Due to the onset of corporate restructuring and the shift to more “open”
employment contracts (Sørensen 2000), market forces play an increasingly
important role in wage determination within a firm. These forces should
have an impact on wages of employees at different career stages, but– due to
differential determinants of bargaining power prior to restructuring, and to
variation in the strength of path dependencies in job and wage structures that
reflected these prior power differences– they arguably will have the greatest
impact at the main interface between the firm and the market, namely on
starting salaries.
As noted, the relationship between the wages attached to entry level jobs
and those in the external market differed by employee type, with production
workers obtaining an above-market wage due to practices and policies of
unions, managers receiving a below-market wage due to the nature of their
human capital investment, and clerical workers receiving an above-market
wage due to efficiency wage and fairness considerations. An implication is
that a firm could obtain a less expensive production worker from the external
market and/or simply lower the wage provided to new entrants. This notion
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is consistent with research on how firms decrease labor costs while preserving
the wages and benefits of current workers, namely by adopting “two-tiered”
wage systems (Cappelli and Sherer 1990, Martin and Peterson 1987, McFarlin
and Frone 1990). As such, wages for entry level positions would move toward
the market wage for such jobs– indicating that starting salaries of production
workers should decline considerably following the onset of restructuring.
Due to the use of deferred compensation schemes, the starting salaries of
managers prior to the onset of corporate restructuring in theory were lower
than the spot-contract external market wage that they could otherwise re-
ceive. Thus, starting salaries of managers should increase following the onset
of restructuring– as firms found it difficult to rely on deferred compensa-
tion arrangements, and hence would be forced to offer market salaries to
new entrants. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this increase might be limited
by pre-restructuring job and wage structures, which have been resilient to
change (Gerhart and Rynes 2003). For example, the tight and extensive link-
ages between jobs and wages in managerial ILMs could limit the degree to
which firms can raise or lower wages at different points in a manager’s career.
That is, adjusting a wage range for entry level positions might require a firm
to modify wage ranges for higher level positions, thereby limiting the upward
pressure of market forces on starting salaries of managers.
Finally, to the extent that wages of clerical workers prior to the onset of
restructuring were adjusted upward due to efficiency wage considerations,
their starting salaries should decline accordingly following the onset of cor-
porate restructuring, as institutional factors that exerted upward pressures
on wages are replaced by market forces. Moreover, the low bargaining power
of clerical workers relative to a firm’s owners would limit their ability to pre-
vent firms from adjusting their wages to the market wage. However, because
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starting salaries of clerical workers prior to the onset of restructuring did not
deviate from the market wages as much as the starting salaries of production
workers did, the magnitude of the decrease will be lower for clerical workers
than for production workers.
In sum, the variation in a firm’s dependence on the three types of employee
groups prior to and during corporate restructuring will lead to different pat-
terns in starting salary dynamics for these groups. In particular, the starting
salaries of production workers will decline the most following the onset of cor-
porate restructuring– with starting salaries of clerical workers declining at a
lower rate, and starting salaries of managers increasing in this time period.
1.3.2 The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Returns to
Seniority
Because RIF limited firms’ ability to use deferred compensation contracts–
and because employment relationships were not fully open following restruc-
turing (Goldthorpe 2000)– firms needed to find new ways of motivating and
rewarding employees. One of the main ways they did so was to implement
variable pay systems with a goal of increasing the link between pay and
productivity (Cappelli et al. 1997).
Prior to the onset of corporate restructuring, seniority played a key role in
salary adjustments and promotions (Doeringer and Piore 1971)– particularly
for production workers, as unions resisted the implantation of any type of
incentive system. Yet, seniority also played a non-trivial role in career out-
comes for managers and clerical workers (Spilerman 1986). Following the on-
set of corporate restructuring, the determinants of salary adjustments shifted
from seniority to performance as firms implemented performance-based com-
pensation systems in locations where they were previously restricted, and
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revamped existing systems. That is, restructuring firms reduced the extent
to which wage increases were dependent on seniority in a job and/or firm,
and increased the degree to which wage increases depended on performance.
The effect of restructuring on returns to seniority will affect all employee
groups, albeit with the magnitude of the effect varying across groups due to
differences in the degree to which each group’s pay increases were previously
dependent on seniority. That is, the extent to which restructuring affected
wage determinants depends on the degree to which each group relied on se-
niority in allocating rewards prior to the onset of the transformation process.
For production workers, implementing pay-for-performance systems– which
had been resisted by unions– would arguably lead to significant reductions in
returns to seniority. That is, because the baseline starting point for returns
to seniority would be higher for production workers than for other employ-
ees due to the collective bargaining contract, the magnitude of the effect
of restructuring on wage determinants would be greater for these workers
than for managers and clerical workers. In addition, the magnitude of this
effect should be higher for clerical workers than for managers, since clerical
workers were rewarded for seniority to a greater extent than were managers
(Spilerman 1986).
1.3.3 The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Wage
Inequality
Much of the research on wage inequality focuses on how broad forces such as
occupations and changes in demands for certain skills influences wage distri-
butions of different employees. We do not deny that these forces exist, but,
like Fernandez (2001), we do argue that the way they affect wage patterns
and outcomes will be influenced in non-trivial ways by the systems, practices,
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policies, and actions of firms.
Although extant research often focuses on one type of restructuring, it is
important to consider the effect of multiple forms of organizational change in
order to understand not only whether restructuring affected wage inequality,
but also how. In particular, the two types of restructuring we study should
both have a substantial impact on wage differences within employee groups,
as well as between them, albeit with the rate of growth varying across groups
due to different path dependencies.
Wage inequality for production workers will increase substantially as a
result of restructuring initiatives, not only as the lower end of the wage
distribution is thickened by two-tier wage systems, but also as returns to
performance increase wage dispersion for these workers. Wage inequality for
managers will be less changed due to market pressures on starting salaries,
but within-group dispersion should increase as institutional determinants of
wages are reduced and those for performance are increased. Wage distri-
butions for clerical workers should increase slightly as market forces push
their starting wages downward, and as seniority becomes a less important
determinant of wage increases (and performance becomes more important
in this regard). In short, given the predicted changes in wage patterns, we
argue that wage inequality should increase for all types of worker groups due
to corporate restructuring, albeit for different reasons and at differing rates
within and across these groups.
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1.4 Organizational Setting, Data, Measures, and
Methods
1.4.1 Organizational Setting
We analyze data obtained from confidential personnel files of a Fortune 500
energy sector firm for the period 1969 to 1993. Like most other large firms
in the same time period, the firm had an ILM composed of hierarchically-
ranked salary grade levels (SGLs) (Gerhart and Rynes 2003, Spilerman and
Petersen 1999). In the SGL system, jobs were evaluated and assigned to
levels to which salary ranges were attached. Non-exempt employees (clerical,
secretarial, administrative, and support staff) were in SGL 1 through 9, and
exempt employees (managers and professionals) were in SGL 7 through 24.
Roughly 25% of employees were paid on a salaried basis and were not a part
of the SGL system. We use the terms “clerical workers,” “managers,” and
“production workers” to denote these three broad categories (non-exempt,
exempt, and salaried), respectively. Top managers, such as CEOs and vice
presidents, were considered by the firm to be “above” the SGL system and
are not included in our analyses. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for
employees in the three work groups.
Like other firms in the 1980s and 1990s, the firm we study restructured
multiple times (Cascio et al. 1997). The firm undertook two RIF during the
1980s and early 1990s, with significant cutbacks during each wave, with the
first RIF occurring in the early- to mid-1980s, and the second in the early
1990s. Soon after the first RIF, the firm transformed its reward system from
one in which pay was determined by seniority in a job to one in which pay
was contingent on an employee’s performance relative to similar employees.
This new system was similar to other firms’ systems at the time: the firm sent
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senior managers to other firms to study the changes that these firms made,
and hired consultants to help design and implement its own system. As part
of the change, performance records were eliminated after pay decisions were
made– according to the firm, it sought to minimize potential bias in future
performance rankings, in that prior performance would be less likely to be
taken into account in measuring current performance. Although the firm was
not an industry leader in the implementation of the restructuring events, it
tended to take these actions at roughly the same time its competitors did.
1.4.2 Data Set
The firm provided career records of a 25% random sample of U.S. employees
between 1969 and 1993. Only employees hired after 1969 are included in
our analyses in order to avoid potential bias caused by incomplete career
information of employees hired before 1968 (Petersen 1995). In the original
data set provided by the firm, a new record was added whenever there was
a “career change” (such as salary change, promotion, demotion, etc.) for
each employee. To transform the data into a yearly panel, we keep only the
last record for each employee in each year. Hence, we have a “snapshot” of
all employees in the firm in the end of each year. All career information,
such as promotion, transfer, etc., is nevertheless preserved and merged into
the snapshot of the year in which such an event occurred. Our final sample
includes 22,187 employees: 6,773 production workers (34,808 employee-year
records), 10,099 clerical workers (46,173 records), and 8,517 managers (67,276
records). An employee who experiences change in type of work (for example,
being promoted from a clerical worker to a manager) is counted in all the
types that he or she ever belongs to. Thus, the summed number of employees
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in each occupation type (6,773+10,099+8,517) is greater than total numbers
of employees (22,187).
1.4.3 Dependent Variable
The salary of the employee is our main variable of interest. The data set
provided nominal annual salaries, which we deflated to 2007 U.S. Dollars. In
our analyses, we also use the logarithm transformation of the real (inflation-
adjusted) salary when necessary.
1.4.4 Independent Variables
We assess effects of corporate restructuring on wage patterns, determinants
and inequality by examining the relations between wages and two main in-
dependent variables: restructuring and seniority. The various methods we
use require different operationalization of the restructuring variable, which
we will address in further details when we discuss our methods and results.
In our analysis we focus on how the first RIF and the change in compen-
sation system that occurred in the 1980s changed wage outcomes (since our
data end in 1993, they do not provide a long enough window for a precise
assessment of the second RIF on wages).
Information on seniority can be constructed from date of entry into the
firm, job level, and date of promotion or demotion. We calculate an em-
ployee’s firm tenure (years elapsed between entry into the firm and time of
observation) and job tenure (years elapsed since starting the current job) in
each year. In robustness tests, we consider how an employee’s performance
influences his or her wage. Because the firm eliminated performance evalu-
ations, we attempt to impute this information from the data by regressing
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wages on all individual characteristics observable in the data and estimat-
ing the regression residuals.1 This performance proxy is time varying and is
updated each year.2
Finally, instead of using separate dummy variables representing different
broad occupations (production, managerial, and clerical) and including a full
set of interaction between the dummy variables and all other independent
and control variables, we estimate separate regressions for these three broad
occupations.
1.4.5 Control Variables
We control for variables common in studies of employment outcomes in large
firms (DiPrete 2005, Elvira 2001, Petersen and Saporta 2004, Spilerman and
Petersen 1999): age, education (a set of dummy variables representing the
highest level of education attained: high school dropouts, high school grad-
uates, college graduates, and post-secondary), salary grade level (entered as
a set of dummy variables rather than a linear term), race (non-white versus
white), sex, division, starting salary, and starting salary grade level. We also
include the union coverage for a given employee in each year as a dummy
variable.
Additionally, we control for effects of the different divisions with five
1The wage can be expressed as an equation of individual and job characteristics (ed-
ucation, job level, seniority, etc.), performance, an idiosyncratic component, and random
errors. By regressing wages on individual and job characteristics as well as individual
fixed effects, we obtain residuals of performance plus the random component in the orig-
inal wage equation. The coefficient on this imputed performance term, hence, should be
interpreted as the true returns to performance plus returns to residuals.
2An alternative and arguably more direct assessment of performance is promotion fre-
quency, as high performers are likely to be promoted more often than other employees.
However, in our identification strategy detailed below, we include employee-job level fixed
effects to correct for the positive correlation between tenure and individual heterogeneity.
Since a promotion is by definition a move from a lower to a higher job level and hence
initiates a new employee-job level spell, the rate of promotion will not capture performance
when employee-job level fixed effects are included in the regression.
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dummy variables: one for the main corporate office (the omitted case), a
dummy for each of three main divisions, and a fifth dummy that contained
several tertiary divisions. To correct for potential selection bias due to job
matching or turnover, we further control for the likelihood of departure
in a year whereby we first modeled a multinomial employment separation
measure– coded one if an employee retired, two if an employee resigned or
was laid off, discharged, or terminated, and zero otherwise– from which we
generated a predicted likelihood of employment separation that was included
as a control measure using various approaches.3 Preliminary analysis shows
our results are similar no matter which set of predicted likelihoods we use.
3We tried two different strategies to generate the predicted likelihood of separation:
a two-step logistic regression model (Ahn and Powell 1993, Lee and Maddala 1985) and
a competing risks Cox model (Castilla 2005, Phillips 2001). Both strategies have their
own advantages and shortcomings. As an extension of the conventional Heckman two-
step model to correct for sample selection bias, the method proposed in Ahn and Powell
(1993) use a multinomial logit model in the first step to allow more than 2 outcomes in the
selection equation. In our analysis, although an employee either left the firm or not during
the data period, different reasons of separation (retirement, resignation, layoff, discharge,
etc.) might be the results of very different wage patterns and career types, and it is more
appropriate to distinguish various reasons of separation/turnover rather than counting
them all together as a single type of separation. And hence, the two-step model in Ahn and
Powell (1993) provides a satisfying way to control for likelihood of separation. However, as
the hazard of separation could be different in different years for two otherwise equivalent
employees (for example, early retirements, layoffs and discharges are more likely when the
firm engaged in RIFs), so it is also necessary to include 24 dummy variables indicating
25 years in the first step to capture the effect of time and external shocks on separation.
Doing so is essentially estimating a hazard model with more restriction– a multinomial
logistic regression imposes linearity constraints in its parameters while a semi-parametric
Cox hazard model does not. Therefore we also estimated competing risks Cox proportional
hazard model, again counting different reasons of separation separately, to generate the
likelihood of separation. The potential problem with applying Cox proportional hazard in
our analysis, however, is that the “proportionality” assumption might be violated (Allison
1982, Allison 1984). For example, in our data it is observed that demotions had a negative
effect on wages and were associated with layoff. In a Cox model, the proportionality
assumption implies that both negative effects on wages and higher risks of being laid off
only occur after a demotion is observed. This assumption is likely to be violated in our
context, since it is a sequence of poor performance, rather than demotion, the observable
outcome of poor performance in the data, that is associated layoff. Consequently, the
effect of demotion on the likelihood of separation should take place earlier than the point
when a demotion is observed, hence violates the proportionality assumption. Although
neither of these two strategies is perfect, they do generate qualitatively the same predicted
likelihood of separation.
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We opted for the competing risks Cox proportional hazard model. Finally,
we impose a linear time trend in the wage patterns in order to capture any
macroeconomic impacts on the wage level.
1.4.6 Methods
We use various methods to analyze our data. Here, we provide an overview
of these techniques and address additional details when we present the re-
sults. We first use graphic presentations to illustrate the change in wage
patterns within the firm over time. We then analyze how the changes in the
firm’s compensation system affected returns to seniority using fixed effect
estimations similar to the two-step strategy in Topel (1991). In other words,
returns to tenure are estimated using a model in which employee-job level
fixed effects are added, so we only identify the returns to job tenure within
the same salary grade level, regardless of firm tenure. We adopt this strategy
to eliminate potential bias in our estimation caused by other factors that can
possibly attenuate the relationship between tenure and wages, such as the
positive correlation between tenure and individual heterogeneity (Abraham
and Farber 1987, Altonji and Shakotko 1987, Altonji and Williams 1993, Al-
tonji and Williams 2005, Topel 1991). This set of fixed-effect models is
identified based on a dummy variable indicating the onset of the changing
compensation system and its interaction with seniority (i.e., we assess how
the implementation of the performance-based compensation system affected
wage levels and returns to seniority).
A semi-parametric variance decomposition method proposed in DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996) is used to assess how restructuring practices, in-
cluding RIF and the implementation of performance-based compensation,
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changed the wage distribution– and hence wage inequality– within the firm.
This method decomposes the change in the wage distribution over time into
the “compositional effect” (caused by changes in the composition of indi-
vidual and job characteristics) and the “wage structure effect” (caused by
the changes in the way workers are compensated). Thus, we can observe
the changes in the wage distribution net of changes in workers composition.
Unlike the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973), this
method also allows different treatment effects across different segments of
the wage distribution, enabling us to assess effects of firm restructuring at
various points across the wage distribution.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Starting
Salaries
In order to assess the effect of corporate restructuring on starting salaries,
we provide graphical depictions of wage patterns in Figures 1.1 through 1.3
(which replicate Figure 2 in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994)). The solid
baseline in each graph connects the mean starting wage of the cohort entering
the firm each year. The line deviating from the baseline every year indicates
year-by-year mean wages of a specific cohort in a given year.
Consistent with the predictions of our framework, figure 1.1 shows a sig-
nificant trend of decreasing starting salaries for production workers in the
early 1980s (when the first RIF occurred), with newly hired employees in
the mid-1980s receiving a salary roughly $20,000 lower than for newly hired
employees in the late 1970s. A regression of starting salary on individual
and entry job characteristics, as well as a time effect, shows that on average,
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starting salaries for production workers are 30% lower after than before the
first RIF. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 also show that, as predicted, changes in starting
salaries for managers and clerical workers are not as drastic as were those
for production workers– exhibiting a slight upward trend in starting salaries
over time for managers and a decrease for clerical workers. Regression results
confirm the patterns in the graphs, as they indicate that managers and cleri-
cal workers experienced a 2% increase and a 4% decrease in starting salaries
in post-RIF years, respectively.
To further explore the impact of restructuring on starting salary, we follow
the literature on the effect of deregulation on wage outcomes (Card 1986,
Cre´mieux 1996, Hendricks 1994, Peoples 1998) and use external wage data
as a comparison to the wage patterns within the firm. We extract the wage
data for people in the same industry as our firm from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) as a comparison to the wage patterns within the firm that we
study.4 The CPS has around 100 to 300 people in this specific industry in
each year, which allows us to calculate the mean salary at the industry level.
We also use the CPS sampling weight to ensure the representativeness of the
CPS data.
Figure 1.4 indicates that mean wage patterns for production workers, man-
4We are not aware of any single publicly available data set that has a large enough
sample at the three-digit industry level as well as covers the same period of time as our
firm data. We ultimately combine the wage information from two different data sets: the
May supplement to the Current Population Survey between 1973 and 1978 as well as the
CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) data between 1979 and 1994. These
combined data sets correspond to wage series between 1972 and 1993 since the CPS asks
about the wage information in the previous year. To our best knowledge, there are no
comparable public data sets that provide wage information between 1969 and 1972. The
May CPS and the CPS-MORG use the same question to collect weekly earnings, which we
multiply by 50 to obtain the annual earnings. However, the wage information in the May
CPS and the CPS-MORG are both top-coded, that is, if an individual has earnings above
the top-coding threshold, her earnings are coded as that certain threshold. Following the
convention (Lemieux 2006), we multiply the top-coded wage records by a factor of 1.4
before calculating the mean wage for each year.
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agers, and clerical workers in the firm that we study were pretty stable in the
1970s. However, production workers experienced a real wage decrease in the
1980s, while clerical workers and managers experienced real wage increases.
The CPS trend rose slightly in 1970s but became essentially flat after 1980.5
Overall, the wage series in our firm and the CPS followed a similar pattern in
1970s but decoupled in 1980s, when managers and clericals experienced wage
increases whereas production workers experienced a wage decline. This pe-
riod coincides with the onset of corporate restructuring in the firm we study,
and the decoupling of the trends in these wage series is strong evidence that
the firm was trying to both retain high-performance employees with higher
salaries and compress the wage structure of the production workers. Further-
more, we decompose the CPS series in figure 1.4 by occupations comparable
to those in the firm that we study. Figure 1.5 depicts the comparison between
production workers in the CPS and in the firm. It is clear that the “firm
wage premium” of production workers quickly disappeared in the 1980s. On
the other hand, figures ?? and 1.6 suggest that the wage patterns in the firm
follow very closely to those in the CPS. And hence, the comparison between
the wage patterns in the CPS and our firm is a strong evidence that the wage
patterns in the firm changed fundamentally in the 1980s, especially for the
production workers.
Overall, figures 1.1 through 1.3 show that although the first wave of restruc-
turing, in the form of RIF, had a non-trivial influence on starting salaries–
particularly with respect to production workers– they also indicate that the
market forces argument is insufficient to explain all of the growth in wage
5Although the CPS provides the three-digit occupation code, we are unable to extract
groups that are similar to the production, clerical, and managerial employees because some
of these detailed occupations span across these groups (primarily because our occupations
span across the firm’s hierarchy).
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inequality within the different employee groups. For example, figure 1.1 indi-
cates that although starting salaries of production workers declined consid-
erably following the onset of restructuring, these recent cohorts nevertheless
experienced more rapid wage growth with time on the job than did the older
cohorts. To assess what factors explain these career changes, in the following
section we assess how the later wave of restructuring, the implementation of
the performance-based pay system, changed post-hiring wage outcomes.
1.5.2 The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Returns to
Seniority and Performance
We measure seniority using job tenure, which is the number of years that
have elapsed since the start of the current job.6 In table 1.2, we provide
employee-job level fixed effect (Topel 1991) estimation results for production
workers.7 Model 1 is the baseline model. Model 2 adds a dummy variable
6Job tenure is not necessarily an integer because a promotion could have occurred in
any month in a given year. Empirically, we first calculate months elapsed since promotion,
and then divide this number by 12 (but do not round the result).
7Assessing the effect of changes in the firm’s performance management system on re-
turns to seniority is not straight forward. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) proposed a model
where the returns to seniority is decomposed into returns to “true” seniority and returns
to job matching. They argued that ordinary least square (OLS) estimate of returns to
seniority without controlling for individual heterogeneity can be upward biased because
good job matches tend to last longer than bad matches, and OLS estimates of returns
to seniority hence include both returns to seniority and returns to matching. To correct
for the bias, they proposed an instrumental variable approach to isolate the effect of se-
niority on wages from the effect of job matching. Topel (1991), in turn, claimed that
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) might over-correct the bias and proposed a two-step first
difference estimator. Altonji and Williams (2005) revisited the literature and concluded
that the direction and magnitude of bias depend on the error structure of the data and
is an empirical question. According to Altonji and Shakotko (1987), it is very likely that
the returns to seniority in our data would be much higher than the population mean in
the U.S. labor market. Due to the nature of our data, employees with longer tenure have
more observations than those with short tenure. If people with longer tenure tend to have
better job matches, the overall returns to job matching (which is not observable and will
be attributed to returns to seniority in an OLS model) may be high. We hence adopt a
similar strategy as the one used in Topel (1991) and include employee-job level fixed effect
in our model. Consequently, we look at the returns to seniority within a job level to avoid
any spurious correlations between wages and firm tenure across salary grade levels. Since
we include employee-job level fixed effects, only the returns to job tenure are identifiable.
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indicating records observed after the compensation policy change (which, as
noted, occurred a few years after the first RIF). It indicates that salaries of
production workers following the transformation in the performance man-
agement system were 2.7% lower than in prior years, even after accounting
for the economy-wide wage trends in the 1980s, such as the rising returns to
college education caused by the changes in relative demand for and supply
of high-skilled workers.
Model 3 of table 1.2 adds interaction terms of the restructuring measure
and the job tenure measure. As such, the coefficient on the interaction term
indicates how returns to seniority changed due to the transformation in the
firm’s performance management system. The interpretations of these coeffi-
cients become complicated with multiple interaction terms, multiple squared
terns, and the linear trends. Thus, in figure 1.8, we provide a graph that
summarizes returns to seniority based on results in Model 3.
The top-left panel in figure 1.8 illustrates the (marginal) effect of seniority
in both pre- and post-restructuring years based on the regression results.
Returns (in terms of percent increase in salary) are on the vertical axis, and
seniority (in terms of years of job tenure) is on the horizontal axis. This
graph clearly shows that, for production workers, post-restructuring returns
to seniority are only half as large as the pre-restructuring returns.
Model 4 adds the interaction between our imputed performance measure
and the restructuring variable, and provides a robustness check for the se-
niority results in Model 3. Findings are consistent with our framework, as
the positive coefficients on the newly added terms indicate that the return
to performance increased after the implementation of the new compensation
To assess the change in the returns to seniority and other factors, we add the interaction
terms between dummy variables indicating records observed after restructuring and the
variables of interest (job tenure, squared term of job tenure, etc.).
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system.
Table 1.3 provides fixed effects estimation results for managers, and ta-
ble 1.4 provides these results for clerical workers. The graphs correspond-
ing to Model 3 in each table are shown in top-right and bottom-left panels
of figure 1.8, show that managers experienced lower returns to seniority in
post-restructuring years than before, but clerical workers did not experience
a visually substantial change in this regard. These results are thus not fully
consistent with our predictions, as they suggest that the shift away from
seniority-based systems was stronger for managers than clericals. However,
they do indicate that, consistent with our predictions, the effect of the imple-
mentation of the performance management system had a stronger negative
effect on returns to seniority for production workers than for managers and
clerical workers. Moreover, the results also support the path dependence
notions in our framework, in that salary ranges in the SGL system limited
wage fluctuation in post-restructuring years.8
A potential problem in our estimates of returns to seniority is simultaneity–
that employees naturally become older after the restructuring than before.
Due to decreasing employee productivity and employer learning, returns
to seniority may decrease for older workers (Gibbons and Waldman 2006).
Hence, the decreasing returns to seniority that we observe can be a result
of restructuring or of employees becoming older. A robustness test is to
re-estimate the models in tables 1.2 through 1.4 using employees who were
hired and quit before the onset of corporate restructuring. Since restructur-
ing would have no impact on employees who quit before the restructuring
8Results from analyses of employees who were hired before the onset restructuring and
were still employed after the compensation system change were largely consistent with
what we conclude above. In addition, results for tenure and performance measures were
robust to an analysis where we include dummy measures of job/task types (and their
interaction with the restructuring measure).
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even started, we would expect to find no difference in returns to seniority over
time for this group. Empirically, this test requires us to re-run the models in
tables 1.2 through 1.4 using employees who are not exposed to restructuring
(those who quit the firm before 1980) and assume a hypothetical “restruc-
turing” occurred in an arbitrary year in the 1970s. That is, in our robustness
test, we used employees who were only with the firm in the 1970s, and we
called the early 1970s period as “pre-restructuring” and the late 1970s as
“post-restructuring.” This hypothetical “restructuring” is thus essentially a
placebo that should not have the effect on wage patterns, indicating that we
would expect to find no difference in returns to seniority between the early-
and late-1970s. We found indeed what we expected in the robustness test:
returns to seniority were significant throughout the 1970s, but the magnitude
of returns stayed constant. In other words, the robustness tests show the de-
creasing returns to seniority only occurred in the 1980s, suggesting what we
find in tables 1.2 through 1.4 are the true effect of corporate restructuring
on wage determinants, rather than an artificial result of decreasing returns
to seniority over time as employees become older.
1.5.3 The Effect of Corporate Restructuring on Wage
Inequality
We assess effects of corporate restructuring on wage inequality by first pro-
viding a graphical depiction of wage percentiles by employee group in figures
1.9 through 1.11. The 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th wages percentiles in each
year are shown in each graph. Figure 1.9 indicates that, overall, lower tail
inequality (the difference between the 50th and 10th percentiles) increased
dramatically for production workers. In addition, figure 1.10 shows that
upper tail inequality (the difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles)
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increased faster than lower tail inequality for managers, whereas figure 1.11
demonstrates that both upper tail and lower tail inequality increased at sim-
ilar paces for clerical workers. Thus, for production workers, inequality in-
creased more rapidly in the lower end of the wage distribution following
restructuring, whereas for managers, inequality increased more rapidly in
the upper end of the wage distribution.
Although figures 1.9 through 1.11 show how the wage dispersion changes
over time, the wage distribution can change due to a “compositional effect”
and a “wage structure effect” (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 2010), where the
composition effect refers to the changes in the distribution of individual and
job characteristics and the wage structure effect refers to the change in the
way that people are compensated. In our context, the change in inequality
caused by changes in the compensation system belongs to the wage structure
effect, while the change in inequality due to layoffs and hiring freezes should
be categorized as the compositional effect. In order to separate these two
effects, we focus on the change in inequality caused by the wage structure
effect and ask the question “what would the post-restructuring wage distribu-
tion have been had employee characteristics resembled their pre-restructuring
levels.”9
We use a semi-parametric approach proposed in DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (1996), henceforth DFL, to construct a “counterfactual” pre-restructuring
wage distribution in which each individual employee is weighted in a way
that overall employee characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, job level,
9Alternatively, the question can be asked as “what would the pre-restructuring wage
distribution have been had employee characteristics remained at the post-restructuring
level?” This, however, only influences which time period is used as the base group and
which distribution is weighted. Although Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (Fortin et al. 2010)
show that using different base groups may change the decomposition outcome, such is not
the case for our study.
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tenure, and union coverage) resemble post-restructuring levels. Such a “coun-
terfactual” distribution is then compared to the actual post-restructuring
wage distribution to obtain the pure effect of restructuring on wages. Hence,
the discrepancy between the “counterfactual” and the actual distributions
can be interpreted as the change in wage distribution due to factors other
than employee characteristics.
Figures 1.12 through 1.14 show results of the DFL decomposition for
pre- and post-restructuring periods. We use the 1981 wage distribution as
the “pre-restructuring” distribution and the 1990 distribution as the “post-
restructuring” one.10 There are three panels in each graph: the dashed line
in the top-left panel denotes the pre-restructuring real wage distribution, and
the solid line in the same panel denotes a “weighted” real wage distribution
(the distribution that would have prevailed if the employee characteristics
prior to restructuring were the same as those following restructuring). The
solid line in the top-right panel is the same as the solid line in top-left panel,
and the dashed line is the actual real wage distribution following the onset
of restructuring. The difference between the two lines in the top-right panel
is shown in the bottom-left panel.
If there is no difference in the two lines in the top-right panel, a horizontal
line at zero should be observed in the bottom-left panel– which would indi-
cate that employees across the entire range of the wage distribution are paid
in the same way prior to and following restructuring (conditional on their
characteristics). However, we do not observe a straight line in the bottom-
left panel in figure 1.12. Instead, we observe some positive difference when
the logarithm of real wage is around ten (equivalent to $22,026 in 2007 Dol-
10Since the selection of timing is somewhat arbitrary, we assessed the decomposition
using alternative pre-restructuring years (e.g., 1980 or 1982) and post-restructuring years
(1989 or 1991). In all cases, patterns were similar.
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lars) and eleven (equivalent to $59,874 in 2007 Dollars), and we observe some
negative difference when logarithm of real wage is between ten and eleven.
This pattern indicates that, compared to the pre-restructuring period, fol-
lowing the onset of restructuring fewer people were paid between $22,026 and
$59,874 (in 2007 Dollars), and more people were paid around $22,026 and
around $59,874 (conditional on worker characteristics). Briefly, the wage dis-
tribution after restructuring is more polarized than before, holding employee
characteristics constant.
Similar inspections in the bottom-left panels of figures 1.13 and 1.14 sug-
gest the wage distributions for managers and clericals are more skewed to
the left following restructuring than before. Thus, following restructuring
the firm is more likely to pay a higher wage than a lower wage to these work-
ers when employee and job characteristics are held constant. Since wages are
measured in logarithm form, a “shift” in the compensation scheme indicates
increasing wage inequality. Moreover, the discrepancy between weighted pre-
restructuring and post-restructuring distributions is larger for managers than
for clerical workers, implying that compensation system change impacted
managers more than clerical workers.11 Similar to the robustness test of
changing returns to seniority in the previous session, we also performed an
alternative set of the DFL decomposition, in which we used 1971 as the
pre-restructuring wage distribution and 1980 as the post-restructuring one.
We did not find significant changes in wage distributions between 1970 and
1980, again confirming the effect of the corporate restructuring in the 1980s
11Additional tests indicate that the variance of log wages grew substantially for all
employees following the onset of restructuring: increasing from 0.122 (pre-restructuring)
to 0.161 (post-restructuring) for production worker, from 0.111 to 0.135 for managers,
and from 0.083 to 0.098 for clericals. Thus, the changes in wage distributions shown in
figures 1.12 through 1.14 correspond to a roughly 20% to 30% increase in the variance of
log wages.
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on wage inequality. Overall, the DFL results indicate that wage inequality
increased for all types of employees in post-restructuring years.12
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Our findings indicate that corporate restructuring had a non-trivial influence
on wage inequality due to two key firm-level changes during this widespread
process: an increased reliance on market forces to set wages, and a decreased
reliance on seniority in salary adjustments due to changes in compensation
systems. These two factors influenced all employee groups in similar ways,
yet due to differences in path dependencies for the three employee groups–
the extent of the effect varied for these groups, leading to substantial within-
and between-group variation in wage determinants and outcomes.
Production workers– whose pre-restructuring wages were affected by unions
and by seniority-driven rules limiting wage differences– experienced the most
dramatic change in wage inequality from corporate restructuring. In partic-
ular, the firm’s reliance on external forces to set wage levels led to a two-
tiered wage structure, where starting salaries of new entrants were reduced by
roughly one-half relative to pre-restructuring years. Yet, while the transfor-
mation in starting salaries is necessary to explain the effect of restructuring
on increased wage inequality for production workers, it is not sufficient. In
particular, the firm’s use of performance-based compensation systems fur-
ther increased wage inequality within this work group in non-trivial ways.
By contrast, although corporate restructuring increased the wage inequality
12In a set of tests, we applied the DFL decomposition to both restructuring practices
separately, rather than assessing the total effect of restructuring as in figures 1.12 through
1.14. This alternative set of results supports our claims that (1) following the first RIF,
production workers experienced downward wage pressures while managers and clerical
workers faced upward pressures; and (2) within-group inequality increased following the
implementation of the new performance-based pay system.
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inherent in pre-restructuring job and wage structures for managers and cler-
ical workers, the extent of this increase was limited by the staying power of
these structures.
Our findings have a number of important implications for research on in-
equality, organizations, and labor markets. First, consistent with claims of a
growing number of scholars (Kim and Sakamoto 2008, Morris and Western
1999), we show that corporate restructuring had a significant influence on
wage inequality. Moreover, we shed light on mechanisms for why restructur-
ing affected wages, as well as on how such changes affected employee groups
differentially. Thus, our findings not only provide confirmation for the unan-
swered untested proposition that restructuring influenced inequality, but also
provide key insights into the ways in which it did, and why similar restruc-
turing mechanisms nonetheless had substantially different effects on wage
determinants and outcomes within and across employee groups.
Second, our findings indicate that the erosion of labor market structures
during restructuring did not result in fully “open” employment contracts
(Sørensen 2000). That is, job and wage structures continued to have a strong
influence on wage inequality throughout the restructuring period (Goldthorpe
2000, Western and Rosenfeld 2011), a finding consistent with Fernandez’
(2001) study. For example, figure 1.1 shows that although starting salaries
of production workers decreased following restructuring, they experienced
substantial increases in wages over timesuggesting perhaps that fairness con-
siderations were still evident in the firm (and/or that returns to performance
were considerable). Nevertheless, the nature of the employment relationship
is clearly less “closed” following restructuring than before– in that salaries are
determined more by short terms factors such as performance in a given year,
and less on long term factors such as deferred compensation arrangements.
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That is, some of the increase in wage inequality from the 1980s onward was
presumably due to the erosion of labor market structures such as ILMs– and
to transformations in rules governing wage setting.
Our findings also highlight that structural factors reflecting past employ-
ment relationships (and thus the determinants of a given employee group’s
power relative to a firm’s owners) played a key role in explaining why wage
inequality differed within and between the employee groups. In doing so they
raise questions regarding the reasons for the differential erosion in job and
wage structures across groups over time. On one hand, the decline in union
power left production workers with less ability to influence wages (Western
and Rosenfeld 2011). On the other hand, the greater relative power of man-
agers afforded them the ability to preserve job and wage structures during
restructuring. Yet, there are some patterns that do not derive easily from a
bargaining power perspective. For instance, although managers experienced
real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth following restructuring, they also were
laid off disproportionately during the restructuring period (Cappelli 1992).
In addition, the preservation of clerical workers’ job and wage structures does
not coincide with the relative lack of power of this group– particularly since it
was disproportionately female and minority, and thus arguably should have
less protection against forces of restructuring (Reskin 2003).13
These patterns suggest that a promising avenue of future research would be
to examine how diversity influences wage patterns and outcomes in relation
to broader external forces, doing so in a way that draws on important research
showing how contextual factors and organizational systems, practices, and
policies influence outcomes in this regard (Fernandez-Mateo 2009, Gorman
13In the firm that we study, 60% of the clerical workers are females, compared to roughly
20% for both production workers and managers. Also, 24% of clerical workers are minori-
ties, while 17% of the production workers and 10% of the managers are.
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and Kmec 2009, Haveman, Broschak and Cohen 2009, Kalev 2009). Research
could also be advanced by considering differences in bargaining power within
groups, such as examining how performance differentials impact a variety of
employment outcomes. For example, our findings suggest that a key source
of post-restructuring power for many types of employees is merit.
Third, our results provide important evidence on how restructuring, in the
form of variable-pay systems, affects returns to seniority and wage inequality–
the nature and effect of which has not been widely explored in the extant
literature. Our findings are consistent with available research indicating
that pay-for-performance systems account for roughly 20% of the growth
in variance in male wages from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Lemieux et
al. 2009). Yet, they also suggest that this study may underestimate the effect
of performance on wages, since these scholars only considered whether there
was an increase in the number of jobs whose wages were entirely dependent
on performance (e.g., commission-based pay jobs). We show that the effects
of performance matter for many types of work.
Finally, we provide an alternative institutional explanation to the skill
biased technological change (SBTC) argument for the widening of wage dis-
persion and inequality in 1980s. For example, the change in wage patterns for
managers and clerical workers under our semi-parametric decomposition is
somewhat similar to SBTC mechanisms (Autor et al. 1998, Fernandez 2001).
Yet even though SBTC arguably occurred at a time when employees who
used computers saw their wages increase faster than other people, our re-
sults suggest that this outcome may not have much (at least directly) to do
with the increasing returns to education and widening inequality.14 Thus,
14For example, to the extent that wage distributions are influenced by increasing de-
mands for education and other skills, managers may experience a stronger upward push
on overall wages relative to other workers, yet we maintain these changes are modified
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although our study in some ways can be seen as a complement to the lit-
erature focusing on economy-wide antecedents of increasing wage inequality
(e.g., SBTC and occupations), it also highlights the importance of assessing
the change in inequality from a firm-level point of view in order to identify the
processes leading to the changing wage structure– a feature often ignored in
the extant literature which treats firms as having little role in key outcomes.
Because the findings reported in this article stem from one large firm lo-
cated in one economic sector, there may be questions regarding potential
generalizability. Several factors reduce these concerns. First, many of our
pre-restructuring results are similar to findings in other single-firm studies in
the same time frame (Petersen and Saporta 2004). Second, like most large
firms, the firm we studied restructured multiple times (Cascio et al. 1997),
and relied on external advice from consultants on the design and implemen-
tation of restructuring initiatives, and from senior managers sent to other
firms to examine best practices. Third, it is important to note that orga-
nizational theory has frequently been advanced and tested with single-firm
studies (Fernandez 2001), an important factor given that many data sets
used to analyze inequality are sorely lacking in organizational characteristics
(Morris and Western 1999). Finally, our study is a response to the call to con-
duct firm-level studies to better understand organizational-level mechanisms
in wage determination.
To summarize, our study helps to fill in the critical knowledge gaps in the
literature on wage inequality by theorizing about and empirically exploring
the previously understudied role of corporate restructuring in this regard. In
particular, we assess the change in inequality from a firm-level point of view
by job and wage structures. In our data, we also observe a widening college-high school
wage gap starting in 1980s, consistent with the literature in wage inequality using publicly
available individual level data such as the CPS (Autor et al. 1998).
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in order to identify the processes leading to the changing wage structure.
We demonstrated not only whether and how restructuring affected wage in-
equality, but also why this critical outcome varied within and across employee
groups– even though the restructuring mechanisms operated in similar ways
for these groups. Our findings suggest that although firms still matter for
wage inequality– particularly with respect to their job and wage structures–
their ability to limit the effects of market forces on wages has been weakened
by RIF, and the way they set wages internally has been transformed substan-
tially by changes in compensation and performance management systems.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Production Workers Managers Clerical Workers
Year Wage Tenure Age Wage Tenure Age Wage Tenure Age
1969 $44,072 0.62 42 $35,426 0.60 31 $73,869 0.62 40
1970 $45,030 1.13 42 $35,177 1.16 31 $73,926 1.38 39
1971 $49,870 1.81 41 $38,045 1.81 32 $80,341 2.22 39
1972 $50,899 2.51 41 $38,551 2.43 32 $82,410 3.01 39
1973 $51,593 3.01 39 $38,121 2.60 31 $82,533 3.60 39
1974 $49,960 3.27 36 $37,681 2.70 31 $85,092 3.96 38
1975 $53,014 3.57 35 $38,302 3.28 31 $82,517 4.63 37
1976 $54,422 3.73 34 $38,825 3.56 31 $84,393 4.85 37
1977 $54,279 3.86 33 $37,856 3.78 31 $83,222 5.20 36
1978 $55,512 4.21 33 $37,690 3.92 31 $83,174 5.42 35
1979 $59,398 4.33 33 $36,807 4.01 31 $80,569 5.58 35
1980 $50,749 4.41 32 $34,915 3.91 31 $75,768 5.49 34
1981 $50,319 4.53 33 $35,607 3.86 31 $78,053 5.47 34
1982 $51,019 5.03 33 $37,660 4.43 32 $83,540 5.96 34
1983 $51,510 5.73 34 $38,589 5.05 32 $86,327 6.72 35
1984 $49,928 6.19 35 $37,648 5.52 33 $86,503 7.63 35
1985 $46,155 6.17 34 $37,691 5.85 34 $87,692 8.02 36
1986 $45,417 6.69 35 $38,739 6.68 34 $89,830 8.84 36
1987 $44,816 7.06 35 $38,551 7.05 35 $89,264 9.35 36
1988 $43,748 7.08 35 $38,212 6.55 35 $89,406 9.43 37
1989 $4 3,179 7.44 36 $37,822 6.49 35 $88,416 9.49 37
1990 $43,446 7.74 36 $38,620 6.71 35 $88,265 9.70 37
1991 $44,140 8.36 37 $39,557 6.95 36 $90,218 10.06 37
1992 $45,180 9.14 38 $40,189 7.70 37 $91,902 10.79 38
1993 $46,207 9.32 39 $40,894 7.83 37 $93,341 11.04 38
Only employees hired after 1968 are included.
Wages are in 2007 U.S. dollars.
Tenure are in years.
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Table 1.2: Employee-Job Level Fixed Effect Estimations of Returns to Seniority, Production Workers
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Salary in 2007 U.S. Dollars
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Job Tenure -0.0434*** -0.0442*** -0.0388*** -0.0512***
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Job Tenure Squared -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0010*** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Linear Time Trend 0.0577*** 0.0589*** 0.0578*** 0.0630***
(0.0030) (0.0090) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Post Restructuring Dummy -0.0276*** 0.0058 0.0002
(0.0052) (0.0098) (0.0091)
Post Restructuring Dummy X Job Tenure -0.0100*** -0.0081***
(0.0017) (0.0016)




Post Restructuring Dummy X Performance 0.0619***
(0.0053)
Number of Employees 6,773 6,773 6,773 6,773
Number of Employee-Job Level Matches 6,773 6,773 6,773 6,773
Number of Records 34,808 34,808 34,808 34,808
Minimum Match Spell (Years) 1 1 1 1
Maximum Match Spell (Years) 25 25 25 25
Mean Match Spell (Years) 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
Additional control variables in all model: A set of dummy variables indicating divisions of the firm, a dummy
variable indicating the occurrence of demotion, and the estimated likelihood of employment separation.
Standard errors are clustered by employee-job level matches and are shown in the parentheses.
*** : p < 0.001
** : p < 0.01
* : p < 0.05
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Table 1.3: Employee-Job Level Fixed Effect Estimations of Returns to Seniority, Managers
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Salary in 2007 U.S. Dollars
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Job Tenure -0.0165*** -0.0157*** -0.0102*** -0.0187***
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Job Tenure Squared -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0013*** -0.0014***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Linear Time Trend 0.0409*** 0.0408*** 0.0397*** 0.0489***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Post Restructuring Dummy -0.0136*** -0.0145*** -0.0239***
(0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Post Restructuring Dummy X Job Tenure -0.0052** -0.0037***
(0.0009) (0.0009)




Post Restructuring Dummy X Performance 0.0158***
(0.0021)
Number of Employees 8,517 8,517 8,517 8,517
Number of Employee-Job Level Matches 20,906 20,906 20,906 20,906
Number of Records 67,276 67,276 67,276 67,276
Minimum Match Spell (Years) 1 1 1 1
Maximum Match Spell (Years) 25 25 25 25
Mean Match Spell (Years) 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Additional control variables in all model: A set of dummy variables indicating divisions of the firm, a dummy
variable indicating the occurrence of demotion, and the estimated likelihood of employment separation.
Standard errors are clustered by employee-job level matches and are shown in the parentheses.
*** : p < 0.001
** : p < 0.01
* : p < 0.05
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Table 1.4: Employee-Job Level Fixed Effect Estimations of Returns to Seniority, Clerical Workers
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Salary in 2007 U.S. Dollars
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Job Tenure -0.0321*** -0.0323*** -0.0266*** -0.0371***
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Job Tenure Squared -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0014*** -0.0013***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Linear Time Trend 0.0509*** 0.0509*** 0.0487*** 0.0588***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Post Restructuring Dummy 0.0050 -0.0147*** -0.0260***
(0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0035)
Post Restructuring Dummy X Job Tenure -0.0010 0.0026
(0.0013) (0.0014)




Post Restructuring Dummy X Performance 0.0267***
(0.0067)
Number of Employees 10,099 10,099 10,099 10,099
Number of Employee-Job Level Matches 16,676 16,676 16,676 16,676
Number of Records 46,173 46,173 46,173 46,173
Minimum Match Spell (Years) 1 1 1 1
Maximum Match Spell (Years) 24 24 24 24
Mean Match Spell (Years) 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Additional control variables in all model: A set of dummy variables indicating divisions of the firm, a dummy
variable indicating the occurrence of demotion, and the estimated likelihood of employment separation.
Standard errors are clustered by employee-job level matches and are shown in the parentheses.
*** : p < 0.001
** : p < 0.01
* : p < 0.05
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CHAPTER 2
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE DYNAMICS
OF HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
2.1 Introduction
One of the most distinctive institutional arrangements in the U.S. labor
market is that the health insurance coverage for the non-poor and non-
elderly population is provided as a part of an individual’s compensation
package. Among this population, health insurance coverage for an individual
is hence largely conditional on employment as well as the employer’s offer-
ing of health insurance benefits. Such arrangement not only has significant
impacts on employment dynamics (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996, Cooper
and Monheit 1993, Gilleskie and Lutz 2002, Gruber and Madrian 1994, Gru-
ber and Madrian 1997, Gruber and Madrian 2004, Madrian 1994b, Monheit
and Cooper 1994) but also directly leads to the dynamics in health insur-
ance coverage– the phenomenon that people move into and out of health
insurance coverage over time (Fairlie and London 2009a, Fairlie and London
2009b, Short and Graefe 2003).
Bhandari and Mills (2003), for example, find that 16% of the full time
workers in the U.S. experienced at least one month without health insur-
ance each year. Fairlie and London (Fairlie and London 2009a, Fairlie and
London 2009b) furthermore document the relationship between demographic
variables and the probability to gain or lose health insurance coverage. Their
results, however, do not account for the dynamics in employment. Due to
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the correlation between employment and the provision of health insurance
coverage, the dynamics of health insurance coverage is also likely to be a
function of employment dynamics, including moving from one employer to
another and into and out of the labor force.
From the “job lock” literature (Gilleskie and Lutz 2002, Gruber 2000,
Gruber and Madrian 1994, Gruber and Madrian 2004, Madrian 1994b), we
know that the dynamics of employment is constrained by employer offering
of health insurance benefits at the current job. Employees are less likely to
switch to a new employer or retire if such move is accompanied by the loss of
health insurance coverage. However, we know less about how people acquire
health insurance coverage by moving from unemployment to employment or
from a job that does not provide health insurance benefits to a job that does.
We also do not know much about the long-term effect of an extended period
of unemployment on health insurance coverage.
This paper intends to examine the dynamics of health insurance coverage–
how an individual’s health insurance coverage over lifetime– changes as a
function of both past coverage as well as past and current employment status.
In order to assess the causal relationship between health insurance coverage
and employment status, it is crucial to incorporate the correlation between
health insurance coverage and employment into the model. The health in-
surance coverage and employment status can be correlated either because
they are causally related, or because they are correlated due to unobserved
individual heterogeneity, or both. It poses empirical challenges to differen-
tiate between these explanations for an observed correlation over time, and
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has features that help to solve
the problem.
This study uses 1999 through 2009 waves of the PSID, which provide
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information on both health insurance coverage and employment history. Al-
though the PSID has become biennial since 1997, in each wave it surveys an
individual’s health insurance coverage in the past two years as well as the
recent employment history for up to four jobs (including the current one).
A twelve-year panel can be constructed accordingly, starting from 1997 to
2008. My results suggest that around 40% of the male population aged 22-64
has lost health insurance coverage for at least one month during the twelve-
year period. Around two-thirds of this population experienced some spell
of unemployment during the span. Those who are younger than 30, single,
less educated, or having household earnings less than 200% of the Federal
Poverty Level are also more likely to drop out of coverage. Most of the cor-
relation between health insurance coverage and unemployment over time can
be attributed to the correlation between them in each year and the state de-
pendence of unemployment. After these correlations are accounted for, the
causal relationship between unemployment and health insurance coverage
becomes much smaller: unemployment spells of any length in two consecu-
tive years reduces the likelihood of health insurance coverage by less than 2
percentage points.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: the next section
presents the related literature and methods used in this paper. It is followed
by an introduction of the PSID data, the descriptive statics, and a presen-
tation of health insurance coverage dynamics. I then estimate the effect of




Health insurance benefit is quickly becoming one of the most important com-
ponents in employee compensation package in the United States. Since the
New Deal era, most of the non-poor and non-elderly population in the U.S.
has relied on employer-sponsored health insurance as the main source of cov-
erage. The provision (or lack of) health benefits have been found to impact
job choice and labor supply decisions. The dynamics of health insurance
coverage, and hence, is highly correlated with the dynamics of employment.
The literature in job lock shows that the offering of health insurance at
the current job may have an effect on labor supply decisions and limit job
mobility. Assuming that both the workers’ preference for health insurance
and the employers’ cost to provide health benefits are continuous, workers
and firms would be sorted into an equilibrium in which workers who desire
health insurance the most would work for employers who can offer health
insurance in the least expensive manner. In a perfect competitive labor
market, there should exist an universal compensation differential ∆W (Rosen
1986), and the workers who choose to enroll in employer-sponsored insurance
plans are paid ∆W lower than their otherwise equivalent counterparts who
do not enroll in health insurance plans. Nevertheless, to the extent that the
availability of job options is limited, a worker who prefers to have health
insurance coverage may choose not to move to a better job (in terms of job
match, compensation, career opportunity, etc.) if that new job does not offer
health insurance or the higher compensation accompanied does not offset
the cost of a self-purchased health insurance plan. Alternatively, workers
may be discouraged from quitting from the current job in order to find a
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better job match due to the lack of health insurance when unemployed. In
other words, workers would be “locked” into their current jobs with health
insurance benefits even when better job opportunities are available.
The negative impacts on job mobility caused by job lock is shown to be
alleviated by the provision of continuation coverage such as COBRA. The
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) is de-
signed to ease the “job lock” problem by allowing outgoing employees to
stay with their original employer-sponsored health insurance plans for up to
18 months upon job separation. Although it is estimated that only around
2% workers in a given year enroll in the COBRA (Madrian 1998)1, it is
well documented that COBRA effectively reduces the magnitude of job lock.
For example, Gruber and Madrian (1997) find that continuation coverage
increases the transition from employment to not in the labor force, the time
spent not in the labor force, and reemployment earnings. Both Cooper and
Monheit (1993) and Madrian (1994b) find that the lack of health insurance
portability reduces turnovers; on the other hand, one year of continuation
coverage increases job turnover by 10% (Gruber and Madrian 1994). Buch-
mueller and Valletta (1996) and Anderson (1997) further show that own
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage reduces turnovers and mobil-
ity.
In addition to job lock, researchers have also focused on the effect of health
insurance provision on retirement and female labor supply. Studies show
that the availability of retiree health insurance (Gustman and Steinmeier
1994, Karoly and Rogowski 1994, Madrian 1994a) or continuation of cov-
erage (Gruber and Madrian 1995, Gruber and Madrian 1996) leads to a
1On average, only about 10 percent of the workforce would experience a qualifying
event that potentially triggers COBRA in a given year and some 20% among them would
actually elect COBRA coverage (Madrian 1998).
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higher probability of people retiring before they are eligible for Medicare.
For those who are married, having spouses who have health benefits for
the whole family increases the likelihood of turnover, decrease the hours
worked, and increases the likelihood to take a prat-time job (Buchmueller
and Valletta 1996, Olson 1998, Schone and Vistnes 2000). Overall, these
results have two important implications: first, there is a close relationship
between health insurance coverage and employment status; second, while
coverage and employment are correlated, the literature mainly focuses on
how the availability of health insurance coverage influences turnover or labor
supply.
The other direction of the causal relationship between coverage and em-
ployment, namely, how workers without coverage move from “unemployed”
to “employed and covered” or from “employed but not covered” to “employed
and covered” to acquire health insurance coverage, is not widely examined.
For example, how does an extended period unemployment impact the proba-
bly that an uninsured worker gains health insurance in the next period? How
long does the impact last? For example, the literature in employer learning
would suggest the experience of layoff is a negative signal to prospective em-
ployers and hence has adverse effect on future employment opportunity and
wages (Altonji and Pierret 2001, Farber and Gibbons 1996, Podgursky and
Swaim 1987, Schønberg 2007). Since health insurance coverage is a compo-
nent of employee benefit, past unemployment likely also will decrease the
likelihood of health insurance coverage.
Although it is an important question to distinguish the causal relationship
between health insurance coverage and employment status, it is nevertheless
empirically challenging. For instance, a worker can be uninsured because
of a previous spell of unemployment, or because of her own preference in
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both demand for health insurance and labor supply. Due to the correlation
between coverage and employment as well as the unobservable individual
heterogeneity that simultaneously affects demand for health insurance and
job choices, a model that does not account for the full correlations among
these variables and their lagged terms are likely to yield inaccurate estimates.
Adding another layer of complexity to this empirically challenging ques-
tion is the state dependence of unemployment (Arulampalam, Booth and
Taylor 2000, Doiron and Gørgens 2008, Heckman and Borjas 1980, Stewart
2007). That is, even if there is no long-term causal relationship between
unemployment and coverage, the correlation between them in each period
as well as the state dependence of unemployment would lead to correlations
between health insurance coverage and unemployment over time in the data.
Additionally, the observed health insurance outcome is likely to be state
dependent as well due to the unobserved individual heterogeneity that corre-
lates with an individual’s health insurance coverage. In an earlier version of
this paper (Fang 2010), I show that the states of being insured or uninsured
are strongly correlated over time: those who are insured in one period are
more likely to stayed insured in the next period, while those who are not
insured tend to stay uninsured for the very next period. Such state depen-
dencies (serial-correlations) of unemployment and health insurance coverage
make the identification of the causal effect between their dynamics over time
more difficult.
This study utilizes the panel structure of the PSID to address the causal
effect of unemployment on health insurance coverage. The information on
both health insurance coverage and employment status in a twelve-year panel
allows me to distinguish the causal relationship between the two. The fol-
lowing subsection introduces the econometric models.
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2.2.2 The Causal Relationship between Unemployment and
Health Insurance Coverage Dynamics
In another chapter in my thesis (Fang 2011), I show that an individual’s
health insurance coverage is largely conditional on being hired by an employer
who offers health insurance benefits. If the coverage is determined only by
the worker’s demand, a model that can be used to estimate the likelihood of
having health insurance coverage can be written as
Pr(HIt = 1) = X
>β + ui + εit, (2.1)
where X is a set of independent variables including individual and job char-
acteristics observable to the researcher, ui is the unobserved individual het-
erogeneity that also determines health insurance coverage, and εit is the
residual term.
However, the dominance of employer-sponsored health insurance benefits
suggests that health insurance coverage and employment are correlated. The
interaction between health insurance coverage and employment can be ex-
pressed in a set of equations,
Pr(HIt = 1) = Pr(HIt = 1, Et = 1) + Pr(HIt = 0, Et = 1)
Pr(HIt = 0) = Pr(HIt = 1, Et = 0) + Pr(HIt = 0, Et = 0)
which simply says that depending on the health insurance coverage and
employment status, people can be categorized in four groups, with (HIt =
1, Et = 1) representing people who are insured and employed, etc.
2 This
means the health insurance coverage Pr(HI = 1) cannot be estimated as a
single equation because coverage also depends on employment status. For
2The term Pr(HIt = 0, Et = 1) can be positive due to COBRA, spousal coverage, or
the public health insurance programs.
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example, in the one-equation setting, it is not possible to tell whether the
lack of coverage is caused by unemployment (HIt = 0, Et = 0) or by having a
job without health insurance benefits (HIt = 1, Et = 0). And hence, without
controlling for the employment history and the correlation between coverage
and employment, equation (2.1) is by no means structural.
The interaction between coverage and employment hence suggests a bi-
variate probit model,
Pr(HIt = 1) = X
>
HIβHI + ui + ε
HI
it
Pr(Et = 1) = X
>
EβE + ρui + ε
E
it
in which the likelihoods of coverage and employment are estimated jointly,
and the unobserved heterogeneity terms in both equations are allowed to be
correlated.
Adding the coverage and employment in previous period(s) allows a causal
interpretation of how employment dynamics influences health insurance. De-
noting health insurance coverage and employment status at time t by HIt
and Et, respectively, the model can be written as








ϕEs Et−s + ui + ε
HI
it (2.2)








ξEs Et−s + ρui + ε
E
it (2.3)
and the vector of coefficients ϕEt , ϕ
E
t−1... captures the causal relationship
between employment status and health insurance coverage when equations
(2.2) and (2.3) are jointly estimated in a bivariate probit model.
In my estimation, HIt is one if an individual is always insured in year t,
and Et is one if an individual is not employed for 12 months in year t (so
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Et denotes the existence of any unemployment spell in a year). The lagged
terms on the right hand side, HIt−s and Et−s, are defined in similar manners
and denotes health insurance coverage and employment status in year t− s.
The set of control variables XHI includes age (in categories of 22-29, 30-39,
40-49, 50-59, and 60-64), highest level of education (high school dropout,
high school, some college, college, or post-secondary), race (white, black,
Hispanic, or other), marital status (married or not), number of kids younger
than 18 in the household (in categories of 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more), job tenure
(not working, less than 1 year, 1 to 3 years, 3 to 5 years, and 5 years or
above) and household earnings in year t (below the Federal Poverty Level,
100%-200% of the FPL, 200%-400% of the FPL, or above 400% of the FPL).
The set of XE is the same as XHI minus job tenure and household income.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a longitudinal survey of
representative U.S. individuals and the families that they reside in. When
it started in 1968, the PSID had two independent samples: a cross-sectional
national sample and a national sample of low-income families. The cross-
sectional sample was drawn by the Survey Research Center (SRC), having
2,930 households, and was an equal probability sample of U.S. families in
contiguous 48 states. The sample from low-income families, also know as
Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample, had 1,872 households and
was conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Office of Economic Op-
portunity (Hill 1991). The PSID core sample constitutes these two samples.
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Between 1968 and 1996, the PSID interviewed individuals from the house-
holds in the core sample. Household splits and merges were both tracked;
adults were observed as they aged, and children were followed as they grew
into adulthood and formed their own family units. Starting from 1997, PSID
became a biennial survey, and the most recent wave of PSID available was
conducted in 2009. Many questions regarding health status and health care
coverage were added into PSID questionnaires beginning from 1999, which
makes the PSID an extremely valuable long panel to study the dynamics of
health insurance coverage. Finally, since the composition of the U.S. pop-
ulation has changed dramatically since 1968, the PSID also provides cross
sectional sample weights each year to ensure its representativeness.
I estimate how unemployment impacts the dynamics of health insurance
coverage using the 1999-2009 waves of the PSID core sample. Only male
PSID household heads aged between 22 and 64 are included in the analy-
sis, regardless of employment status and labor force participation. Female
household heads are dropped because female wage earners tend to have dif-
ferent incentives to obtain health insurance coverage.3 People who are older
than 65 would be eligible for Medicare automatically and hence are dropped
since they would not contribute to the dynamics of health insurance cover-
age. Only individual records that are older than 65 are dropped; that is, if a
person turns 65 between 1999 and 2009, his records before aged 65 are still
retained. Also, records that are younger than age 22 are excluded because
people younger than 22 are likely to be students; for students, their health
insurance coverage may not be a direct outcome of employment due to the
3Since the PSID always counts the male as the household head between a married
couple, female household heads in the PSID are either not married or married but sepa-
rated from their husbands. This makes the availability of spousal coverage a less concern.
However, pregnant women under a certain income threshold would still be eligible for
subsidized public health insurance plans.
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provision of student insurance. Households that were part of the Survey of
Economic Opportunities subsample are dropped to obtain a random sam-
ple since the Survey of Economic Opportunities over-sampled households in
lower social-economic status. Overall, 5,262 individuals and 22,729 records
are used in the analysis. Numbers of records are 3,481, 3,627, 3,726, 3,833,
3,962, and 4,100 in each biennial wave, starting from 1999 and ending in
2009.
The PSID has two major components: the individual survey and the house-
hold survey. Individual characteristics, such as age, years of education and
types of health insurance are obtained from the individual survey. Earnings
in the previous year, hours worked/unemployed in the previous year, em-
ployment history, and number of months covered by health insurances are
obtained from the household survey. Years of education is not available in all
waves of PSID; in the cases of missing data, information from the most recent
wave is used to fill in. Four types of earnings are available in PSID: labor
earnings, unemployment benefits, social security benefits, and other transfer
earnings. These information are used to calculate household earnings, and
all the dollar amounts are deflated to 2010 U.S. dollars using the CPI-W.
Descriptive statistics of these variables, weighted by the PSID crosssectional
sample weights to ensure the representativeness of the sample, are provided
in table 2.1.
2.3.2 Employment History in the PSID
In each wave of the interview, the PSID surveys the employment history
of both the head and the wife. It first asks the interviewee whether he
or she is working, unemployed, or out of labor force. For those who are
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working, information about the type of the employer (public, private, or self-
employed), industry, occupation, and when the job started are asked. For
those who are not working, the starting and end dates of the last job is
recorded. Regardless of employment status, the PSID asks information on
up to three additional jobs. These additional jobs can be either a previous
job that the interviewee worked before the current main job or an “extra
job” that occurred simultaneously with one of the main jobs. For these
additional jobs, both starting and end dates (if not censoring) are recorded.
Based on such information, the employment history of an interviewee can be
constructed. Given the biennial nature of the PSID and that PSID surveys
the interviewee early in the year, I use information from year t of the PSID
to construct the employment history in years t − 1 and t − 2. That is,
employment history in 1997 and 1998 is constructed based on the 1999 wave
of PSID, employment history in 1999 and 2000 is based on the 2001 wave,
etc. The employment history is then transformed into monthly basis, that
is, a PSID individual is coded to be working in a certain month if he is
employed in that month; otherwise, the person is coded to be not working
(unemployed). The monthly employment history hence consists of a sequence
of binary variables indicating whether an individual is employed in a given
month. Unfortunately, the PSID only asks about job search behaviors four
weeks prior to the time of survey for those who are not working at the
time of survey, and there is no reliable information to distinguish between
unemployed and not in the labor force for each month in the employment
history.
One of the limitation to the PSID employment history is that only up to
four jobs are recorded in each wave. These jobs are recorded chronically,
with the most recent one recorded first; however, if an interviewee worked
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for more than four jobs between the current and previous waves of the PSID,
information regarding the earlier jobs will not be available. Since the only
feasible way to construct the employment history from the PSID is to count
people as employed when they report they are working based on the job
information available in the data, people would be counted as “unemployed”
when they actually are working for the jobs that are not reported in the PSID.
Jobs not reported in the PSID are likely to occur earlier than later in the
two-year period of the monthly employment history given how job history is
chronically recorded, hence, employment is likely lower in the earlier part of
the two-year period. For instance, the 1999 wave of PSID is used to construct
the employment history in 1997 and 1998. The jobs not recorded in the PSID
are more likely to occur early in 1997 than late in 1998, so it is expected that
the monthly employment rate would be lower in early 1997 than in late 1998.
Descriptive statistics indeed suggest that, among the final sample included
in the analysis, the monthly employment rate on average increases from 72%
in the early of the two-year period to 84% in the middle of the period to
88% in the end of the period. The increase is monotonic in time within each
of the two-year periods, consistent with the hypothesis that earlier jobs are
more likely to be missed in the PSID.
2.3.3 Health Insurance Coverage Information in the PSID
The PSID also asks the question “how many months were you covered by
health insurance in each of the past two years?” Consequently, the 1999 wave
of the PSID has numbers of months covered in 1997 and 1998, the 2001 wave
has 1999 and 2000, etc. The six waves of PSID can be used to construct
a panel consisting number of months each year that each PSID household
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head is covered by health insurance between 1997 and 2008. This is the main
health insurance coverage information used in this study. Unfortunately, the
PSID does not have enough information on type of health insurance coverage
that can be used in the twelve-year panel.4 Based on the number of months
covered, all the yearly records of the PSID male household heads can be split
into three categories: always covered (having coverage for 12 months in a
year), never covered (having health insurance coverage for zero month), and
sometimes covered (neither always nor never covered). Table 2.2 shows the
cross-sectional distribution of these three states of coverage in each of the
twelve years.
Specific patterns in table 2.2 suggest some extent of heteroscedastic ret-
rospective/measurement errors. Recall that the 1999 wave of PSID asks the
number of months covered in 1997 and 1998, the 2001 wave asks about cov-
erage in 1999 and 2000, etc. This means information about 1997 and 1999
coverage may have more retrospective error than information about 1998 and
2000, simply because 1997 and 1999 are further away from the time of survey
than 1998 and 2000. Table 2.2 suggests people are more likely to answer “al-
ways covered” or “never covered” regarding the coverage in 1997, 1999, etc.
than in 1998, 2000, etc. This should not be surprising, since people are less
likely to recall the exact number of months covered by health insurance in
4The PSID does ask about the type of health insurance coverage at the time of sur-
vey. The types include: not insured, employer-sponsored, directly purchase from pri-
vate insurance market, Medicare, Medi-Gap, Medicaid, Military, CHAMPUS (Civilian
Health and Medical Program of the Uninformed Services)/TRICARE/CHAMP-VA (Civil-
ian Health and Medical Program-Veteran’s Administration), Indian Health Insurance,
state-sponsored, and other government plans. However, type of plan is not surveyed in
the retrospective question regarding the coverage in the past two years. It is still possible
to, for example, obtain type of insurance in 1999 from the 1999 wave of data and number
of months covered in 1999 from the 2001 wave. But such matching mechanism requires a
strong assumption that one does not change plan types during the span, and the matching
may still be ambiguous when more than one types of health insurance are provided. And
hence, I do not use the information on plan types in the analysis.
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earlier years and may just report either “never covered” or “always covered”
instead, especially if the exact number of months is close to 0 or 12.
Column 1 in table 2.3 shows the relationship between individual character-
istics and health insurance coverage. The left hand side variable is a dummy
indicating whether an individual is always covered in a given year, and the
coefficients in column 1 are from a random effect probit model.5 All the
coefficients have the expected signs. Older people, those who are married,
and those who have kids are more likely to be covered than those who are
younger or single with no kid. The likelihood of health insurance coverage
is positively correlated with the level of education. Minorities are less likely
to be covered. Those with job tenure more than 3 years are more likely to
have health insurance coverage. However, those whose job tenure is less than
3 years, and especially those who just started a job, are less likely to be
covered than those who are not working. This is consistent with the findings
in Farber and Levy (2000) that people in new jobs (job tenure less than one
year) are less likely to have health insurance coverage, and this might also
reflect that some of those who are not working are covered by public health
insurance plans. Finally, the higher household earnings is also associated
with higher probability of health insurance coverage.
5Household earnings are compared to the Federal Poverty Level (calculated based on
the family size) and split into four categories: less than the FPL, between 100% and 200%
of the FPL, between 200% and 400% of the FPL, and above 400% of the FPL. Such
categorization is better than strict income brackets or the logarithm of income because
the eligibility for public health insurance programs is determined by the comparison of
household income to the Federal Poverty Level. Using 100%, 200%, and 400% of the
FPL as thresholds largely complies with the latest eligibility rules following the recent
expansions in government-sponsored health insurance programs since 1990s (Cutler and
Gruber 1996, Gruber and Simon 2008, LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004).
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2.3.4 Dynamics of Health Insurance Coverage in the PSID
The dynamics of health insurance coverage in the PSID is evident and can
be shown by estimating how people transit into and out of different states
of coverage (always covered in a year, never covered in a year, or sometimes
covered in a year).
First, I show how long people stay in the “always covered” status before
they transit into “never covered” or “sometimes covered”; in other words,
this is an estimate of how soon people drop out from being “always covered.”
Figure 2.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curve of the “always covered”
status, utilizing all observations between 1997 and 2008. Starting with 100%
of all those who are always covered in a given year, a Kaplan-Meier survival
curve depicts the proportion of those who are initially always covered and
stay always covered in each year. It hence shows roughly 70% of those who
are initially always covered are still always covered after ten years.6
Another way to approach this is to show how soon people can get out of
“never covered” status and gain coverage. Figure 2.2 shows such survival
curve, and around 20% among those who are initially “never covered” stay
in the same status after 10 years. In other words, 80% of those who are
“never covered” gain health insurance coverage at some point of time. Given
that slightly less than 85% people are always covered and slightly more than
6It would be technically less sophisticated to just show the proportion of the sample
that falls into each of the three categories based on simple descriptive statistics of the
sample. However, a survival curve utilizes the information contributed by the censoring
observations while the descriptive statistics do not. For example, if an individual is in the
data for five years and is always covered but then disappears, a survival curve would only
count this person to be always covered for only five years but censored, while the descriptive
statistics would just count this person as “always covered”. Even if all the censored (those
who do not stay in the data for the full twelve years) are kept, a survival curve still is
more informational. For those who are moving into and out of coverage, the survival
curve would utilize each yearly spell of “always covered”, “sometimes covered”, or “never
covered” in estimating the likelihood of dropping out of coverage, and the information
available from descriptive statistics is very limited.
65
10% are never covered in each year according to table 2.2, figures 2.1 and 2.2
suggest that over any 10-year span, almost 60% (70%× 85%) of the sample
is always covered and 2% is never covered (20% × 10%), implying roughly
40% transiting into and out of health insurance coverage.
The survival curves, nevertheless, are nonparametric and do not tell whether
any of the individual or job characteristics increases or decreases the likeli-
hoods of losing/ gaining coverage. Columns 2 and 3 in table 2.3 are the es-
timates from Cox proportional hazard models that show how individual/job
characteristics change “the hazards” of losing or gaining health insurance
coverage. The numbers in columns 2 and 3 are hazard rates, and a coeffi-
cient larger than one implies a greater likelihood of losing/gaining coverage
compared to the base group while a coefficient less than one implies a less
likelihood.
According to the estimates in column 2 of table 2.3, those who are older,
married, and with kids are less likely to drop out from being “always covered”
than those who are aged 22-29, single, and without kid. Less educated people
are more likely to lose coverage. People with shorter job tenure are more
likely to lose coverage– either they lose coverage because they start new jobs
following unemployment or because those who are not working are covered
by public health insurance plans. Less wealthy households also have greater
hazards to loss coverage. These results are very similar to those reported in
Fairlie and London (2009a, 2009b).
Column 3 of table 2.3 shows the hazards of gaining coverage. Older people
are less likely than younger people to gain health insurance once they lose
coverage. Married people are more likely to become covered. Conditional on
being uninsured, the likelihood of gaining coverage is positively correlated
with the level of education. People with short tenure are more likely to gain
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coverage than those who are not working, presumably through having an
employer who offers health benefits or becoming eligible for those benefits.
Higher household earnings are again associated with greater hazards to gain
coverage. Although some of the coefficients are not significant in column 3
due to a smaller sample size (much less people are not covered to begin with),
most of the coefficients still have expected signs.
Overall, an examination of a 12-year panel shows that the health insurance
coverage does not stay static. Roughly 40% of the sample transits into and
out of coverage, with the hazards of transit differ by individual characteris-
tics. The main theme of this study is to show how much of the dynamics
in health insurance coverage is caused by the dynamics in employment. As
I argue in the previous sections, coverage and employment are closely cor-
related because health insurance coverage in the U.S. is a major component
of employee benefits and the provision of health insurance may alter labor
supply decisions. An evidence to the correlation is that, in my sample, only
around 10% of those who are always covered throughout the twelve-year pe-
riod experience any spell of unemployment, while more than two-thirds of
those who transit into and out of coverage experience at least one spell of
unemployment.7 The causal relationship between unemployment and health
insurance coverage is examined in the next section. I first present the esti-
mates based on a model that does not control for the correlation between
coverage and employment. I then show how the estimates change after such
correlation and endogeneity are controlled.
7These numbers are calculated by the author.
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2.4 Result
2.4.1 A Model without Controlling for the Correlation
between Coverage and Unemployment
Table 2.4 tabulates the estimated relationship between unemployment and
health insurance coverage based on equation (2.1) using random effect probit
models. The same set of control variables as those in table 2.3 are included
in all models but are not reported to save space. The coefficients on these
control variables are qualitatively similar to those reported in column 1 of
table 2.3.
Column 1 of table 2.4 shows the effect of unemployment or not working
(for any duration or number of spells in a year) on health insurance coverage
in the same year. The coefficient of -0.4711 corresponds to a marginal effect
of -0.1456, that is, any spell of unemployment reduces the probability of
covered for 12 months in the same year by 14.56%. A lagged term is added in
column 2; coefficients of -0.4637 and -0.1157 correspond to marginal effects of
-0.1093 and -0.0505, respectively. This implies the spells of unemployment are
correlated over time, and the effect of unemployment in year t on the coverage
in year t is reduced after unemployment in year t − 1 is included in the
regression. More lagged terms of unemployment are added in the following
columns. The numbers suggest that the negative effect of unemployment on
coverage lasts for up to three years (column 4), as the coefficients on longer
lagged terms in columns 5 through 7 are mostly insignificant. The total
combined marginal effects of all lagged terms in column 4 is -0.1625.
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2.4.2 The Bivariate Probit Model
Estimation results of equations (2.2) and (2.3), based on bivariate probit
models that control for the endogeneity between coverage and unemployment
as well as individual heterogeneity, are shown in table 2.5. There are four
columns in each panel, and the first columns in panels A and B are from
the same set of bivariate probit regression, the second columns in both panel
from the same set of regression, etc. Each of panel A and B has its own set
of control variables: the control variables in panel A are the same as those in
table 2.4, and panel B has the same control variables except job tenure and
household earnings. Coefficients on these control variables are not reported
to save space. Besides, in order to separate the change in the estimates due
to the change in the model (number of lag terms included) and the change
in the sample (those who do not stay in the panel long enough are dropped
when more lags are included), only the individuals who have more than five
observations are used to estimate equations (2.2) and (2.3). The changes
in coefficients on the same variable across columns in table 2.5 hence reflect
only the change in specifications.
The estimates in table 2.5 show that error terms in the two bivariate pro-
bit regression equations are negatively correlated (ρ ranges from -0.1603 to
-0.0951), justifying the use of bivariate rather than univariate probit mod-
els. Also, the effect of unemployment on health insurance coverage only lasts
for one year, as the top half of panel A suggests only coefficients on unem-
ployment in years t and t − 1 are significant. This indicates that the effect
does not last as long as the estimates based on univariate models shown in
table 2.4. The interpretation of the coefficients in table 2.5, however, is less
straightforward than those in table 2.4. The nature of the bivariate probit
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setting in equations (2.2) and (2.3) means that, for example, the effect of
unemployment on health insurance coverage depends on how unemployment
affects the probability of both “covered and unemployed” and “covered and
employed”. That is, given
Pr(HIt = 1) = Pr(HI = 1, Ut = 1) + Pr(HIt = 1, Ut = 0), (2.4)
the effect of unemployment at any period on health insurance coverage at
the current period, ∂Pr(HIt=1)
∂Ut−k




∂Pr(HI = 1, Ut = 1)
∂Ut−k
+
∂Pr(HIt = 1, Ut = 0)
∂Ut−k
, (2.5)
where unemployment at k period(s) earlier is denoted as Ut−k. Each marginal
probability in equation (2.5) depends on the the coefficients in equations
(2.2) and (2.3) as well as the correlation between the two errors terms, ρ.
The calculated marginal probabilities based on the coefficients in table 2.5
are listed in table 2.6.
Panel A in table 2.6, which contains numbers calculated based on the
column 1 in table 2.5, shows how the experience of unemployment influences
the joint likelihoods of health insurance coverage and unemployment. That
is, for example, the numbers in the column labeled “P (HIt = 1, Ut = 1)” are
the marginal changes in probability of being covered and unemployed in year t
caused by the spell of unemployment and health insurance coverage at various
points of time. In panel A of table 2.6, any spell of unemployment in year t
reduces the probability of both covered (HIt = 1) and unemployed (Ut = 1)
by 0.37 percentage point, evaluated while the values of other variables are
held at the mean. This number is calculated based on the first coefficient in
the first column of panel A in table 2.5 (-0.1315), the first coefficient in the
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first column of panel B in the same table (1.4914), and the correlations of
the error terms in equations (2.2) and (2.3) that is reported at the bottom
of table 2.5 (-0.1603). The same column in panel A of table 2.6 also shows
unemployment in year t reduces the likelihood of covered (HIt = 1) and
employed (Ut = 0) by 1.28 percentage point. To show the relative magnitudes
of these effect sizes, the sample mean proportions of the four regimes jointly
determined by health insurance coverage and unemployment are listed at the
top of the panel. Overall, unemployment in year t reduces the probability
of being covered by 1.65 percentage point, or 1.75% of the 94.05% who are
covered by health insurance.
On the other hand, the net effect of unemployment in year t−1 on coverage
is positive, at 1.79 percentage point. For those who experienced unemploy-
ment spells in year t−1, the likelihood of health insurance coverage decreases
by 43.45 percentage points if he is always working in year t but increases by
45.24 percentage points if he is not always working. This result is consistent
with previous study that the availability of continuation coverage or retiree
health insurance coverage makes it affordable to stay unemployed or out of
labor force for an extended period of time or to retire before being eligible
for Medicare (Gruber and Madrian 1995, Gruber and Madrian 1996, Gru-
ber and Madrian 1997, Gustman and Steinmeier 1994, Karoly and Rogowski
1994, Madrian 1994a). And hence, for those who have unemployment spells
for two years in a row, the combined effect of unemployment on coverage is
positive but very small at 0.14 percentage point based on panel A.
Panels B through D in table 2.6 show the short-term effect of unemploy-
ment on coverage becomes larger when more lagged terms are included. The
effect of unemployment in year t on coverage in the same year is -1.8 per-
centage point (-0.0040-0.0140) in panel B, -3.04 percentage points in panel
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C, and -3.86 percentage points in panel D. On the other hand, the unemploy-
ment in year t− 1 increases the likelihood of coverage by 1.66 percentage in
panel B, 2.04 percentage points in panel C, and 2 percentage points in panel
D. If an individual has unemployment spells for two consecutive years, the
cumulative effect of unemployment on coverage is -0.14 (-1.8+1.66) percent-
age point in panel B, -1 percentage point in panel C, and -1.86 percentage
point in panel D. To the extent that including more lags leads to more pre-
cise estimates, the effect of long-term unemployment on coverage is slightly
negative.8 Overall, after the endogeneity between coverage and employment
is controlled for, estimates in tables 2.5 and 2.6 suggest that unemployment
has a smaller negative effect on the likelihood of health insurance coverage–
both in terms of magnitude and duration.
The numbers in table 2.6 have some caveats. First, due to the limitation
in information on job search behaviors available in the PSID, the states of
“unemployment” and “not in labor force” can not be distinguished. Dis-
tinguishing these two states in each month of the job history would require
the information on whether an individual has an active job search in each
month, which is not available in the PSID. Consequently, an individual would
be counted as “unemployed” in a given month if he is not recorded as “work-
ing” in that month, regardless whether he is unemployed, not in the labor
force, or working for a job not recorded in the PSID. Second, while the PSID
allows the reconstruction of monthly job history, it does not provide enough
information for a monthly health insurance coverage history. It only has in-
formation on the number of months in each of the previous two years that
an individual has health insurance coverage. Such limitation constraints my
8The marginal probabilities of terms on t − 2, t − 3, and t − 4 are not used because
their effects are not statistically significant according to table 2.5.
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analysis at yearly rather than monthly level. It also prevents a direct as-
sessment of the relationship between the durations of unemployment and
uninsured spells.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In spite of its important policy implications, the dynamics of health insurance
coverage and how such dynamics is influenced by employment is not widely
studied. This study examines the causal effect of unemployment on health
insurance coverage using male household heads aged 22-64 from six waves of
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that lead to a twelve-year panel
data of health insurance coverage and employment history.
The dynamics of health insurance coverage is evident. The nonparametric
survival analysis suggests that almost 60% of the sample always stays covered
during the twelve-year span, while roughly 2% is never covered. This implies
around 40% of the sample moves into and out of health insurance coverage.
Descriptive statistics show that those who move into and out of coverage
experience more unemployment than the group that is always insured: more
than two-thirds of the former group experiences at least one spell of unem-
ployment during the twelve years, but only about 10% of the later group
experiences any unemployment. This result means a great deal of dynamics
in health insurance coverage is correlated with employment dynamics.
Distinguishing the causal relationship between health insurance coverage
and employment, however, is empirically challenging. Health insurance cov-
erage is one of the major component in compensation in the U.S. labor mar-
ket, and the provision (or the lack) of health insurance has been shown to
influence job choice and labor supply decisions. Such endogeneity between
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the two has to be accounted for in order to obtain a precise estimate of the
causal relationship. The estimation is further complexed by the existence of
individual heterogeneity that influences both health insurance and coverage.
The panel structure of the PSID allows an empirical strategy that yields an
unbiased estimate of how unemployment affects health insurance coverage.
A model that does not account for the endogeneity between coverage and
employment suggests that the negative effect of unemployment on the likeli-
hood of health insurance coverage lasts for up to three years, with a combined
marginal effect of 16%. However, the bivariate probit model that accounts
for the correlation structure suggests a smaller effect. When the state depen-
dency of unemployment as well as the endogeneity between health insurance
coverage and employment is included in the model, the long term cumulative
effect of unemployment on health insurance coverage becomes much smaller:
unemployment spells in two consecutive years reduces the likelihood of cov-
erage by less than two percentage points. The comparison of the two sets of
results underscore the importance to take the endogeneity into consideration
in order to assess the causal relationship between unemployment and health
insurance coverage.
This study nevertheless has its own limitations. First, the PSID only
records up to four jobs in each wave, and an individual might sometimes
be mis-classified as unemployed in the monthly employment history if he
works for more than four jobs during the two year that each wave of the
PSID covers. Second, the information on job searching behaviors available
in the PSID is very limited, which makes it challenging to distinguish between
unemployment and not in the labor force. And hence, I am not able to es-
timate specifically whether people would move form “not in the labor force”
to employment in order to obtain health insurance coverage. Third, health
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insurance plans are all but homogeneous. Plans differ in generosity, employee
contribution, and out-of-pocket expenses. Treating health insurance coverage
as a dichotomy probably would lead to a simplified view of how health insur-
ance coverage and employment interact with each other. However, with the
information available in the PSID, this study still demonstrates a reasonable
solution to an important yet empirically challenging research question.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, Male PSID Household Heads, 1999-2009
PSID Wave 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Age 42.75 43.28 43.54 44.14 44.40 44.58
(10.87) (10.94) (11.08) (11.45) (11.69) (11.94)
Years of Education 13.64 13.68 13.72 13.70 13.72 13.71
(2.28) (2.21) (2.21) (2.18) (2.17) (2.14)
Household Earnings in 2010 U.S. Dollars
1st Quartile $19,630 $21,000 $19,000 $20,000 $21,200 $22,320
2nd Quartile $35,000 $37,500 $36,500 $39,900 $40,600 $43,711
3rd Quartile $54,300 $60,000 $60,000 $65,000 $70,000 $75,000
Number of People 2,966 3,104 3,220 3,287 3,394 3,491
Weighted using the PSID cross sectional sample weight.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2.2: Cross Sectional Health Insurance Coverage
Year Always Covered Never Covered Sometimes Covered Number of People
1997 85.91% 11.10% 2.99% 2,947
1998 86.32% 9.97% 3.71% 2,967
1999 86.67% 10.40% 2.93% 3,086
2000 86.07% 9.80% 4.13% 3,102
2001 86.36% 10.06% 3.58% 3,219
2002 85.39% 10.25% 4.36% 3,223
2003 82.40% 14.10% 3.50% 3,267
2004 81.24% 13.43% 5.33% 3,275
2005 83.23% 14.01% 2.76% 3,392
2006 81.48% 12.82% 5.70% 3,404
2007 82.22% 13.90% 3.88% 3,507
2008 81.39% 13.72% 4.89% 3,504
Weighted using the PSID cross sectional sample weight.
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Table 2.3: Likelihoods of Being Covered, Dropping out of Coverage, and
Gaining Coverage
(1) Being Covered (2) Losing Coverage (3) Gaining Coverage
Age 30-39 0.3441** 0.6021** 0.8809
(0.0431) (0.0530) (0.0826)
Age 40-49 0.6733** 0.4498** 0.7454**
(0.0568) (0.0434) (0.0799)
Age 50-59 0.8320** 0.4008** 0.7765
(0.0670) (0.0434) (0.1007)
Age 60-64 1.1987** 0.2313** 0.7036
(0.0948) (0.0412) (0.1619)
Married 0.6745** 0.3391** 1.5672**
(0.0418) (0.0248) (0.1377)
Having 1 Kid 0.1265** 0.7999** 1.0553
(0.0456) (0.0769) (0.1110)
Having 2 Kids 0.2272** 0.7379** 1.0546
(0.0523) (0.0738) (0.1194)
Having 3+ Kids 0.1876** 0.9410 1.1087
(0.0675) (0.1103) (0.1381)
High School Dropout -0.8582** 1.4861** 0.6834**
(0.0988) (0.1522) (0.0745)
Some College 0.4107** 0.8081** 1.3200**
(0.0732) (0.0623) (0.1160)
College 1.1640** 0.5464** 1.8171**
(0.0909) (0.0543) (0.2502)
More than College 1.2941** 0.4587** 2.1848**
(0.1231) (0.0649) (0.4203)
Black -0.3778** 1.1507 1.0461
(0.1262) (0.1454) (0.1426)
Hispanic -0.6420 1.3035 0.4511
(0.4294) (0.4972) (0.2628)
Other Race -0.4808** 1.1909 1.0491
(0.0834) (0.1159) (0.1110)
Tenure 0 to 1 Year -0.5464** 2.4935** 1.4296**
(0.0386) (0.2054) (0.1398)
Tenure 1 to 3 Years -0.1148** 1.5257** 1.3201**
(0.0386) (0.1442) (0.1333)
Tenure 3 to 5 Years 0.3248** 0.6028** 1.1131
(0.0540) (0.0924) (0.1637)
Tenure 5+ Years 0.4818** 0.4020** 0.7167**
(0.0409) (0.0423) (0.0890)
Below FPL -0.3321** 1.0569 0.8158**
(0.0401) (0.0927) (0.0759)
200%-400% FPL 0.3256** 0.5821** 1.2122**
(0.0376) (0.0484) (0.1158)
Above 400% FPL 0.5584** 0.3758** 1.4021**
(0.0544) (0.0417) (0.2021)
Number of Observations 38,893 26,588 3,698
Number of People 4,737 – –
χ2 2,037.17** 1,376.92** 186.53**
Coefficients in column 1 are the marginal effects from a random-effect Probit model.
Coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are hazard ratios.
Standard errors in parentheses.
**: p < 0.05
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Table 2.4: Unemployment and Health Insurance Coverage, Random Effect Probit Models
Dependent Variable: Having Health Insurance Coverage for 12 Months in Year t
Unemployment in Year:
t -0.4711** -0.4637** -0.5330** -0.5558** -0.6317** -0.6256** -0.7065**
(0.0325) (0.0366) (0.0418) (0.0472) (0.0548) (0.0623) (0.0742)
t− 1 -0.1157** -0.1221** -0.1047** -0.1409** -0.1120** -0.1219
(0.0340) (0.0396) (0.0444) (0.0515) (0.0578) (0.0686)
t− 2 -0.0978** -0.9993** -0.1157** -0.1218** -0.1219
(0.0385) (0.0442) (0.0516) (0.0582) (0.0692)
t− 3 -0.1024** -0.1224** -0.2060** -0.2688**
(0.0430) (0.0510) (0.0572) (0.0685)
t− 4 -0.0279 -0.0126 0.0042
(0.0512) (0.0592) (0.0713)




Number of Observations 38,893 33,962 29,117 24,970 20,902 17,471 14,116
Number of People 4,737 4,658 4,094 4,016 3,431 3,355 2,825
Control variables included in the regression: age (in categories of 22-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64),
highest level of education (high school dropout, high school, some college, college, or post-secondary), race
(white, black, Hispanic, or other), marital status (married or not), number of kids younger than 18 in the
household (in categories of 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more), job tenure (not working, less than 1 year, 1 to 3 years, 3 to
5 years, and 5 years or above) and household income in year t (below the Federal Poverty Level, 100%-200%
of the FPL, 200%-400% of the FPL, or above 400% of the FPL).
Coefficients are the estimates from random effect Probit models.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
**: p < 0.05
79
Table 2.5: Unemployment and Health Insurance Coverage, Bivariate Probit
Models
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Covered for 12 Months in Year t
Unemployment in Year:
t -0.1315** -0.1460** -0.2461** -0.3057**
(0.0537) (0.0573) (0.0647) (0.0702)
t− 1 0.1619** 0.1541** 0.2030** 0.2014**
(0.0444) (0.0460) (0.0523) (0.0556)
t− 2 0.0340 0.0001 -0.0100
(0.0396) (0.0478) (0.0507)




Health Insurance Coverage in Year:
t− 1 2.2129** 1.9848** 2.0769** 1.9485**
(0.0634) (0.0405) (0.0485) (0.0494)
t− 2 0.3253** 0.0097 0.0669
(0.0451) (0.0666) (0.0650)




Panel B. Dependent Variable: Any Spell of Unemployment in Year t
Unemployment in Year:
t− 1 1.4914** 1.2721** 1.3451** 1.3144**
(0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0280) (0.0305)
t− 2 0.4079** 0.3438** 0.2909**
(0.0296) (0.0371) (0.0362)




Health Insurance Coverage in Year:
t− 1 -0.1740** -0.1450** -0.1243** -0.1072**
(0.0280) (0.0383) (0.0409) (0.0464)
t− 2 -0.0093 0.0641 0.0447
(0.0388) (0.0523) (0.0564)




ρ -0.1603 -0.1490 -0.1206 -0.0951
Number of Observations 30,327 27,070 23,813 20,556
Number of People 3,257 3,257 3,257 3,257
Coefficients are the estimates from bivariate Probit models.
Coefficients on the controlled variables are not listed to save space.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
**: p < 0.05
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Table 2.6: Corresponding Marginal Probabilities of the Bivariate Probit
Models Estimates
Panel A: Corresponding Marginal Probabilities of Coefficients in Column 1 in Table 2.5
P (HIt = 1, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 1, Ut = 0) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 0)
Sample Mean 0.1462 0.7940 0.0147 0.0449
Unemployment in Year:
t -0.0037 -0.0128 0.0037 0.0128
t− 1 0.4524 -0.4345 0.0222 -0.0401
Health Insurance Coverage in Year:
t− 1 0.0899 0.5109 -0.1350 -0.4658
Panel B: Corresponding Marginal Probabilities of Coefficients in Column 2 in Table 2.5
P (HIt = 1, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 1, Ut = 0) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 0)
Sample Mean 0.1485 0.7935 0.0141 0.0437
Unemployment in Year:
t -0.0040 -0.0140 0.0040 0.0140
t− 1 0.3855 -0.3689 0.0181 -0.0348
t− 2 0.1045 -0.1007 0.0068 -0.0107
Health Insurance Coverage in Year:
t− 1 0.0784 0.4418 -0.1159 -0.4043
t− 2 0.0078 0.0372 -0.0101 -0.0349
Panel C: Corresponding Marginal Probabilities of Coefficients in Column 3 in Table 2.5
P (HIt = 1, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 1, Ut = 0) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 0)
Sample Mean 0.1415 0.8040 0.0118 0.0426
Unemployment in Year:
t -0.0060 -0.0244 0.0060 0.0244
t− 1 0.4051 -0.3847 0.0156 -0.0360
t− 2 0.0838 -0.0838 0.0059 -0.0059
t− 3 0.0296 -0.0248 0.0009 -0.0058
Health Insurance Coverage in Year:
t− 1 0.0785 0.4668 -0.1093 -0.4360
t− 2 0.0140 -0.0129 0.0008 -0.0018
t− 3 -0.0068 0.7989 -0.0174 -0.0556
Panel D: Corresponding Marginal Probabilities of Coefficients in Column 4 in Table 2.5
P (HIt = 1, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 1, Ut = 0) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 1) P (HIt = 0, Ut = 0)
Sample Mean 0.1505 0.7955 0.0114 0.0424
Unemployment in Year:
t -0.0076 -0.0310 0.0076 0.0310
t− 1 0.4050 -0.3850 0.0149 -0.0349
t− 2 0.0722 -0.0733 0.0051 -0.0040
t− 3 0.0108 -0.0085 0.0002 -0.0025
t− 4 0.1058 -0.1008 0.0055 -0.0105
Health Insurance Coverage in Year:
t− 1 0.0749 0.4259 -0.1022 -0.3985
t− 2 0.0115 -0.0039 -0.0007 -0.0068
t− 3 -0.1250 0.0490 -0.0093 -0.0272
t− 4 0.0243 0.0240 -0.0078 -0.0405
Marginal effects of the control variables are not listed.
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CHAPTER 3




The racial disparity in social-economic status and economic outcomes has
long commanded the attention of social scientists in the United States. One
of the important topics is the racial wage gap, and researchers have con-
sistently concluded that the black-white wage gap is still around 10% even
when all the information observable in the data are controlled for (Altonji
and Blank 1999, Chay and Lee 2000). On the other hand, despite the
fact that most of the working-age people obtain health insurance cover-
age through their employers and health insurance has become one of the
most valuable component of employee benefits,1 the racial health insurance
coverage gap is not as widely studied as the racial wage gap (Altonji and
Blank 1999, Dushi and Honig 2005, Fairlie and London 2009a, Reschovsky,
Hadley and Nichols 2007, Waidmann, Garrett and Hadley 2004). In this
study, I estimate the racial gap in employer-sponsored health insurance cov-
erage, address the causes of the gap, assess how the increases in health in-
surance premium influence the gap, and propose how my findings set up the
stage for further organizational level studies.
In the past decade, there has been some progress in the study of racial
1In December 2010, health insurance premium values at 8.4% of the total compensation
cost according to the “Employer Costs for Employee Compensation” report released by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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health insurance coverage gap, especially in the economic literature. Sev-
eral studies were sponsored by the Economic Research Initiate on Uninsured
(ERIU) at the University of Michigan. Crow, Harrington, and McLaughlin
(2002) document black-white and Hispanic-white health insurance coverage
gaps of 8% and 13%, respectively, based on the 2001 Current Population
Survey (CPS). They argue that such gap may be the result of racial dispar-
ities along other dimensions such as education attainment, earnings, public
insurance coverage, employment sector, and labor force participation. Af-
ter these variables are controlled for, most studies show that the racial gap
shrinks by 50% to 65% but remains significant. Overall, earnings difference
is a major determinant of the black-white gap, while nativity and educa-
tion are important components in explaining the Hispanic-white gap (Crow,
Harrington and McLaughlin 2002). There are also some studies that specif-
ically address the health insurance coverage of the Hispanics. For example,
nation of origin and English proficiency influence the likelihood of health
insurance coverage for non-citizen Hispanics (Reschovsky et al. 2007, Rut-
ledge and McLaughlin 2008). Although Monheit and Vistnes (2000) show
that 40% of the 13 percentage points drop in health insurance coverage be-
tween 1987 and 1996 for Hispanic males is attributed to changes in worker
demography and 60% is attributed to other factors, a large portion of the
change in Hispanic-white health insurance coverage gap remains unexplained
(Rutledge and McLaughlin 2008).
Given that most of the working-age population rely on employer-sponsored
plans as the source of health insurance coverage in the U.S. and the racial
gap exists for very different reasons in public and private insurance cover-
age, the racial gap in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage deserves
to be examined separately. Studies show that whites have more access to
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employer-sponsored coverage than the Hispanics, but the black-white dispar-
ity is much smaller (Crow et al. 2002, Dushi and Honig 2005, Fronstin 2007,
Quinn 2000, Reschovsky et al. 2007, Rutledge and McLaughlin 2008, Waid-
mann et al. 2004). When the employer-sponsored health insurance coverage
is further decomposed to employer offering, employee eligibility, and employee
take-ups, there is less consensus regarding the racial gap in these three com-
ponents. Relying on the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), Dushi and Honig (2005) find significant minority-white
gap in employer offering but not employee enrollment. Reschovsky and his
colleagues (2007), on the other hand, find significant Hispanic-white gap in
both offering and enrollment using the Community Tracking Study (CTS)
Household Survey. They argue that Hispanics may have different demand
for health insurance when they face price increases, which partially explains
the Hispanic-white coverage gap. The review by Crow, Harrington, and
McLaughlin (2002) also suggests findings in the racial gap in employer of-
fering and employee enrollment of health insurance coverage are somewhat
inconsistent, depending on the data used– some find the black-white gap
in offering to be significant but some do not, some find the racial gap in
employee enrollment to be substantial but some conclude the gap is rather
small.
From a dynamic perspective, it is not well studied why the racial health
insurance coverage gap changed over time. The literature suggests that a
good portion of changes in racial gap remains unexplained (Monheit and
Vistnes 2000, Reschovsky et al. 2007). Although Fairlie and London (2009a,
2009b) conclude that blacks and Hispanics are less likely to earn and more
likely to lose employer-sponsored health insurance coverage using data from
1996 to 2004 waves of the CPS, the fact that racial health insurance cov-
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erage gap has been fluctuating implies a more complicated causal model to
explain the racial gap in addition to the racial disparity in transition into
and out of coverage. Figure 3.1 shows the time trends of racial gaps as well
as overall employer-sponsored health insurance coverage between 1993 and
2009 based on the March CPS. The share of the population with health in-
surance coverage is shown on the left vertical axis of the figure, and both
the black-white and Hispanic-white gaps in coverage are shown in the right
vertical axis. The axes cover the same range despite the magnitudes of the
numbers are different, so the changes in each trend represent the same level of
change in coverage or racial gaps. Had the racial disparity in transition into
and out of insurance been the only reason that explains the racial gap, the
black-white and Hispanic-white gap would not have narrowed at all. More
interestingly, the time trends seem to suggest that the black-white gap de-
creases when overall health insurance coverage increases and vice versa, and
the Hispanic-white gap follows a similar pattern although to a lesser extent.
Another perspective of health insurance coverage dynamics is how the mar-
ket factors, namely the recent hike in health insurance premiums, affects the
coverage. Economic theories that predict the relationship between premium
cost and coverage differ on how the “price” of health insurance is defined. One
theory (Chernew, Cutler and Keenan 2005) defines the full amount of pre-
mium as the price of health insurance coverage. If the premium cost goes up
because the “value” (including the cost of health care services without cover-
age, the quality of care, and the generosity of coverage) goes up, the quantity
of demand for health insurance would increase. However, if the premium cost
goes up because of a higher level of moral hazard or adverse selection, the
quantity of demand would go down. The overall impact of premium cost in-
crease on coverage is hence theoretically ambiguous, and this is exacerbated
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by the lack of a reliable measure on the level of moral hazard (Chernew et
al. 2005). The other theory, which is more dominant in health economics
textbooks, asserts that the health insurance premium consists two compo-
nents: the expected payoff of medical care benefits and the “load”– such as
the administrative cost, insurance company’s profit, and the risk premium
of the insurance company (Chernew and Hirth 2004, Feldstein 1999, Kron-
ick and Gilmer 1999, Phelps 2003). From this perspective, the “price” of
health insurance is essentially the load, which can be seen as the risk pre-
mium that a consumer is willing to pay to insure against uncertain medical
care expenditures. Price theory would suggest the quantity of demand for
health insurance to decrease when the load goes up, everything else being
equal. On the other hand, the health care expenditure hike in the past two
decades not only shifts the mean of the expenditure distribution but also
skews the whole distribution further to the right (French and Jones 2004).
Such change in the expenditure would on average increase the expected level
of benefit from health insurance (which increases health premium cost but
does not change the demand for health insurance because the expected payoff
still equals the premium cost) as well as the risk premium that people are
willing to pay (which increases the demand for health insurance). Although
the overall effect in this framework still is not clear, proxies that are corre-
lated with different components of the insurance premium can be used to
separately identify change in demand for health insurance coverage caused
by increase in different component of the premium cost. Besides, note that
both theories implicitly assume that health insurance coverage is affordable
and people can decide whether they want to purchase the coverage or not. If
the premium cost becomes too high, then the theoretical implication is con-
clusive: people would drop out of coverage because they cannot afford the
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premium. Given that the average health insurance premium outgrows wages
by almost 10% each year in the past decade, the affordability is becoming
an important determinant of health insurance coverage. Finally, regardless
of the theory used, Reschovsky and his colleagues (2007) do find Hispanics
may have different demand for health insurance, suggesting some extent of
racial disparity in the effect of premium increase on coverage.
Despite the progress in the literature, three related issues remain unre-
solved. First, while the racial gap remains significant in employer-sponsored
health insurance plans, whether the gap concentrates in employer offering,
employee take-up, or both is not conclusive based on the previous litera-
ture. Second, although some studies use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
(Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973) to address how the discrepancy in the distribu-
tions of individual characteristics across racial groups affect health insurance
coverage, we still do not know whether the compositional effect (the gap at-
tributed to the discrepancy in the distribution of individual characteristics,
in other words, the “explained” racial gap) is consistent across both em-
ployer offering and employee enrollment decisions and how it changes over
time. Third, although the effect of rising health insurance premium cost in
the past two decades on overall coverage may be theoretically ambiguous, we
do not know whether the rising price impacts all racial groups equally and
whether the racial gap is enlarged or shrunk due to recent hikes in the health
insurance premium.
Using the Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supple-
ments (February 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2005) to the Current Popula-
tion Survey, I find that the trend in the employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage is dominated by the changes in employer offering, as eligibility re-
mains somewhat constant and employee take-up has declined since 1995. A
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sizable Hispanic-white gap also presents in employer offering of health insur-
ance; however, conditional on offering, there are no racial gap in eligibility
and take-up. A non-linear variance decomposition shows that around 20%
of the racial coverage or offering gap can be explained by the discrepancy
in education across racial groups, and roughly another one-third of the gap
can be attributed to difference in job characteristics including job type (full-
versus part-time and whether the tenure is longer than one year), industry,
and occupation. Finally, depending on the proxy used for health insurance
premium cost, the recent cost has no or small negative effects on insur-
ance coverage; more specifically, the employer offering somewhat increases
and employee take-up significantly decreases following the price increase.
Nonetheless, Hispanics face a lower rate of employer offering when the health
insurance premium rises.
The rest of the article is structured as the following. The framework of
the study, including the related literature and the econometric skills used,
is introduced in next section. The data used in this study, the Contingent
and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplements to the Current Pop-
ulation Survey as well as various proxies for health insurance premium cost,
are introduced in section 3. The exclusive restrictions and sample construc-
tion process are also mentioned. Section 4 presents the results, including the
racial gap in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, the decomposi-
tion of the racial gap, and the effect of recent health insurance premium hike




This section discusses the analytic framework and econometric methods re-
garding how the employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and the racial
gap can be decomposed as well as how other factors may affect the level of
coverage. First, it is straightforward that coverage can be written as the
products of a sequence of conditional probabilities: employer offering, em-
ployee eligibility, and employee take-up. I then introduce a decomposition
method proposed by Fairlie (2005), which is an extension of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973) when the dependent
variable is binary. Finally, following the recent literature in health economics
regarding the decline of employer-sponsored health benefits (Cooper and
Schone 1997, Farber and Levy 2000, Gruber and Washington 2005, Hadley
and Reschovsky 2002, Nichols, Blumberg, Cooper and Vistnes 2001), I es-
timate how the increasing health care cost changed the trend of insurance
coverage and the racial gap in the past decade.
3.2.1 Components of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Coverage
To be covered under employer-sponsored health insurance plans, an employee
needs to (1) have an employer who provides a health insurance coverage plan,
(2) be eligible for the health insurance benefit plan provided by the employer,
and (3) enroll in the plan. Following Farber and Levy (2000), employer-
sponsored health insurance coverage for group i can be decomposed as:
P (C)i = P (O)i · P (E|O = 1)i · P (T |E = 1)i, (3.1)
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where P (·) denotes probability and C, O, E, and T in the equation stand
for coverage, offering, eligibility, and take-up, respectively.
Additionally, the difference in coverage between groups i and j can be
written as
P (C)j − P (C)i = P (O)j · P (E|O = 1)j · P (T |E = 1)j −
P (O)i · P (E|O = 1)i · P (T |E = 1)i
= P (O)i(1 + ∆O) · P (E|O = 1)i(1 + ∆E) · P (T |E = 1)i(1 + ∆T )−
P (O)i · P (E|O = 1)i · P (T |E = 1)i
= P (O)i · P (E|O = 1)i · P (T |E = 1)i ·[
(1 + ∆O)(1 + ∆E)(1 + ∆T )− 1
]
(3.2)
in which ∆O, ∆E, and ∆T represent the difference in offering, eligibility,
and take-up between groups i and j, where groups i and j can be different
racial groups at the same time, the same racial group at different time, or
a mix of both. Rewrite P (C)j as P (C)i(1 + ∆C) and divide both sides of
equation (3.2) by P (C)i, which is also P (O)i · P (E|O = 1)i · P (T |E = 1)i,
the change in coverage can be expressed as:
∆C = (1 + ∆O)(1 + ∆E)(1 + ∆T )− 1, (3.3)
which simply means the change in coverage can be decomposed into the
contributions of changes in offering, eligibility, and take-up. And hence,
equation (3.3) can be used to estimate how the changes in offering, eligibility,
and take-up influence the difference in overall coverage between two racial
groups at the same time, for the same racial group over time, or between
racial groups over time.
Since the take-up of employer-sponsored health insurance is conditional
90
on being eligible, which in turn is conditional on being offered, estimat-
ing separate models for offering, eligibility, and take-up will lead to biased
estimates of standard errors. A sequential Logit model is therefore used,
and coefficients on the year of observation dummy and the interaction be-
tween year of observation and racial group dummies can be used to assess
the significance of changes in offering, eligibility, and take-up of both within
and between ethnic groups over time. I use the Stata module SEQLOGIT
(Buis 2010) to estimate sequential Logit models. Note that it is also possible
that the error terms in these three sequential regressions are endogenous and
correlated across stages. To model the error structure, however, requires a
fairly strong parametric assumption about the covariance matrix of the error
terms, such as a multi-variate normal distribution (Ferguson 2008, Upchurch,
Lillard and Panis 2002). Such model then can be fitted into a multivariate
probit regression with simulated maximum likelihood estimation (Cappellari
and Jenkins 2003, Cappellari and Jenkins 2006). The null hypothesis that
error terms are independent with each other is indeed rejected using the
February CPS, but the multivariate model does not yield qualitatively dif-
ferent estimates on the coefficients of interest compared to the sequential
Logit models. In the result section, I rely on the estimates obtained in the
sequential Logit models, which require fewer parametric assumptions.
However, equations (3.1) and (3.3) only decompose the outcome (depen-
dent variable) and do not utilize individual and job characteristics (inde-
pendent variables) that also contribute to the coverage gap. Following the
wage inequality literature that decomposes wage differentials into the “com-
positional effect” (the wage differential attributed to different compositions
across two groups) and the “wage structure effect” (the wage differential at-
tributed to different coefficients on independent variables across two groups)
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(Fortin et al. 2010) relying on counterfactual distributions, a similar question
that can be asked is “What would the coverage for black people have been
had the blacks had the same distributions of both individual and job char-
acteristics of the white population?” The extensions of the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition introduced in Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), Fairlie (2005),
and Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2010) can be used to address this question.
3.2.2 Decomposing Coverage, Offering, Eligibility, and
Take-up
Based on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973),
the changes in health insurance coverage can be decomposed into the impacts
of changes in the composition of individual characteristics (compositional
effect) and of changes in returns to these characteristics (“health insurance







where C¯ is the mean coverage of the population, N is the size of the popu-
lation, and X is the set of independent variables in a regression model F (·)






























as W and B denote whites and blacks, respectively. If F (·) is a linear func-
tion, equation (3.5) reduces to the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition,
2This term is called the “wage structure effect” in Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2010)
because the explained variable in their context is employee wages. Calling it “health
insurance coverage effect” instead should fit this study better and avoid confusion.
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which in turn can be written as:









in which X¯W and X¯B are the vectors of the mean values of the independent
variables for whites and blacks, and βˆW and βˆB are the vectors of coefficients
for each racial group. The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.6) is
the compositional effect, and the second term is the health insurance coverage
effect. These effects are easily calculated by estimating two regressions for
whites and blacks separately and obtaining vectors of mean independent
variables and coefficients from both regressions.
In addition to the “aggregate decomposition” of the coverage into the
compositional and health insurance coverage effects, the Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition can also be used to obtain the “detailed decomposition” (Fortin
et al. 2010) to estimate the contribution of the variation in each variable to
the compositional effect and the total variation in health insurance coverage.
Theoretically, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can be directly applied in
a linear probability model if the dependent variable is dichotomous. How-
ever, Fairlie (2005) shows that applying the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
on linear probability models may yield less accurate results, especially when
the distribution of an independent variable is highly skewed. A modified
decomposition that can be applied on Logit and Probit models is proposed
in Fairlie (2005) to estimate the detail decomposition of the compositional
effect. Note that, assuming linear additivity, the compositional effect in



















where J is the number of variables in the array of independent variables,
Xj denotes the j
th independent variable in the array, X−j is the array of all




−j are the estimates obtained
from the pooled (whites and blacks) sample on respective set of independent
variables. In other words, the contribution of the independent variable Xj
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using the Delta method (Oaxaca and Ransom 1994, Fairlie 2005). In this
study, I use the FAIRLIE procedure in Stata written by Jann (2008) to cal-
culate the decomposition. Although the above elaboration focuses on the
coverage gap, the gaps in offering, eligibility conditional on offering, and
take-up conditional on eligibility can be calculated in similar manners.
In addition to comparing the racial gap cross-sectionally, the same method
can be used to calculate the change in coverage (and offering, eligibility, etc.)
over time for the same racial group or across racial groups. Empirically, this
can be done by choosing a counterfactual distribution that resembles the
composition of the same ethnic group in a different year and applying exactly
the same algorithm. Hence, for example, using the white population in 1995
as the “base group”, the following two basic questions can be answered:
1. What would the mean coverage for black people have been in 1995 had
the black population had the same composition (including individual
and job characteristics) as the white population in 1995?
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2. What would the mean coverage for white people have been in 2005 had
the composition remained the same for white people since 1995?
Similar questions can be asked based upon various counterfactual distri-
butions using different time and different racial gaps (black-white versus
Hispanic-white). Ultimately, one can assess how the compositional effect op-
erates across racial groups cross-sectionally, within the same race over time,
or whether the effect itself changes over time.
3.2.3 Impacts of Rising Health Insurance Premium Cost on
Coverage
Depending on how the price of health insurance is defined, there are two
widely-recognized economic models that predict how health insurance cov-
erage would change following an increase in the premium cost. The first
of them treats the full amount of premium as the price of health insurance
(Chernew et al. 2005). This model predicts that the demand for health in-
surance coverage when the premium cost increases would go up if higher
premium is associated with a rising magnitude of potential losses (hence the
“value” of health insurance is rising). However, the demand for coverage
would go down if higher premium is associated with a rising level of moral
hazard or adverse selection. The demand would also go down if the “benefit”
of being uninsured, namely in the form of uncompensated care, increases–
this would occur when the premium goes up but the amount of care that
one can receive through uncompensated care stays constant. Consequently,
the effect of rising cost on health insurance coverage becomes an empirical
question in this model, especially as no reliable measure of moral hazard is
available (Chernew et al. 2005).
The other model that is more dominant in health economics textbooks
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suggest that the health insurance premium cost can be divided into two
components: the expected payoff of medical care benefits as well as the load
or loading fee, which includes administrative cost, profit of the insurance
company, and insurer’s risk premium (Feldstein 1999, Phelps 2003). This
dominant paradigm hence defines the price of health insurance as the load,
which reflects the difference between premium cost and expected payoff. If
the load equals to zero, the health insurance is essentially free to the con-
sumers (Phelps 2003). Following this vein, the price or the load of health
insurance is the risk premium that a person is willing to give up in exchange
for insuring against uncertain medical expenses.
Price theory would suggest that, everything else being equal, the quan-
tity of demand for a certain good should decrease when the price goes up,
and there have been numerous studies addressing how the health insurance
coverage respond to health insurance premium hikes or subsidies (Blumberg,
Nichols and Banthin 2001, Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin 1997, Cutler
2003, Gruber and Washington 2005, Hadley and Reschovsky 2002, Nichols
et al. 2001). Overall, scholars have found the demand elasticity for health
insurance to be negative but rather small.3 Nevertheless, the mechanism
behind the effect of premium increase on health insurance coverage is rather
complicated with a theoretically ambiguous implication. The demand for
health insurance would only decrease if the increase in premium is due to the
increase in the load while everything else is unchanged. A different literature,
on the other hand, finds the distribution of medical care expenditures has not
only shifted further to the right but also become more skewed (Chandra and
Skinner 2011, French and Jones 2004). If the expected payoff of medical care
3Note that Cutler (2003) points out it only takes an elasticity of -0.06 to explain the
recent decline in coverage.
96
benefits (and hence health insurance premium cost) increases in the same
magnitude as the mean shift in the medical expenditure distribution, the
demand for health insurance should not change because the actuarial value
of the health insurance plan is still the same. However, the change in the
skewness of the medical care expenditure distribution would actually increase
the risk premium that an average consumer is willing to pay for health in-
surance benefits. In the end, the recent increase in medical expenditure may
cause the demand for health insurance to increase to the extent that the load
in health insurance premium cost does not outgrow the risk premium that
an average consumer is willing to pay. These combined make the effect of
insurance premium hike on coverage theoretically ambiguous since the risk
premium cannot be imputed. Nevertheless, this very concept to decompose
the health insurance premium still underlies the necessity to distinguish be-
tween expected payoff and load components of premium cost in order to
address how health insurance coverage responds to premium changes.
Regardless of the definition of price, one implicit assumption embedded in
these two theories is that the health insurance coverage is always affordable
and rational agents can determine whether to buy health insurance coverage
or not based on their own utility-maximizing decisions. However, according
to the premium information in the Kaiser Employer Health Benefits Annual
Survey (2010), the health insurance premium has been outgrowing wage by
almost 10% annually in this past decade and is quickly becoming a big fi-
nancial burden for average workers. Indeed, the average health insurance
premium for a family of four was $12,000 in 2007, marking the first time
that health insurance premium for a family eclipses minimum wage.4 If the
4The full-time equivalent federal minimum wage is $10,712 in 2007 before it was ad-
justed upward to $14,500 in 2009.
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health insurance premium is too high to be affordable, then the relationship
between premium cost and coverage is clear: people will drop out of cover-
age no matter how “valuable” the coverage is or how skewed the distribution
health care expenditures become. In other words, although the economic
theories generate theoretically ambiguous predictions and make the question
more empirical-oriented, the reasons that lead to a positive relationship be-
tween premium cost and coverage may become secondary to the extent that
the health insurance premium keeps rising at the current speed. That is, if
health insurance coverage becomes increasing unaffordable, the relationship
between premium cost and coverage would be overwhelmingly negative.
An additional challenge to estimate the impact of premium price change
on coverage is that data on health insurance premium are seldom available.5
In this study, I rely on three different sources of information: the operational
wage index information obtained from the Center of Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), the medical care component of Consumer Price Index (CPI),
and the mean health insurance premium for employer-sponsored plans at
state level from the MEPS-IC, as proxies for the health insurance premium
cost at individual level. More detailed explanations regarding these data are
presented in the data section of this paper. Briefly speaking, the operational
wage index is a component of the Prospective Payment System (PPS) that
is used by the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services to determine the
amount of Medicare reimbursement based on various factors that affect the
5To overcome such limitation, studies that deal with the relationship between em-
ployee cost and coverage have used various employer surveys, such as the Health In-
surance Association of America (Chernew et al. 2005), the Kaiser Family Founda-
tion/Health Research and Educational Trust Survey of employer-sponsored health ben-
efits (Cutler 2003, Chernew et al. 2005), Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Bene-
fit Survey (Gruber and McKnight 2003), the KPMG Peat Marwick data (Gruber and
McKnight 2003), or the insurance component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS-IC) (Blumberg et al. 2001) to obtain the premium cost.
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health care cost at each hospital. I use the operational wage index in each
year at MSA level and match the information with the CPS as a proxy for
health insurance premium.6
The medical care component of the CPI, on the other hand, provides a
more direct assess of the health insurance cost. The shortcoming of this
data is its availability: unlike the CMS wage index, medical care CPI is only
available in 27 metropolitans.7 Besides, although the 1995 CPS provides
an unique identifier for the state of residence, its publicly available release
does not provide information regarding which MSA an interviewee resides in
due to confidentiality concerns. Instead it only provides a variable indicat-
ing whether an interviewee resides in a MSA. Since some states (California,
Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Texas) have
more than one metropolitan, I am not able to uniquely identify the metropoli-
tan that a person lives in based on the publicly available information in the
1995 CPS. This results in the 1995 CPS being dropped completely when the
CPI data is matched with the CPS. Roughly one-third of the sample in the
remaining waves resides in MSAs where the BLS provides metropolitan-level
CPI data. Nevertheless, given its direct assess of the price of other medical
care consumptions and services, the medical care CPI can still be used as a
proxy for health insurance premiums.
Finally, the state-level aggregates of health insurance premium data from
the MEPS-IC capture the variation of health insurance premium across states
and over time. Based on the MEPS-IC data, the Agency for Healthcare Re-
6Wage index information are obtained from the PPS historical impact files, which
can be downloaded at the CMS website https://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/03_
wageindex.asp.
7Including Anchorage, Atlanta, Baltimore/Washington, D.C., Boston, Chicago, Cincin-
nati, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Honolulu, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles,
Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland,
San Diego, San Francisco, St. Louis, Seattle, and Tampa.
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search and Quality (AHRQ) publishes mean health insurance premium by
plan types at the state level starting from 1996.8 Although the premium
information at individual level would be ideal, such data are not available at
a nationally representative scale9, and sample selection problem might occur
even if this ideal data set does exist since we seldom are able to know about
the health insurance premium cost among those who are not insured. Fur-
thermore, even for those who we can observe the health insurance premium,
an ordinary least square model still might produce a biased estimate if health
insurance premium is correlated with unobservables; for instance, those who
are in higher-paying jobs may also bear higher premium cost due to a more
generous health insurance package. Nevertheless, provided that the health
insurance premiums for all types of employer-sponsored plans within a state
in a given year are all highly correlated, the state-aggregate of total health
insurance premium provides a reasonable assessment of how the geographic
and intertemporal variations in health insurance premium affect individual
coverage.
While the state-aggregate of health insurance premium from the MEPS-IC
directly captures the variation in premium, note that the CMS wage index
and the medical care CPI represents different component of the health insur-
ance premium under the dichotomy of expected payoff versus load discussed
earlier. Each data point in the CMS wage index is a weighted mean wage of
hospital workers in a local area. Since the wages of the hospital workers is
generally not correlated with the load, the CMS wage index should be more
8Hence, the 1995 wave of the CPS is again dropped when the MEPS-IC is matched to
the CPS.
9Matching MEPS-IC to the household component of the MEPS will generate an in-
dividual level data that contains types of coverage and amount of premium. However,
the individuals in this merged data set are no longer a random sample due to the non-
responding bias in the MEPS-IC.
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correlated with the expected payoff component of health insurance premium
than with the load. Oppositely, the medical care CPI reflects the overall cost
of health care and should be correlated with both the expected payoff and
the load components of health insurance premium cost.10 As a result, the
medical care CPI is more likely than the CMS wage index to capture a nega-
tive effect of premium cost increase on insurance coverage. Such conceptual
difference across the three proxies of individual-level health insurance pre-
mium is evident in my data: the correlation between the CMS wage index
and the MEPS-IC health insurance premium is 0.61, the correlation between
the medical care CPI and the MEPS-IC premium is 0.33, but the correlation
between the CMS wage index and the medical care CPI is only 0.14.
Regardless of the proxy used, the full model can be written as:
Pr(Coveragei,t) = α ·Premiumi,t +X>i,tβi,t + Sj + Tt + Sj × Tt + εi,t (3.10)
in which Coveragei,t is individual i’s employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage in year t, Premiumi,t is the operational wage index at MSA level,
the medical care CPI, or the state-level health insurance premium in the
respective years; X is an array of race dummies, individual characteristics,
and a set of detail industry and occupation indicators. Sj and Tt are state
and year fixed effects, and Sj × Tt represents the set of state-year interac-
tions. The reason to include the state and year interactions is that private
insurance might have been “crowded-out” by the expansion of public in-
surance programs such as Medicaid and SCHIP, as enrollment in private
10Berndt and his colleagues (2001) point out that the CPI is only an index of price and
is not related to the quantity of consumption. For example, if the unit price of health care
services remains constant but people simply consume more units of health care on average,
such increasing expenditure in health care will not be captured by the CPI. Fortunately,
this does not seem to be the case according to the recent studies on health care expenditure
(Chandra and Skinner 2011, French and Jones 2004), as the technological advancement
being a major driving force of unit price increase.
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health insurance coverage declined when free or subsidized public health
insurance programs became available in the past two decades (Cutler and
Gruber 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1997, Yazici and Kaestner 2000, Card
and Shore-Sheppard 2004, LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, Ham and Shore-
Sheppard 2005, Hudson, Selden and Banthin 2005, Gruber and Simon 2008).
Although the individuals included in this study (employed male aged 18-
64) are unlikely to be direct beneficiaries of the public insurance expansion
(which mostly targets at pregnant women and children under age 18 below a
certain income level), it still is possible that an adult working male drops the
employer-sponsored family (and hence his own) coverage because his spouse
or kids become eligible for Medicaid and SCHIP, especially when the coverage
becomes more expensive. Because individuals with lower household income
are both more sensitive to premium increase and more likely to benefit from
public insurance expansion, the estimated effect of premium hike on coverage
will be biased if the potential crowd-out effect is not properly controlled. Un-
fortunately, because the February CPS only collects wage information from
those who report as being paid hourly and is a survey based on households
rather than health insurance units, I am not able to impute each individual’s
Medicaid eligibility using the total income at the health insurance unit level.
This prevents me from following the prevailing “imputed IV” strategy in the
crowd-out literature that uses the imputed women’s and children’s Medi-
caid/SCHIP eligibility as an instrument for actual enrollment in Medicaid
and/or SCHIP (Currie and Gruber 1996a, Currie and Gruber 1996b, Cutler
and Gruber 1996, Gruber and Simon 2008). Since the crowd-out is essentially
identified through the variation of eligibility rules and level of generosity over
states and over time in this imputed IV strategy, I use the set of state-year
interactions to capture the effects of public health insurance expansion on
102
employer-sponsored coverage without estimating the magnitude of crowd-
out directly.11
Alternatively, employer offering, employee eligibility and employee take-up
decisions can be estimated simultaneously using sequential Logit models to
account for the correlations across stages:
Pr(Oit) = α
O · Premiumit +X>i,tβOit + Sj + Tt + Sj × Tt + εOit
Pr(Eit) = α
E · Premiumit +X>i,tβEit + Sj + Tt + Sj × Tt + εEit (3.11)
Pr(Tit) = α
T · Premiumit +X>i,tβTit + Sj + Tt + Sj × Tt + εTit
where O, E, and T are dummy variables for employer offering, employee
eligibility, and employee take-up decisions.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 The Current Population Survey
I use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate the cover-
age gap among racial groups. The Contingent and Alternative Employment
Arrangement Supplements (February 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2005) to
the CPS ask questions about the offering of employer-sponsored health in-
surance and whether an employee is eligible for and enrolls in the plan if
being offered. The first two waves of the data are also used in Farber and
Levy (2000) to assess how the recent decline in employer-sponsored health
insurance is explained by the changing composition of job types. Only people
who are employed have their health insurance coverage information collected
in these supplements, so those who are not employed at the time of data
11The state-year interactions are not included in the model when state-aggregated health
insurance premium is on the right hand side of the regression model.
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collection are missed out in this study. This should not be a problem as the
focus of this study is employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, which
by definition is provided to those who are employed and their immediate
family members. An exception to this is some of the unemployed who have
employer-sponsored health benefit from the former employer through CO-
BRA. Nevertheless, given that only about 10 percent of the workforce would
experience a qualifying event that potentially triggers COBRA in a given year
and some 20% among them would actually elect COBRA coverage, it implies
only 2% of the workforce have coverage through COBRA (Madrian 1998).
Furthermore, since COBRA coverage lasts up to 18 months but the median
unemployment spell is around 1.5 to 2.5 months between 1996 and 2003 ac-
cording to the Census Bureau reports (2003, 2006), it is reasonable to assume
that only a small portion of COBRA takers, whom by themselves constitute
a very small portion of people who are covered by employer-sponsored health
benefits, is missing from the February CPS.
Only male wage earners aged between 20 and 64 are included in the sample.
Those who are older than 65 are covered by Medicare, and those who are
younger than 19 are likely to be covered by Medicaid or SCHIP if they are not
covered by their parents’ plans. People who are not employed at the time of
the survey are excluded because their health insurance coverage information
is not available in the data. People who are self-employed are excluded as well
because the distinction between employer-sponsored health insurance plans
and individual directly-purchase health insurance plans is less clear for these
people. Finally, since male and female wage earners have different incentives
to obtain employer-sponsored health benefits12, I only include male wage
12All members in the same health insurance unit can be covered under one plan. And
hence, if one of the family members already has a job that provides health insurance
coverage to all the members, there is essentially no need for other members to find jobs
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earners.
The descriptive statistics of selected variables are tabulated in table 3.1.
Except for age, all other variables are dummies that take values of 0 or 1.
And hence, for example, 77.20% of the male wage earners are non-Hispanic
whites in 1995. The race variables are mutually exclusive, including White
Non-Hispanics, Black Non-Hispanics, Hispanics, and Other. The CPS uses
a separate question to ask whether one is a Hispanic in addition to the ques-
tion asking about race, and a person is categorized as Hispanic as long as
he identifies himself as a Hispanic, regardless of his race. The “White, Non-
Hispanic” group includes people who identify themselves as white and not
Hispanic, the “Black, Non-Hispanic” group include people who self-identified
black and non-Hispanic, and the “Other” group include people who identify
themselves as races other than white and black (mostly American Indians or
Asian) and not Hispanic. In the 1995 through 2001 waves of data, people are
only allowed to select one racial group. However, in the 2005 wave of data,
people are allowed to choose more than one group. To assign race categories
in the 2005 data, the following decision rule is used: (1) people who identify
themselves as Hispanic in the separate question are counted as Hispanics re-
gardless of their choice(s) of race; for those who are not Hispanics, (2) only
people who select “white” only are counted as White Non-Hispanics, (3)
people who select “black” only or both “white” and “black” are counted as
Black Non-Hispanics, and (4) the rest are counted as Other. Such mutually
exclusive categorization is consistent with Farber and Levy (2000) and Fron-
with health insurance or to enroll in the coverage even if it is provided. To the extent
that men have higher labor participation rates than women and women are more likely to
have part-time jobs not eligible for health insurance, between a married couple it is more
likely for the husband than the wife to enroll in employer-sponsored health insurance plans.
Besides, pregnant women under a certain income threshold would be eligible for subsidized
public health insurance plans, which is another disincentive for women to pay for health
insurance out of their own pockets.
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stin (2007) as well as literature in black-white wage gap such as Neal and
Johnson (1996), Oettinger (1996), and Chay and Lee (2000). I also tried an
alternative categorization that include both black non-Hispanics and black
Hispanics in the Black group (while black Hispanics are still included in the
Hispanics group, so this alternative definition is not mutually exclusive), but
the results are not sensitive to the changes, as the black-white coverage gap
only increases by less than half of a percentage point.
Besides race, individual characteristics such as age, marital status, and
years of education are directly available from the February CPS. Years of
education is then transformed into the highest level of education attained:
high school dropout (less than 12 years of education), high school graduate
(12 years), some college (more than 12 but less than 16 years), and college
degree and beyond (16 years or more). Since wages and employee benefits
(and hence health insurance provision) tend to be highly correlated with
types of job, industry, and occupation, job characteristics also need to be
controlled. However, in 2002, the CPS changed from 3-digit industry and
occupation codes used in the 1990 census to 4-digit codes used in the 2002
census. While this is not a problem in cross-sectional studies, such change
poses a significant challenge to longitudinal studies because there is no one-to-
one match from 3-digit to 4-digit industry and occupation codes. Fortunately,
the basic monthly CPS coded industry and occupation information using
both 3-digit and 4-digit systems between 2000 and 2002. I hence merge the
February CPS in 2001 (which only has industry and occupation information
in 4-digit codes) with the basic monthly CPS to obtain both the 3-digit and
4-digit industry and occupation codes for individuals in February CPS based
on the method proposed in Madrian and Lefgren (2000). Around 0.07% of
the individuals in the 2001 wave of February CPS cannot be matched with
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the monthly CPS and hence are dropped from my sample. This allows me
to compare 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves of data based on the 3-digit
industry and occupation codes and 2001 and 2005 waves of data based on
the 4-digit codes. I also group the industries and occupations by the CPS
detailed industry and occupation categories, which consist of 51 industry and
45 occupation groups for the 3-digit codes and 51 industry and 22 occupation
groups for the 4-digit codes. In addition to industry and occupation, a couple
of variables describing job types, which are shown to have significant impacts
on employer-sponsored health insurance benefit (Farber and Levy 2000), are
also included: whether the job is full time or part time, and whether the job
has been held for more than one year.
Most importantly, the February CPS has detailed questions on the source
of health insurance coverage. As mentioned earlier, only those who are em-
ployed at time of survey are asked of these questions. The first question asks
the interviewee about the source of health insurance coverage, which can
be employer-sponsored plans, individual direct-purchased plans, Medicare,
Medicaid and other public plans, or uninsured. If the answer to the first
question is “employer-sponsored plans”, the following question is who the
provider is– either the interviewee’s own employer or spouse’s employer. Fi-
nally, all wage earners are asked whether their employers sponsor any health
insurance plans, whether they would be eligible for the plans, and whether
they take up the plans. If the interviewee has an employer who offers health
benefit but either is not eligible or does not enroll in the plan, the reason
of ineligibility or not taking up is also collected in the data. Based on these
detailed information, a data set of whether a wage earner has a health insur-
ance plan sponsored by own employer as well as employer offering decision,
employee eligibility, and take-up decision can be constructed along with the
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individual characteristics and job type variables introduced above.
3.3.2 The Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services Wage
Index
As mentioned in an earlier section, given the lack of health insurance premium
information in the Current Population Survey, I use the operating wage index
data from the Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and other
measures as proxies for health premium cost. The operating wage index
information is an important component of the Prospective Payment System,
which is used by the CMS to calculate the amount of reimbursement to the
hospital for inpatient Medicare discharges.
In order to construct the wage index, the CMS groups hospitals by geo-
graphic locations. Hospitals located in urban areas are grouped by Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area (MSA); if a hospital is located in a rural area and does
not belong to an MSA, it is grouped with all other hospitals in the same state
that are also in rural areas. Each of the MSAs and state-level aggregates of
rural areas represents a “local labor market”. Based on hospital-level sur-
veys conducted by CMS, the average hourly wage (AHW, which is simply
the total wage cost divided by total hours worked) of hospital workers can
be calculated for each local labor market. Each local labor market’s AHW
is then divided by the national AHW, becoming the operating wage index.
And hence, the operating wage index is the weighed price of hospital workers
at a local labor market compared to the national level, and it is applied to
the labor-related portion of the base rate for Medicare reimbursement. For
each Medicare discharge case, the base rate is then adjusted by the relative
cost of each MS-DRG (Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Group, which
groups patients with similar problems that are expected to consume similar
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amount of hospital resources), the length of stay, and other hospital-specific
adjustments (such as whether the hospital provides services to a dispropor-
tionate share of Medicaid patients or uncompensated care, whether it is a
teaching hospital, whether it is a sole community hospital, etc.), to calculate
the Medicare reimbursement to a hospital.13
The operating wage index is a good proxy for health insurance premium
for several reasons. First, Cutler (2003) notices that most of the variation
in health insurance premium cost originates from the changes in health care
cost. According to the estimation by the CMS, the “labor share”, namely
the local wage rates and fringe benefits and are captured in the operating
wage index, constitutes to roughly 68% of the base rate of Medicare reim-
bursements. Even though the non-labor share of the base rate (such as land
cost) may be significantly different from one geographic area to another, it
tends to remain relatively constant over time within a given market and
does not contribute to the changes in health care costs over time. Second,
although private insurance companies may not calculate the payment to hos-
pitals exactly the same as the Medicare does, the reimbursement made by
private insurance companies and the Medicare should be highly correlated
given that the health care services are provided by the same group of physi-
cians and nurses within a labor market. And hence, it is conceivable that
most of the changes in health insurance premiums, which reflect the changes
in health care costs over time, are driven by the changes in labor-related
costs at local labor markets.
Because the CMS wage index is only a price index with the national average
13For more information on how the operating wage index and other factors are used to
calculate the Medicare reimbursement to the hospital, see a brief report by the Medicare
Panel Advisory Commission (2010), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/
MedPAC_Payment_Basics_10_hospital.pdf
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hourly wage normalized to 1 in each year, the wage index by itself does
not capture the growth of wages in hospital sectors over time. The Federal
Register keeps the records of nominal average hourly wages in each local area
that are used to calculate the index. I hence obtain the nominal wages from
the Federal Register, deflate them based on the Social Security National
Average Index14 to reflect the wage in hospital sectors and hence price of
health care relative to wage income. Doing so enables the series of this
“deflated” wage index to include variations of health care cost both across
geographic areas and over time. Besides, one of the necessary conditions for
the CMS wage index to be a good proxy for health premium cost is that it
has to grow faster than the wages of all workers, since the health insurance
premium outgrows wage by almost 10% each year during the time that my
study covers. Although the CMS wage index does not grow as fast as the
health insurance premium itself does, a simple t-test suggests that CMS
wage index on average outgrows the overall wages for all workers15, with a
t-statistic of 28.14.
Matching the wage index to the CPS is, however, not straightforward for
two reasons. First, due to the nature how the wage index is constructed,
there is some lagged time between when wage survey is conducted and when
the wage index made from that specific survey becomes in effect for reim-
bursement calculation. Typically the lag is four years, that is, wage index in
year t is based on wage surveyed in year t − 4. Second, the CPS in year t
reports the health insurance in year t− 1, and health insurance in year t− 1
depends on the health insurance premium in year t−1, which in turn depends
on health care cost in year t− 2 or even earlier years. This poses a challenge
14Available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html
15Wage information is obtained through the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups and clus-
tered at MSA level.
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to using wage index as a proxy for health insurance premium– there is not
necessary a “correct” match of the wage index to the CPS. Nevertheless, in
this study I match the wage index in year t + 2 (which is based on wage
surveys in year t − 2) to the CPS in year t (which reflects the decision to
enroll in health insurance in year t− 1 as a response to the health insurance
premium in year t − 1, which is based on health care cost in year t − 2).
And hence, the CMS wage index in 1997 is matched to the February CPS in
1995, the wage index in 1999 is matched to the CPS in 1997, etc. For each
of these wage index and CPS pairs, wage index is then matched to the CPS
individuals by geographic area (MSA for urban areas and state-aggregates
for rural areas).
3.3.3 Medical Care Component of the Consumer Price Index
The CPI has eight major categories: food and beverages, housing, apparel,
transportation, medical care, recreation, education and communication, and
other goods and services. The ratio of its medical care component divided by
the components excluding medical care hence represents the relative price of
health care commodities and services compared to other consumptions. This
provides an alternative assess of health insurance premium cost to the CMS
wage index.
The medical care component of the CPI is further split into two categories:
medical care commodities (MCC, including medical drugs and medical equip-
ment supplies) and medical care services (MCS, including professional ser-
vices, hospital and related services, and health insurance). Although the
health insurance premium cost accounts for almost 50% of the medical care
CPI,16 the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not collect information on health
16For more technical details on how the medical care CPI is constructed, including the
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insurance premium directly. Instead, the health insurance cost is imputed
indirectly based on the changes in the prices of medical care items covered by
insurance policies and the changes of administrative costs. The first item re-
flects the insurer’s reimbursements/payments for medical treatments, and the
second item is calculated using the changes in insurance companies’ retained
earnings ratios. The weights furthermore exclude employer-paid health insur-
ance cost as well as tax-funded health insurance programs such as Medicaid
and Medicare Part A in order to more precisely reflect out-of-pocket expen-
ditures for health care services. Unfortunately, the CPI does not release a
separate index for health insurance premiums, and even the series of MCC
and MCS components are not separately released until very recent years.
This limitation forces me to use the medical care CPI as a whole rather than
its subcomponent that is arguably more correlated with the health insurance
premiums.
To incorporate the medical care CPI in my analyses, I first calculate the
ratio of medical care CPI to the CPI excluding the medical care component.
This gives the relative price of medical care consumptions and services to
other goods. Between 1984 and 2010, the relative price of medical care con-
sumptions and services increased significantly, with increments ranging from
55% (Kansas City) to 143% (Boston). The medical care CPI series is only
available in 27 metropolitans, but the BLS did not collect such information
from a few of them until late 1990s. To account for the difference in the base
year across metropolitans, the relative price of medical care to non-medical
care goods is re-normalized to 1 for each metropolitan in 2005. This series
is then merged to the February CPS, and the 1995 CPS has to be dropped
definitions of refined items in each category and their relative weights, see “Measuring
Price Change for Medical Care in the CPI” on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifact4.htm
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completely because MSA information is not available due to confidentiality
concerns.17 Roughly one-third of the CPS sample in the remaining waves
lives in the metropolitans covered by the CPI series. Similar to the timing
issue in the CMS wage indices, the relative price in year t − 2 is merged to
the CPS in year t to reflect the causal relationship between health care cost
and health insurance coverage. As a robustness test, I also match the moving
average of the relative price in years t−4, t−3, t−2 with year t of the CPS.
Using the relative price in one year or the three-year moving average yields
similar estimates.
3.3.4 The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
The insurance/employer component of the MEPS (MEPS-IC) collects from
employers the information regarding the types of employer-sponsored health
insurance plans, the mean amount of premium per enrolled employee, and the
mean amount of employee contribution to the total premium. The sample
is drawn at establishment level from the U.S. Census Bureaus Business Reg-
ister (for private sector establishments) or from the Census of Governments
(for state and local government units). Overall, around 35,000 to 40,000
establishments and government units are surveyed each year.
The MEPS-IC started in 1996. Due to the budget limitation in the first
few years, it only representatively sampled establishments from the 30 most
populous states in the U.S. plus 10 of the 20 less populous states;18 hence,
17The 1995 CPS provides an unique identifier for the state of residence, but its publicly
available release does not provide information regarding which MSA an interview resides
in due to confidentiality concerns. Instead it only provides a variable indicating whether
an interviewee resides in a MSA. Since some states have more than one metropolitan, I am
not able to uniquely identify the metropolitan that a person lives in based on the publicly
available information in the 1995 CPS.
18Establishments from the remaining states were still sampled, but the sample size was
not enough to generate reliable estimates.
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state-level estimates were only available for 40 states each year in the MEPS-
IC until 2002. Starting from 2003, the MEPS-IC improved the sample size
and design so that it now covers all 50 states plus the District of Columbia
and can even produce reliable descriptive statistics of premium information
at the MSA level.
Although the MEPS-IC data are not available without an approval from
the U.S. Census Research Data Center, the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ) releases the mean health insurance premium at state
level by type of plans and the size of employer based on MEPS-IC each
year. I match the state-level total premium in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2004
to the corresponding waves of the CPS19 to perform the final assessment of
the relationship between health insurance premium and employer-sponsored
health insurance coverage. The AHRQ releases premium information for
three types of plans: single coverage, employee-plus-one, and family cover-
age. Since insurance premium costs for different types of plans are highly
correlated and my identification strategy is based on the variation of health
insurance premium over time as well as across state rather than the actual
amount of premium for each CPS individual, I only rely on the family cov-
erage premium as the proxy for the health insurance premium cost. For the
states that the state-level estimate of premium is not available due to sample
size constraints in earlier waves of the MEPS20, the AHRQ would lump them
together and release the mean premium in “all state not separately listed”.
My estimates reported in the following section are not sensitive to the in-
19This corresponds to 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2005 waves of the February CPS, which
respectively collect health insurance coverage information in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2004.
The 1995 wave of the CPS is dropped because a corresponding wave of MEPS is not
available.
20States that do not have state-level premium data in all four waves are Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, New Hampshire,
Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, plus the District of Columbia.
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clusion of these higher-level aggregates. Finally, the premium information
by the AHRQ only includes private sector establishments. Excluding public
employees from my CPS data do not lead to significantly different results,
presumably due to the high correlation of premiums in private and public
sectors.
3.4 Result
I present how the overall health insurance coverage (regardless of sources),
own employer-sponsored health coverage, and their respective racial gaps
in each wave of the February CPS before I decompose the own employer-
sponsored coverage into employer offering, employee eligibility, and employee
take-up. These are followed by the main results of this study: how the racial
gap can be explained by individual and job characteristics and how the racial
gap is affected by the recent increase in health insurance premium cost.
3.4.1 Overall Health Insurance Coverage
Table 3.2 shows the proportion of the sample that has health insurance cov-
erage between 1995 and 2005 based on the February CPS. The proportion
of the sample covered by health insurance (regardless of the source of cov-
erage) increased from 85.4% in the 1995 CPS to 86.5% in 2001 but then
decreased to 83.3% in 2005.21 A breakdown by race shows the same pattern
that the coverage increased between 1995 and 2001 waves of the CPS but
decreased in the 2005 wave. In all years, non-Hispanic white workers are
21Note that the CPS actually asks about health insurance coverage in the previous year.
And hence, the 1995 CPS reflects the health insurance coverage in 1994, the 1997 CPS
reflects the coverage in 1996, etc. To avoid confusions, I still label each wave by the year
that the data were collected, although the data reflect the health insurance coverage status
a year earlier.
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more likely to have coverage than non-Hispanic black workers, who in turn
are more likely to be covered than Hispanic workers. The next two columns
in table 3.2 show the black-white and Hispanic-white coverage gaps. The
back-white and the Hispanic-white gaps move in the same direction except
in 2005, when the black-white gap shrank but the Hispanic-white gap en-
larged. Besides, the gaps are somewhat consistent (not statistically different
over time) but again except in 2005. The last two columns in table 3.2
shows the “regression-adjusted” difference, obtained through the coefficients
on dummies of blacks and Hispanics from separate OLS regressions for each
year that have a dummy of coverage on the left-hand side and control for age
(entered as 45 age dummy variables rather than a single linear term since
the relationship between health insurance coverage and age is not likely to
be linear), gender, marital status (single, married, widowed, divorced, and
separated), the highest level of education (high school dropout, high school,
some college, and college degree or higher), state of residence (50 dummy
variables for 50 states plus the District of Columbia), industry and occupa-
tion (detailed CPS industry and occupation category dummy variables), job
types (full-time versus part-time), and whether the employee has held the
job for more than 1 year. The adjust coverage gaps are only 40% to 50%
as large as the raw gap yet are statistically significant, suggesting that some
50% to 60% variation in the racial coverage gap can be explained away by
individual characteristics and job types. This is consistent with the wage and
health insurance coverage gap literature (Altonji and Blank 1999, Crow et
al. 2002, Monheit and Vistnes 2000, Reschovsky et al. 2007) that individual
and job characteristics explain a non-trivial portion of male black-white wage
or insurance coverage gaps.
The proportion of the sample that is covered by own employer-sponsored
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health insurance plans is shown in table 3.3. Numbers are, albeit slightly
higher, close to those in a recent EBRI report that uses a similar source of
data (Fronstin 2007). Since information about health insurance coverage is
only available for employed people in the February CPS, a comparison of
numbers in table 3.3 and the time trends in figure 3.1 (which is based on the
March CPS using all adults) suggest that simply conditioning on employ-
ment significantly increases the rate of employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage for all races and decreases the racial coverage gap to some extent.
Similar to table 3.2, the adjusted racial gaps are much smaller than the raw
gaps but remain at least marginally significant except the black-white gap in
2005. Furthermore, the black-white gap seems to be more volatile than the
Hispanic-white gap, as the Hispanic-white gaps across the five periods are
not significantly different from one another. The adjusted black-white gap
hovers between 45% to 75% of the raw gap (again, except for in 2005), but
the adjusted Hispanic-white gap stays at around 30% of the raw gap over
time.
To summarize, tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveal similar information. First, over-
all coverage went up from 1995 to 2001 and contracted between 2001 and
2005. Second, both black-white and Hispanic-white gaps are non-trivial,
even after individual and job characteristics are controlled for. The following
subsections further explore these observations. To begin with, I decompose
the employer-sponsored health insurance coverage into employer offering, em-
ployee eligibility, and employee take-up decisions. Such decomposition allows
me to estimate the racial gap in each stage and how each stage contributes
to the changes and racial gaps in coverage. I then use a simple variance
decomposition method to assess the main reasons that affects racial gaps in
employer-sponsored health insurance offering, eligibility, take-up, and cover-
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age. Finally, I answer the question how the racial gap in health insurance
coverage is affected by the changes in the cost of health insurance premium.
3.4.2 Components of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Coverage
In this section, I decompose employer-sponsored health insurance coverage
into three components: offering, eligibility, and take-up. Based on equation
(3.1), tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the employer offering, employee eligibility,
and take-up rates of employer-sponsored health insurance plans as well as
racial gaps using the same format as tables 3.2 and 3.3. The eligibility rate
is conditional on offering, and the take-up rate is conditional on being eligible.
Similar to the patterns of health insurance coverage regardless of sources
and the coverage of own employer-sponsored health insurance, table 3.4 shows
the offering rate increased from 1995 to 2001 but decreased in 2005. Both
black-white and Hispanic-white gaps in offering rate are of similar magnitudes
to the coverage gaps in table 3.3. The regression-adjusted black-white offering
gap is only statistically significant for three out of five waves and is also highly
volatile, again similar to the pattern in table 3.3. The adjusted Hispanic-
white offering gap, on the other hand, is significant in all waves and remains
at a relatively consistent level. The similar patterns of racial gaps in table
3.3 and 3.4 suggest that employer offering may be an important determinant
in the racial gaps in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.
Conditional on offering, the eligibility also increased from 1995 to 2001
but contracted in 2005 (Table 3.5). However, there is basically no difference
among white, black, and Hispanic workers in terms of eligibility for employer-
sponsored health insurance, as the adjusted racial gaps stay around zero in
spite of some fluctuations. Conditional on being eligible, take-up rates follow
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a decreasing trend for whites and Hispanics but less so for blacks (Table 3.6).
The regression adjusted difference suggests that, except for the whites and
blacks in 1995, employees of all racial groups are equally likely to take up the
health insurance plan if they are eligible. Given that there is no significant
racial gaps in employee eligibility and take-up decisions, results in tables 3.5
and 3.6 affirm that most of the coverage gap is caused by the difference in
employer-offering.
Next, I decompose the changes in offering, eligibility, and take up of
employer-sponsored health insurance over time based on equation (3.3). Given
that most of the trends (including coverage, offering, and eligibility) increased
between 1995 and 2001 but contracted between 2001 and 2005, I perform the
decomposition in two parts (1995-2001 and 2001-2005) in order to assess the
factors contributing to the rise and decline of employment-sponsored health
insurance. The results are in table 3.7. Panels A and C in table 3.7 are the
raw changes in coverage, offering, eligibility, and take-up over time according
to numbers in tables 3.3 through 3.6. Panels B and D are the results based
on the decompositions implied by equation (3.3), that is, the changes in cov-
erage is decomposed to the contributions of changes in offering, eligibility,
and take-up. For example, the first column in panel B implies that out of 1.3
percentage points increase in coverage for whites between 1995 and 2001, 1.7
percentage points is contributed by the increase in offering, 1.0 percentage
point is contributed by the increase in eligibility, while changes in take-up
actually contributes to 1.2 percentage points decrease in coverage.22
22Note that the contributions of employer-offering, employee eligibility and employee
take up may not necessarily add up to the total change in coverage. This is because the
full expansion of equation (3.3) also includes “interaction” terms (using the terminology
in Farber and Levy (2000)) among changes in offering, eligibility and take-up. These
“interaction” terms are ∆O∆E, ∆E∆T , ∆O∆T , and ∆O∆E∆T in the full expansion of
equation (3.3).
119
A few patterns emerge from panels B and D of table 3.7. The change in
employer offering is the most important contribution to the change in cov-
erage for whites and Hispanics between 1995 and 2005. The huge decrease
in offering for the Hispanics in 2001-2005 may be the reason why the (un-
adjusted) Hispanic-white coverage gap increased during that period of time,
as shown in figure 3.1 and tables 3.2 and 3.3. On the other hand, change in
take-up rates is the most important determinant of change in coverage for
blacks. Because whites plus Hispanics account for around 90% of the sample,
the last column that includes the pooled sample has a result very similar to
that of whites and Hispanics.
3.4.3 Changes of Racial Gaps in Offering, Eligibility, and
Take-up over Time
Table 3.7 shows how the racial differences in employer offering, eligibility,
and take up affect respective coverage over time. Consistent with an earlier
study (Cooper and Schone 1997), the take-up ratio has been decreasing since
the mid-1990s. It is also clear that rather than take-up rates, it is changes
in employer offering that determines whether the overall coverage trends
upwards or downwards. However, the numbers in table 3.7 are not adjusted
by the difference in individual and job characteristics, and neither do they
illustrate a clear picture of the racial gap in each of the components.
Equation (3.2) provides a channel to further explore the racial gap in cov-
erage over time. Specifically, including the interaction terms between race
and time in the regression of coverage (offering, eligibility, etc.) equation
enables the identification of racial gaps in employer offering, eligibility, take-
up, and their aggregated effect on overall coverage over time. However, due
to the sequential nature of the components leading to employer-sponsored
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health insurance coverage, I model offering, eligibility, and take-up decisions
in a single sequential Logit model instead of separate OLS regressions. Ta-
ble 3.8 shows the coefficients on the interaction terms between the dummy
variable indicating the minority group and the dummy variable indicating
the later year in the given period; hence a significant coefficient suggests the
racial (black-white or Hispanic-white) gap (in offering, eligibility, or take-up)
changes over time. All numbers in panel A are from the same sequential
Logit regression and all numbers in panel B from another. For example, the
first number in panel A of table 3.8 suggests the black-white gap in employer
offering increased by 5.1% between 1995 and 2001, as a coefficient of -0.056
represents a log-odds ratio of 0.949. Interestingly, none of the coefficients
on the Hispanic-white gap is significant, suggesting a stable Hispanic-white
gap in offering, eligibility, and take-up over time. For the black-white gap,
both of the coefficients on offering are significant, and the 1995-2001 coeffi-
cient on take-up is also significant. These are consistent with the numbers in
table 3.7 that employer offering for blacks follows a different trend from em-
ployer offering to whites and Hispanics. Overall, the black-white gap is less
stable than the Hispanic-white gap in employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage.
3.4.4 Decomposition of Coverage and Offering
In this subsection, I use the non-linear decomposition method for Logit
regressions proposed in Fairlie (2005) to further explore the dynamics of
employer-sponsored health insurance across racial groups and over time.
Since there are no significant racial gaps in eligibility conditional on offering
and take-up conditional on eligibility, only coverage and offering are ad-
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dressed in this subsection.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the decomposition of cross-sectional racial gaps
in coverage and eligibility, respectively. The first three rows in panel A of
table 3.9 are the row coverage rates for whites, blacks, and the raw racial
gap in each year. These are followed by a detailed decomposition using the
same set of control variables used to calculate the adjusted racial gaps in
tables 3.2 through 3.6. More specifically, these variables are split into six
categories: age (45 age dummy variables), marital status (single, married,
widowed, divorced, and separated), education (high school dropout, high
school graduate, some college, and college graduate or higher), state of resi-
dence (50 dummy variables for 50 states plus the District of Columbia), job
types (whether the job is full-time and whether job tenure is more than one
year), and industry and occupation (dummy variables for detailed CPS in-
dustry and occupation categories). And hence, for example, age contributes
to 0.006 (with a standard error of 0.001) of the 0.060 black-white coverage
gap (10.13%) in the year of 1995. All the control variables combined con-
tributes to 0.022 of the 0.060 raw gap (36.67%). In other words, the racial
gap would decrease by 0.022 (36.67%) had the blacks have the same distri-
butions of those control variables as the white sub-population. The rest of
panel A in table 3.9 shows the decomposition of black-white coverage gap
over time. The numbers suggest a non-trivial portion of the black-white cov-
erage gap can be explained by the discrepancy of individual characteristics
between blacks and whites, especially education and job type.
Panel B in table 3.9 shows the decomposition of the Hispanic-white cov-
erage gap. Overall, the discrepancy in individual characteristics explains a
slightly higher proportion of the Hispanic-white coverage gap than black-
white coverage gap. Unlike in panel A, it is the distribution of industry and
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occupation rather than types of job that explains a bigger portion of the
gap. Discrepancy in education is also an important factor that contributes
to the Hispanic-white coverage gap, with an effect size three to four times
larger than its effect on the black-white gap.23 The results in both panels
of table 3.9 suggest the importance of education and general human capital,
which is also related to the finding that industry, occupation, or types of job
are important reasons for the sizable black-white and Hispanic-white cover-
age gaps. Overall, education, job type, industry and occupation consistently
contribute to around 90% of the compositional effect of the racial coverage
gap (the difference in coverage attributed to discrepancies in the distributions
of independent variables) in all years.
Similar to table 3.9, the decomposition of employer offering is shown in ta-
ble 3.10. The overall pattern is similar to the decomposition of coverage gap
that the discrepancy in education, job type, industry and occupation explains
a significant part of the offering gap and contributes to the major portion
of the compositional effect. Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to work in
the industry, occupation, and job type that come with employer-sponsored
health insurance offering– presumably jobs with lower wages and less gener-
ous employee benefits. Table 3.7 already shows that it is employer offering
that affects the trend in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Ta-
bles 3.9 and 3.10 confirm this and further suggest that the discrepancy in
employer offering among racial groups differs in the level of education and
the jobs that people have, emphasizing the role of education (general human
capital), job types, industry, and occupation (job characteristics and quality)
in determining health insurance offering and hence coverage.
23In percentage terms, the effect size of education is slightly smaller in the Hispanic-
white gap than in the black-white gap, mostly because the Hispanic-white gap is larger.
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Among the sets of the independent variables used to produce tables 3.9
and 3.10, education probably is the most important. Education is highly
correlated with earnings and can also be seen as a mediating variable that
influences a person’s job type, industry, and occupation. Earnings are di-
rectly related to whether an employee can afford health insurance coverage,
and job type, industry, and occupation all are correlated with the likelihood
of health insurance offering. And hence, an alternative specification is to only
include demographics information and education to estimate the total “di-
rect” effect of education on the racial gap in health insurance coverage. The
results are not reported here to save the space, but the explanatory power of
education in tables 3.9 and 3.10 are generally only 50% to 60% as large as
the numbers in respective alternative specifications not reported here. This
means 40% to 50% of the direct effect of education is absorbed through job
types, industry, and occupation. And hence, the importance of education
and hence general human capital is to some extent understated when job
characteristics are included in the decomposition models. Additionally, as
it has been shown in some recently studies that focus on non-pecuniary re-
turns to education (McMahon 2009, Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2009), ignoring
health insurance benefit may understate the returns to education.
I next decompose the changes in coverage and offering over time for the
same racial group. Although the within-race coverage change does not by
itself explain the racial gap, this set of analysis helps to pin down whether
there are factors other than individual and characteristics that affect the
racial gap in health insurance coverage and offering. If the discrepancies in
individual and job characteristics explain the within-race change in cover-
age/offering over time as well as they explain the cross-sectional racial gaps,
I can more confidently conclude that discrepancies individual and job char-
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acteristics are the main reason that contributes to the difference of health
insurance coverage across the population. Also, this would imply the racial
gap in health insurance coverage is mainly mediated by the gap in individ-
ual and job characteristics, suggesting that policies that intend to improve
the health insurance coverage of the minorities should focus more on these
mediating factors. However, if the individual and job characteristics do not
explain the within-race coverage variation as well as between-race variation,
it means either these characteristics have interactions with races or there are
some other factors not captured in the CPS data that affect the racial cov-
erage gap, suggesting more extensive firm-level studies on the provision of
health insurance benefits or compensation practices in general. The results
of longitudinal, same-race decompositions are shown in table 3.11.
There are two reasons why the time trend of coverage and offering should
be split in 2001. First, as tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, both the overall (regard-
less of sources) and employer-sponsored health insurance coverage increased
between 1995 and 2001 but decreased between 2001 and 2005. And hence,
rather than decomposing the changes over the 10-year span, decomposing
the increase (1995-2001) and decrease (2001-2005) allows me to capture the
reasons for both the increase and the decrease, especially if they are driven
by different forces. Second, due to the changes in the way industry and oc-
cupation are coded in the CPS in the early 2000s as well as the lack of the
one-to-one match between different coding mechanisms, there is no natural
way to appropriately control for detail industries and occupations if the data
span across the two coding schemes. This makes the split inevitable in order
to control for detail industry and occupation categories.
The interpretation of the results in table 3.11, however, is less straight-
forward than tables 3.2 and 3.3. To begin with, many factors in table 3.11
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have “negative” explanatory power, where the compositional effect goes in a
direction opposite to the observed change in coverage or offering over time.
For example, the result in the first column of panel A suggests the cover-
age would have decreased by 1.4% rather than increasing by 1.2% had the
white people had the same distributions of industry and occupation in 1995
and 2001, which is basically -116.40% of the observed change. The decom-
positions for black people seem to be more vulnerable to this, as not only
individual factors but also the collective effects of all factors have contribu-
tions of negative numbers, absolute values larger than 100%, or both. These
numbers make the results hard to interpret. Fairlie and London (2009a) have
the same problem in their results as well and conclude that it is the com-
mon problem when the observed change is small and the two groups being
compared are largely homogeneous.
Regardless of the challenge to interpret some of the numbers, a common
theme of the results in table 3.11 is that the compositional effect is a less
significant driving force of the change in health insurance coverage and of-
fering over time for the same racial group, given the compositional effects
are smaller in table 3.11 than in tables 3.9 and 3.10 when the racial gaps are
decomposed. More importantly, note that the coefficients for the same factor
and racial group tend to have the same sign in panels A and B. For instance,
the coverage for whites would have increased by 0.002 in 2001 and 0.003 in
2005, respectively, if the age distribution had remained the same. However,
since the coverage of the white people increased in 1995-2001 but decreased
in 2001-2005, the effects of age on actual changes in coverage are oppositely
signed in both periods. Since the composition (including demography and
job characteristics) for the same racial group is not likely to change signifi-
cantly within 10 years, the fact that the coefficients tend to have the same
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sign in panels A and B indicates that the compositional effect may not be
the main reason behind the rise and fall of health insurance coverage and of-
fering between 1995 and 2005. In the following, I switch the focus to how the
rapid increase in health insurance premium cost affects of health insurance
coverage over time.
3.4.5 The Effect of Rising Health Insurance Premium Cost
As the previous subsection shows, individual and job characteristics explain
the increase in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage in late 1990s
fairly well but fail to account for the decline of coverage between 2001 and
2005. Table 3.7 also suggests that it is the decline of offering, rather than the
decline of take-up, that overturned the trend of employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage between 1995 and 2005. Namely, employer offering in-
creased in late 1990s but declined after 2001, and the trend of coverage
followed the same pattern despite that employee take-up has decreased since
1995. Not only did the decline in offering occur simultaneously with the de-
cline in coverage, it was also accompanied by a widening racial coverage gap,
especially the Hispanic-white one. All these observations combined suggest
that there are factors other than individual and job characteristics influenc-
ing employer offering in early 2000s, and minority groups may have been
more adversely impacted according to the widening racial gap.
One of the commonly accepted reasons that explain the change in health
insurance coverage in the past two decades is the rise in health insurance
premium cost (Blumberg et al. 2001, Chernew et al. 1997, Cutler 2003, Gru-
ber and Washington 2005, Hadley and Reschovsky 2002, Nichols et al. 2001).
Despite the mixed empirical evidence, economists tend to believe that em-
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ployees bear the full cost of health insurance premiums, and the mixed find-
ings are caused by endogeneity in the data rather than imperfect theory
(Blumberg 1999, Gruber 1994, Gruber 2000, Levy and Feldman 2002, Rosen
1986, Sheiner 1999).24 When the premium cost goes up, it is reflected in the
total compensation package either as a lower take-home pay or a slower wage
increase.
However, the earlier discussion suggests that the health insurance premium
can go up for two reasons. Provided that the benefit package unchanged, the
premium can go up if the “load”, including the administrative cost and the
profit of insurance companies, increases. On the other hand, the premium
can also go up with the level of expected benefit, which is especially the case
when the medical care cost raises. The former corresponds to a decrease in
quantity of demand for health insurance, but the later may lead to an increase
demand of health insurance if people are willing to pay more risk premium
to insure against unexpected high amount of medical care expenses. These
two effects combined make the sign of demand elasticity for health insurance
ambiguous. Although the theory would suggest a downward sloping demand
curve, this only applies to the “load” part of the premium. And hence,
in addition to the challenge that premium information is seldom available
in a nationally representative data, it is also important to find appropriate
proxies for different components (expected benefit versus the load) of the
health insurance premium.
In this study, I use three different proxies for health premium cost: the
CMS wage index, the medical care component of the CPI, and the state-level
24Another reason why the wage-health insurance trade-off is hard to observe is the
firm’s limited ability to discriminate wages on the basis of the value of health insurance
and compensate employees on a person-to-person basis depending on individual decision
to enroll in health insurance plans (Cutler 2003, Gruber 1994, Gruber and Madrian 2004,
Sheiner 1999).
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health insurance premium from MEPS-IC. Cutler (2003) argues that most of
the variation in health premium is driven by the changes in health care cost,
and including state dummy variables in the regression equation makes the
CMS wage index an appropriate proxy for the expected benefit part of health
premium cost because these dummy variables capture geographical or cross
sectional variation of medical care sector wages not related to health care
(and hence health insurance premium) cost. The medical care CPI, on the
other hand, represents the overall cost in health care spending and proxies for
both the benefit and the load component of the premium cost. And hence, I
would expect the effect of changes in medical care CPI to be more negative
than changes in the CMS wage index on health insurance coverage based on
the theory articulated above. At last, the MEPS-IC premium information
at the state level is expected to capture the overall impact of the premium
increase on coverage since it is by its nature correlated with both components
of the premium.
Formally, the model that accounts for the health care cost is estimated as
equation (3.10) with standard errors clustered by both years of observation
and states. The term Premiumi,t is either the CMS wage index, the medical
care CPI, or the MEPS-IC state-level premium. The CMS wage index is
entered into the equation as the logarithm of real hourly wages of hospital
labor at MSA level in 2009 U.S. Dollars (adjusted based on the Social Security
National Average Wage Index). More specifically, since the CPS in year t
asks about the health insurance coverage in year t− 1, CMS wage index for
fiscal year t− 2 is matched to year t of the CPS as the coverage in year t− 1
is influenced by the premium in year t− 1 and hence the health care cost in
year t− 2. The medical care CPI enters the regression in the same time lag
as the CMS wage index, and the CPI is also normalized that one unit change
129
represents one percentage point change in the relative price of health care
expenses to other goods and services. The MEPS-IC premium in year t− 1,
which reflects the health insurance premium in that same year, is directly
matched to the year t of the CPS.
The estimation results of equation (3.10) are shown in table 3.12. All
the coefficients are estimates using linear probability models with standard
errors clustered by years of observation and states of residence. Columns
1 through 3 use the CMS wage index as the proxy for health insurance
premium, columns 4 through 6 use the medical care CPI, and columns 7 and
8 use the MEPS-IC state level premium. The left hand sides of all regressions
in table 3.12 are own employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, and I do
not differentiate offering, eligibility, and take-up in this table. Columns 1, 4,
and 7 are the baseline model, several interaction terms are added in columns
2, 5, and 8, and the set of state and year interactions is added in columns 3
and 6 to capture potential crowd-out effect. No state-year interactions are
used for the model where the MEPS-IC premium is on the right hand side
because this measure by itself only varies by state and year.
The numbers in columns 1 through 3 suggest that the increase in the CMS
wage index is not significantly associated with change in the level of coverage.
However, Hispanics are more likely to lose coverage with the increase in
the CMS wage index. Given that the coefficient on the Hispanic dummy
in specifications 2 is 0.239, the negative coefficient on the interaction term
between Hispanics and wage index means that Hispanics would be adversely
impacted by the high health care cost if the real hourly wage in hospital
sector increases by around 2.5% or higher.
Columns 4 through 6 use the medical care CPI as the proxy for health
insurance premium. The sample size becomes much smaller because the
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CPI is only available for those reside in 27 metropolitans (corresponding
to roughly one-third of the CPS sample). Also, the whole 1995 wave of
the February CPS is dropped as the matching between CPI and CPS is
not feasible due to the lack of detail geographical information in the 1995
wave of CPS. Because the CPI captures both the expected benefit and load
components of health insurance premium, the number in column 4 based on
this restricted sample is more negative than the number in column 1 and is
indeed significant.25 Adding interactions in columns 5 and 6 yields similar
results. Similar to columns 2 and 3, Hispanics are more likely to lose coverage
when medical care services become more expensive. More interestingly, the
effect of change in CPI on insurance coverage also differs by education level–
less educated people are more likely to lose insurance when price increases.
Columns 7 and 8 in table 3.12 show the results when MEPS-IC state-
level health insurance is used as the proxy for individual-level premium. The
sample size is smaller than that in columns 1 through 3 because MEPS did
not start until 1996, which causes the entire 1995 wave of the February CPS
to be dropped. The numbers suggest that rising health insurance premium
do not significantly decrease coverage, although the Hispanics are still more
adversely affected than non-Hispanics. Similar to columns 5 and 6, people
with more years of schooling are also less vulnerable to rising health insurance
premiums. The estimates are similar if I exclude the ten less populous states
which the MEPS under-sampled due to budget limitation in earlier waves
(only the mean health insurance premium in these ten states, rather than
the mean for each of the states, is available).
To summarize the results in table 3.12, the Hispanics are much more vul-
25Note that the coefficient still captures both positive and negative changes in demand
caused by health insurance premium hike, so the “pure” effect of the increase in loading
fee on coverage may be more negative.
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nerable to coverage loss when the premium goes up, regardless of the prox-
ies used. Besides, only the medical care CPI is negatively associated with
health insurance coverage; such result is consistent with the dichotomy of
expected benefit versus load, given the three proxies capture different com-
ponents of the health insurance premium. However, the estimates in table
3.12 have coverage as the dependent variable and do not further differentiate
each component of coverage. In order to account for the correlations of error
terms across each stage to determine employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage (employer offering, employee eligibility, and employee take-up), I
next estimate equation (3.11) using sequential logistic models to assess the
effects of rising health insurance premium on offering, eligibility, and take-up
simultaneously. As in table 3.12, the CMS wage index, the medical care CPI,
and the MEPS-IC state-level premium are separately used as proxies for the
health care cost. The results are in table 3.13.
Table 3.13 is composed of estimates from six regressions. There are two re-
gressions in each panel, one with no interactions (regression 1 in each panel)
and one with interactions of race and the proxy for premium, race and the
proxy, and the set of state-year interactions (regression 2). As in table 3.8, a
sequential logistic model estimates the effects of variables of interest simul-
taneously for employer offering, employee eligibility and employee take-up.
Panel A has the CMS wage index as the proxy for health insurance premium,
panel B has the medical care CPI, and panel C has the MEPS-IC state-level
health insurance premium.
The baseline estimates in regression 1 of panel A show that the change
in wage index does not significantly affect offering, eligibility, and take-up.
After all the interactions are entered, the estimates in regression 2 suggest
a marginal increase in employer offering when premium cost increases. The
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effects on eligibility and take-up are essentially zero. While numbers in ta-
ble 3.12 suggest the Hispanics are more likely to lose coverage when price
increases, regression 2 of panel A in table 3.13 shows that most of the effect
concentrates in employer offering. Indeed, both Hispanics and blacks are
more likely to have employers not offering health insurance.26 Although the
coefficient on the interaction of Hispanics and wage index is more negative
than the one on the interaction of blacks and wage index, these two coeffi-
cients are not statistically different. In regression 1 of panel B in table 3.13,
increase in medical care CPI leads to a lower level of employee take-up of
employer-sponsored health insurance plans. The coefficient of -0.016 is asso-
ciated with a log-odds ratio of 0.983, yielding an elasticity of -0.017. These
numbers also help to explain the pattern in figure 3.1 that racial gap grows
when overall coverage declines– the negative coefficients on the interaction
term of blacks/Hispanics and wage index/CPI in table 3.13 imply that mi-
norities suffer from both lower offering and lower take up while whites only
face lower take-up when price increases. Adding interactions to the regres-
sion 2 of panel B in table 3.13 does not change the results qualitatively, and
Hispanics still are more adversely affected in employer offering when price
increases. Finally, in panel C, an increase in state-level health insurance pre-
mium leads to lower employee take-up overall and lower offering to Hispanic
workers; the estimates in panel C are qualitatively similar to those in panel
26There are several possible explanations to this. For example, the group health insur-
ance premium tends to be higher for smaller firms, whose owners/employers arguably also
have the most elastic demands for health insurance (Hadley and Reschovsky 2002). If the
minorities are more likely to be hired by small firms, the observed coverage and offering
outcome will be consistent with what are presented here. Another possible explanation is
the Hispanics are less able to afford the health insurance premium when it goes up, and
an employer may hence drop the offering if most of her employees do not plan to enroll in
the insurance plan. And hence, employer’s decision to drop offering may simultaneously
reflect both employer’s and employees’ demand for health insurance. Unfortunately, the




To summarize, the dominant theory in health economics suggests there
are two components in health insurance premium: the expected benefit and
the load. An increase in the load decreases the quantity of demand for
health insurance coverage, but higher expected benefit accompanied by a
more skewed medical care expense distribution may increase the demand
for coverage. Although the premium information is seldom available in na-
tionally representative data (let alone separate identifications of these two
components of premium cost), I use the CPS wage index, medical care CPI,
and MEPS-IC state-level health insurance premium to proxy for the indi-
vidual premium. The MEPS-IC premium information directly captures the
overall relationship between premium increase and insurance coverage, while
the CMS wage index and medical care CPI proxy for separate components of
the health insurance premium. Because the medical care CPI is more corre-
lated with the loading fee than the CMS wage index, a more negative effect
on coverage is expected from the increase in CPI than in the wage index. The
estimates in tables 3.12 and 3.13 are largely consistent with the prediction.
Furthermore, the effect of the wage index concentrates on employer offering,
and the medical care CPI mostly affects employee take-up of insurance plans.
Minorities, especially the Hispanics, are adversely affected due to lower rate
of employer offering when insurance premium cost increases.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Since the end of the World War II, employer-sponsored health insurance
plans have become the major source of private health insurance coverage for
the American people. Even with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid
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in 1965 and the recent expansions of public health insurance programs to
cover low-income pregnant women and children, more than 50% of the U.S.
population still obtain health insurance coverage through the their own or
their immediate family member’s employment. Nevertheless, just like the
racial wage gap, there is a persistent health insurance coverage gap between
the whites and the minorities, and the gap seems to have broadened slightly
as the number of uninsured people went up in the past decade.
This study examines how the racial gap in employer-sponsored health in-
surance coverage changed between 1995 and 2005. Using the Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement to the Current Popula-
tion Survey, which allows me to further decompose the employer-sponsored
health insurance coverage into employer offering, employee eligibility, and
employee take-up of the plan, I estimate how the trend and the racial gap
in each component of the coverage changed during the 10-year span. Based
on the variance decomposition method proposed in Fairlie (2005), I further
assess how much of the change in the time trend and the racial gap coverage
can be attributed to the difference of individual and job characteristics over
time or across racial groups. Finally, the impact of rising health insurance
premium cost is also addressed.
Major findings in this study include: (1) The racial gap in employer-
sponsored health insurance coverage concentrates mostly on the gap in em-
ployer offering; (2) Around half of the racial gap in coverage and offering can
be explained away by the racial discrepancies in individual and job charac-
teristics; and (3) Depending on the proxy used, rising health insurance cost
has no or small negative employer-sponsored health insurance coverage for
employed males at age 18-64, but the Hispanics are especially hit with lower
employer offering when price increases.
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Despite the findings above, the scope of this study is limited by the data
available in the Current Population Survey. Granted, there is no single source
of data that is ideal for this study, and some trade-offs have to be made. For
example, it is plausible that the health insurance coverage is correlated with
wages, which in turn is correlated with an individual’s labor market expe-
rience, so it would be good to have information on wages and labor market
experiences. Nevertheless, although the March CPS covers a longer span of
time and has more detailed information on wages and labor market expe-
riences, it does not allow the decomposition of employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage into offering, eligibility, and take-up. Also, one can ar-
gue that the CPS asks about the health insurance coverage in the previous
year and hence may be contaminated with retrospective errors (Short 2004),
so data that ask about the current coverage such as the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) or Health Retirement Study (HRS) may
be more suitable. However, SIPP is not nationally representative (10 states
are excluded from the survey), and the HRS simply does not have people
younger than 50 years old. At last, health insurance coverage is more com-
plicated than a dichotomy of insured versus uninsured, as health insurance
plans differ in generosity and the level of contribution. Such information is
not available in the CPS. The Medicare Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
does provide such information after its household and insurance components
are matched, but not only does the match lead to a sample that is not nation-
ally representative27, it also has a smaller sample size and covers a shorter
span of time. Consequently, albeit far from being perfect, the February CPS
does seem to be one of the reasonable choices to initiate the study on racial
27The household and insurance components have different sample designs. When both
have non-random attrition problems (namely non-responding), there is no natural way to
construct the sample weight for those who can be matched across the two components.
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gap in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and set up for further
research.
Several implications emerge from these results. First, although the anec-
dotal evidences suggest that high premium cost causes working people to
drop health insurance and become uninsured, it is actually employer offering
decisions that drive the trend in employer-sponsored health insurance cov-
erage. And hence, in addition to making health insurance more affordable,
policies intended to increase coverage should address employer offering as
well. Second, while the black-white wage gap often stays at around 10%
even after detail individual and job characteristics are controlled (Altonji
and Blank 1999), the black-white gap in employer-sponsored health insur-
ance coverage is either very small or insignificant after the same set of vari-
ables are controlled for. Such parity in health insurance coverage implies
that focusing on the wage gap only would overstate the total compensation
gap between blacks and whites by roughly 10%.28 Finally, there is strong
evidence in table 3.13 that Hispanics tend to work for employers who drop
health insurance offering when the health insurance premium cost increases.
Such racial disparity not only creates potential fairness issue in the work-
place but also prompts a more thorough examination of firm compensation
practices to identify the exact cause.
The theme of this study is to shed light on factors that explain the racial
28For instance, in 2010, the median income for the U.S. household is $43,000 and the
median health insurance premium for family coverage is $12,000, yielding median compen-
sation of $55,000. Based on a simple back-of-envelop calculation, a black-white wage gap
of 10% and coverage gap of 6% (the largest adjusted black-white gap in table 3.3 divided
by the respective level of coverage for whites) means on average blacks get $4,300 less in
wages and $720 less in health benefits, leading to a compensation gap of only 9.1% even
though the magnitude of the gap becomes larger. Consequently, focusing on the wage gap
only overstates the total compensation gap by around 10%. With the recent trend that
the cost of health benefits outgrow wages by five times, the racial compensation gap will
shrink even faster and the racial wage gap is becoming a more misleading indicator of the
total compensation gap.
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gap in employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and to lay down the
foundation upon which more studies in human resource management and
employee benefits can build. The findings in this research provide insights
regarding how employer offering decisions dominate the trend in coverage, the
importance of education and job characteristics in explaining the racial gap,
and how the Hispanics become more disadvantaged when health insurance
premium cost increases. These results have implications on several litera-
tures, including health insurance, racial compensation gap, human resource
management, and employee benefits. Furthermore, these results also identify
the directions to explore the more fundamental causes of the racial gap and
raise some research issues that require different data sets with more informa-
tion on wages and health insurance premiums. Embedded in the implications
and further research questions are the call to a deeper understanding of the
mechanism how employers decide to offer health insurance coverage, how
employees decide to enroll in the plan, and how the mechanism differs across
races. Such understanding underscores the importance of organizational-level
studies regarding the employer’s decision to provide health insurance benefits
under the cost pressure, the design of health insurance plans, and the role of
health insurance in the compensation package.
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Figure 3.1: Trends of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage and
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Year
Overall EPHI Coverage Black−White Gap
Hispanic−White Gap
Obtained from the ’Health Insurance Historical Tables−− Original series’ on
the U.S. Census website, which is calculated based on March CPS.
1993−2009
EPHI Coverage and Racial Gap over Time
Table 3.1: Male Wage Earners Aged 20-64 in 1995-2005 Waves of the CPS
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement
Variables 1995 1997 1999 2001 2005
Age 38.07 38.54 39.05 39.19 39.97
White 0.772 0.754 0.742 0.732 0.697
Black 0.099 0.096 0.099 0.098 0.091
Hispanic 0.097 0.108 0.115 0.122 0.151
Other Races 0.030 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.059
Single 0.229 0.235 0.237 0.250 0.246
Married 0.669 0.659 0.652 0.646 0.648
Widowed 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
Divorced 0.078 0.081 0.087 0.080 0.083
Separated 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.016
HS Dropout 0.108 0.111 0.103 0.100 0.104
High School 0.323 0.323 0.312 0.301 0.309
Some College 0.287 0.284 0.285 0.288 0.278
College Degree 0.279 0.280 0.298 0.310 0.307
Full-Time Jobs 0.936 0.941 0.944 0.944 0.934
Sample Size 21,569 19,300 19,414 14,394 15,957
Descriptive statistics are weighted using the CPS weights.
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Table 3.2: Fractions of the Male Wage Earners Aged 20-64 Covered by Any Health Insurance, 1995-2005
CPS All White Black Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic
Year Workers Workers Workers Workers Difference Difference Adjusted Adjusted
1995 0.854 0.889 0.801 0.643 0.088 0.246 0.050 0.111
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
1997 0.857 0.894 0.821 0.653 0.073 0.241 0.041 0.121
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
1999 0.860 0.899 0.821 0.650 0.078 0.249 0.040 0.120
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
2001 0.865 0.907 0.820 0.656 0.087 0.251 0.040 0.124
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
2005 0.833 0.884 0.817 0.604 0.067 0.280 0.018 0.123
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Descriptive statistics are weighted using the CPS supplement sample weights.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The adjusted differences in the last 2 columns are coefficients on dummies of black and Hispanic from separate OLS regressions
for each year in which age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), marital status, education, type of job (full
time versus part time), job tenure (more than one year versus less than one year), state of residence, and detailed CPS industry and
occupation categories are controlled.
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Table 3.3: Fractions of the Male Wage Earners Aged 20-64 Covered by Own Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995-2005
CPS All White Black Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic
Year Workers Workers Workers Workers Difference Difference Adjusted Adjusted
1995 0.740 0.766 0.706 0.570 0.060 0.196 0.045 0.060
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
1997 0.743 0.770 0.740 0.579 0.030 0.191 0.017 0.060
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
1999 0.752 0.785 0.727 0.576 0.058 0.209 0.032 0.071
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
2001 0.749 0.779 0.725 0.581 0.054 0.198 0.025 0.084
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
2005 0.709 0.751 0.721 0.511 0.030 0.240 -0.004 0.078
(0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Descriptive statistics are weighted using the CPS supplement sample weights.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The adjusted differences in the last 2 columns are coefficients on dummies of black and Hispanic from separate OLS regressions
for each year in which age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), marital status, education, type of job (full
time versus part time), job tenure (more than one year versus less than one year), state of residence, and detailed CPS industry and
occupation categories are controlled.
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Table 3.4: Offering of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance to Employees Aged 20-64, 1995-2005
CPS All White Black Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic
Year Workers Workers Workers Workers Difference Difference Adjusted Adjusted
1995 0.864 0.889 0.861 0.681 0.028 0.208 0.014 0.095
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
1997 0.869 0.895 0.856 0.716 0.039 0.179 0.021 0.075
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
1999 0.876 0.903 0.873 0.718 0.030 0.185 0.010 0.074
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
2001 0.878 0.910 0.854 0.706 0.056 0.204 0.029 0.096
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
2005 0.849 0.891 0.869 0.640 0.022 0.251 -0.007 0.112
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Descriptive statistics are weighted using the CPS supplement sample weights.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The adjusted differences in the last 2 columns are coefficients on dummies of black and Hispanic from separate OLS regressions
for each year in which age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), marital status, education, type of job (full
time versus part time), job tenure (more than one year versus less than one year), state of residence, and detailed CPS industry and
occupation categories are controlled.
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Table 3.5: Eligibility of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Conditional on Offering, 1995-2005
CPS All White Black Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic
Year Workers Workers Workers Workers Difference Difference Adjusted Adjusted
1995 0.947 0.949 0.940 0.938 0.009 0.011 -0.005 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1997 0.949 0.950 0.957 0.937 -0.007 0.013 -0.014 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1999 0.952 0.958 0.931 0.925 0.027 0.033 0.013 0.012
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
2001 0.957 0.958 0.948 0.955 0.010 0.003 0.000 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
2005 0.954 0.956 0.944 0.949 0.012 0.007 0.005 -0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Descriptive statistics are weighted using the CPS supplement sample weights.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The adjusted differences in the last 2 columns are coefficients on dummies of black and Hispanic from separate OLS regressions
for each year in which age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), marital status, education, type of job (full
time versus part time), job tenure (more than one year versus less than one year), state of residence, and detailed CPS industry and
occupation categories are controlled.
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Table 3.6: Take-up of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Conditional on Eligibility, 1995-2005
CPS All White Black Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic White-Black White-Hispanic
Year Workers Workers Workers Workers Difference Difference Adjusted Adjusted
1995 0.903 0.908 0.872 0.891 0.036 0.017 0.039 -0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
1997 0.900 0.905 0.903 0.863 0.002 0.042 0.012 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
1999 0.901 0.907 0.894 0.867 0.013 0.040 0.011 0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
2001 0.891 0.894 0.894 0.862 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
2005 0.875 0.881 0.878 0.840 0.003 0.041 -0.006 -0.000
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Descriptive statistics are weighted using the CPS supplement sample weights.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The adjusted differences in the last 2 columns are coefficients on dummies of black and Hispanic from separate OLS regressions
for each year in which age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), marital status, education, type of job (full
time versus part time), job tenure (more than one year versus less than one year), state of residence, and detailed CPS industry and
occupation categories are controlled.
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Table 3.7: Decomposition of Changes in Employer-Sponsored Health Insur-
ance Coverage, 1995-2005
Panel A: Overall Changes, 1995-2001
White Black Hispanic All Races
Coverage 0.013 0.019 0.011 0.009
Offering 0.020 -0.007 0.025 0.014
Eligibility 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.010
Take-Up -0.014 0.022 -0.029 -0.012
Panel B: Decomposition of Overall Changes, 1995-2001
White Black Hispanic All Races
Coverage 0.013 0.019 0.011 0.009
Offering 0.017 -0.006 0.021 0.012
Eligibility 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.008
Take-Up -0.012 0.018 -0.019 -0.010
Panel C: Overall Changes, 2001-2005
White Black Hispanic All Races
Coverage -0.028 -0.003 -0.069 -0.040
Offering -0.018 0.015 -0.066 -0.029
Eligibility -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003
Take-Up -0.013 -0.016 -0.022 -0.016
Panel D: Decomposition of Overall Changes, 2001-2005
White Black Hispanic All Races
Coverage -0.028 -0.003 -0.069 -0.040
Offering -0.015 0.013 -0.054 -0.025
Eligibility -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
Take-Up -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013
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Table 3.8: Sequential Logit Estimates of Racial Gaps in Employer Offering,
Eligibility, and Take-up over Time
Panel A: 1995-2001
Offering Eligible Take-up
Black-White Gap -0.056 0.025 0.087
(0.021) (0.040) (0.028)




Black-White Gap 0.103 -0.080 -0.005
(0.038) (0.064) (0.042)
Hispanic-White Gap -0.008 0.008 0.002
(0.024) (0.059) (0.034)
Control variables are the same as in the last two columns
of tables 2-6.
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Table 3.9: Non-Linear Variance Decomposition of Racial Gaps in Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage
Panel A: White-Black Coverage Gap
1995 1997 1999 2001 2005
White Coverage Rate 0.766 0.770 0.785 0.779 0.751
Black Coverage Rate 0.706 0.740 0.727 0.725 0.721
White-Black Gap 0.060 0.030 0.058 0.054 0.030
Contributed by Racial Differences in:
Age 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
10.13% 14.33% 4.33% 12.63% 9.93%
Marital Status -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-4.98% -2.33% -2.42% -5.49% -9.58%
Education 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
14.11% 42.00% 21.83% 23.26% 39.72%
Residence 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
4.81% -4.00% -0.69% -10.07% 5.47%
Job Type 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.005
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
8.63% 16.67% 13.86% 24.54% 18.49%
Ind. and Occ. 0.002 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
3.98% 25.33% 4.15% -7.32% -0.68%
All Variables 0.022 0.027 0.018 0.020 0.018
36.67% 91.33% 32.40% 54.32% 64.04%
Panel B: White-Hispanic Coverage Gap
1995 1997 1999 2001 2005
White Coverage Rate 0.766 0.770 0.785 0.779 0.751
Hispanic Coverage Rate 0.570 0.579 0.576 0.581 0.511
White-Hispanic Gap 0.196 0.191 0.209 0.198 0.240
Contributed by Racial Differences in:
Age 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
7.31% 5.02% 4.92% 3.72% 4.66%
Marital Status 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
0.10% 0.31% 0.62% 1.00% 0.25%
Education 0.032 0.035 0.042 0.047 0.045
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
16.67% 18.53% 20.19% 23.75% 18.87%
Residence -0.000 0.014 0.011 -0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
-0.35% 7.64% 5.50% -0.85% 5.83%
Job Type 0.025 0.020 0.010 0.013 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
13.10% 10.89% 5.16% 6.84% 8.83%
Ind. and Occ. 0.059 0.062 0.054 0.043 0.069
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
30.43% 32.82% 26.22% 21.84% 29.08%
All Variables 0.132 0.144 0.131 0.112 0.149
67.42% 75.39% 62.77% 56.56% 62.45%
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Table 3.10: Non-Linear Variance Decomposition of Racial Gaps in Offering
of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Panel A: White-Black Offering Gap
1995 1997 1999 2001 2005
White Offering Rate 0.889 0.895 0.903 0.910 0.891
Black Offering Rate 0.861 0.856 0.873 0.854 0.869
White-Black Gap 0.028 0.039 0.030 0.056 0.022
Contributed by Racial Differences in:
Age 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
15.35% 4.33% 13.04% 5.75% 17.80%
Marital Status 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
9.28% 17.34% 9.36% 12.94% 21.46%
Education 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
25.00% 29.08% 27.42% 27.69% 30.59%
Residence 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
33.57% 10.91% 14.04% 13.35% 10.04%
Job Type 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
25.00% 13.77% 24.94% 14.25% 27.39%
Ind. and Occ. -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 -0.005 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
-34.28% -18.62% -46.15% -9.74% -10.95%
All Variables 0.021 0.022 0.013 0.035 0.021
75.00% 57.39% 43.47% 64.07% 97.26%
Panel B: White-Hispanic Offering Gap
1995 1997 1999 2001 2005
White Offering Rate 0.889 0.895 0.903 0.910 0.891
Hispanic Offering Rate 0.681 0.716 0.718 0.706 0.640
White-Hispanic Gap 0.208 0.179 0.185 0.204 0.251
Contributed by Racial Differences in:
Age 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2.55% 0.16% 2.69% 1.86% 2.34%
Marital Status 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
0.09% 0.50% 0.48% 0.88% 0.19%
Education 0.025 0.031 0.037 0.047 0.027
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
12.15% 17.48% 20.01% 23.28% 11.11%
Residence 0.012 0.020 0.009 0.020 0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
5.83% 11.67% 5.33% 10.24% 5.17%
Job Type 0.016 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
8.05% 6.59% 3.66% 4.85% 3.86%
Ind. and Occ. 0.049 0.051 0.040 0.040 0.071
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
23.68% 28.65% 21.68% 20.04% 28.27%
All Variables 0.109 0.116 0.099 0.124 0.128
52.40% 65.13% 53.88% 61.22% 51.05%
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Table 3.11: Non-Linear Variance Decomposition of Racial Gaps in Coverage
and Offering of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance over Time
Panel A: 1995-2001
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
Coverage Coverage Coverage Offering Offering Offering
1995 0.766 0.706 0.570 0.889 0.861 0.681
2001 0.779 0.725 0.581 0.910 0.854 0.706
Change over Time 0.012 0.019 0.011 0.021 -0.007 0.025
Contributed by Changes in:
Age 0.002 0.024 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.005
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005)
20.31% 127.29% 25.00% 15.94% -287.69% 21.13%
Marital Status 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
15.62% 23.28% -20.68% 4.83% 9.23% -11.78%
Education 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.006 -0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
37.50% 42.85% 19.82% 29.95% 10.76% 12.60%
Residence 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.007
(0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003)
9.37% 11.64% 88.79% 14.00% -29.23% 31.70%
Job Type 0.008 -0.013 0.007 0.004 -0.019 0.004
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
67.18% -72.48% 67.24% 23.67% 301.53% 19.10%
Ind. and Occ. -0.014 -0.008 -0.013 -0.015 0.049 -0.015
(0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
-116.40% -42.85% -118.96% -72.46% -766.15% -63.82%
All Variables 0.004 0.017 0.007 0.003 0.050 0.002
35.93% 91.00% 60.34% 17.39% -770.76% 10.16%
Panel B: 2001-2005
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic
Coverage Coverage Coverage Offering Offering Offering
2001 0.779 0.725 0.581 0.910 0.854 0.706
2005 0.751 0.721 0.511 0.891 0.869 0.640
Change over Time -0.028 -0.004 -0.070 -0.019 0.015 -0.066
Contributed by Changes in:
Age 0.003 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.007
(0.000) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.011) (0.004)
-13.24% -496.96% -7.00% -24.04% 131.16% -11.46%
Marital Status 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
-1.74% 15.15% 0.71% -2.18% 20.12% 0.30%
Education 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
-4.87% 48.48% 2.57% -4.91% 0.64% 1.83%
Residence 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.014 0.004
(0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003)
-2.43% -71.72% 0.04% -12.56% 92.20% -6.42%
Job Type 0.006 0.016 -0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002)
-22.99% -493.75% 0.11% -20.21% 11.03% -3.21%
Ind. and Occ. -0.017 -0.029 -0.018 -0.015 -0.013 -0.024
(0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.016) (0.006)
61.67% 881.54% 25.71% 85.79% -87.66% 36.85%
All Variables -0.004 0.003 -0.016 -0.003 0.025 -0.011
14.98% -90.75% 23.00% 20.21% 167.53% 18.04%
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Table 3.12: Impacts of Health Insurance Premium Cost on Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage and the Racial Gap, Linear Probability
Models
Linear Probability Models
CMS Wage Index Medical Care CPI MEPS Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CMS Wage Index 0.011 0.015 0.037
(0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Black X Index -0.010 -0.007
(0.027) (0.028)
Hispanic X Index -0.110** -0.104**
(0.032) (0.032)
No H.S. X Index -0.034 -0.032
(0.034) (0.034)
Some Coll. X Index 0.018 0.017
(0.019) (0.019)
College X Index 0.029 0.032
(0.021) (0.021)
Medical Care CPI -0.002** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black X CPI 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic X CPI -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
No H.S. X CPI -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Some Coll. X CPI 0.002* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
College X CPI 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
MEPS Premium -0.042 -0.069
(0.042) (0.044)
Black X Premium 0.039
(0.036)
Hispanic X Prem. -0.068**
(0.034)
No H.S. X Premium -0.050
(0.050)
Some Coll. X Prem. 0.061**
(0.024)
College X Premium 0.063**
(0.024)
Black -0.024** 0.007 -0.004 -0.030** -0.030 -0.027 -0.018** -0.380
(0.005) (0.081) (0.085) (0.011) (0.096) (0.096) (0.006) (0.331)
Hispanic -0.100** 0.239** 0.221** -0.105** 0.126 0.138 -0.102** 0.522
(0.006) (0.098) (0.100) (0.008) (0.129) (0.132) (0.007) (0.318)
State X Year N N Y N N Y N N
N 86,302 86,302 86,302 21,940 21,940 21,940 65,379 65,379
R2 0.1862 0.1865 0.1888 0.1892 0.1904 0.1938 0.1821 0.1824
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether one has own employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by states and years of observation.
Control variables include age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), race, marital status,
education, job characteristics (full time versus part time, more than one year versus less than one year, covered by
collective bargaining contracts versus not covered, and public versus private sector), state of residence, and year of
observation.
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Table 3.13: Impacts of Health Insurance Premium Cost on Employer-
Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage and the Racial Gap, Sequential Logit
Models
Panel A: CMS Wage Index
Regression 1: No Interactions Regression 2: With Interactions
Offering Eligible Take-up Offering Eligible Take-up
CMS Wage Index 0.168 -0.051 0.021 0.730* 0.038 0.025
(0.244) (0.184) (0.168) (0.374) (0.259) (0.250)
Black -0.092** -0.104 -0.179** 1.975** -1.759 -1.616
(0.044) (0.078) (0.049) (0.628) (1.175) (0.924)
Hispanic -0.728** -0.020 -0.096 1.914** 0.354 0.812
(0.045) (0.067) (0.053) (0.674) (1.212) (0.741)
Black X Wage Index -0.695** 0.545 0.478
(0.210) (0.385) (0.304)
Hispanic X Wage Index -0.867** -0.119 -0.296
(0.219) (0.388) (0.242)
Panel B: Medical Care CPI
Regression 1: No Interactions Regression 2: With Interactions
Offering Eligible Take-up Offering Eligible Take-up
Medical Care CPI -0.010 -0.021 -0.016** -0.012 -0.021 -0.021**
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009)
Black -0.220** -0.010 -0.172* 0.098 1.196 -0.709
(0.087) (0.144) (0.088) (0.925) (1.475) (0.868)
Hispanic -0.792** 0.152 -0.149* 1.084 -0.472 0.629
(0.066) (0.118) (0.083) (0.852) (1.859) (1.063)
Black X Medical Care CPI -0.003 -0.013 0.006
(0.010) (0.016) (0.009)
Hispanic X Medical Care CPI -0.021** 0.007 0.005
(0.009) (0.021) (0.012)
Panel C: MEPS Health Insurance Premium
Regression 1: No Interactions Regression 2: With Interactions
Offering Eligible Take-up Offering Eligible Take-up
MEPS Insurance Premium 0.083 0.248 -0.803** 0.205 0.232 -1.260**
(0.386) (0.668) (0.377) (0.405) (0.703) (0.394)
Black -0.110** -0.120 -0.091 -2.257 8.164 -4.502
(0.055) (0.089) (0.056) (2.536) (4.274) (2.627)
Hispanic -0.734** -0.003 -0.135** 6.424** -1.394 -3.307
(0.053) (0.076) (0.060) (2.010) (4.202) (3.132)
Black X MEPS Insurance Premium 0.235 -0.909 0.483
(0.278) (0.468) (0.287)
Hispanic X MEPS Insurance Premium -0.783** 0.152 0.347
(0.217) (0.463) (0.344)
The sample includes all male wage earners aged 20-64 who are not self-employed.
Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether one has own employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.
Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by states and years of observation.
Control variables include age (entered as 45 dummy variables rather than a linear term), race, marital status,
education, job characteristics (full time versus part time, more than one year versus less than one year, covered by
collective bargaining contracts versus not covered, and public versus private sector), state of residence, and year of
observation. State-year interactions are also included but only in panels A and B.
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